Power up! Robust Graph Convolutional Network via Graph Powering

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Abstract

Graph convolutional networks (GCNs) are powerful tools for graph-structured data. However, they have been recently shown to be vulnerable to topological attacks. To enhance adversarial robustness, we go beyond spectral graph theory to robust graph theory. By challenging the classical graph Laplacian, we propose a new convolution operator that is provably robust in the spectral domain and is incorporated in the GCN architecture to improve expressivity and interpretability. By extending the original graph to a sequence of graphs, we also propose a robust training paradigm that encourages transferability across graphs that span a range of spatial and spectral characteristics. The proposed approaches are demonstrated in extensive experiments to simultaneously improve performance in both benign and adversarial situations.

1 Introduction

Graph convolutional networks (GCNs) are powerful extensions of convolutional neural networks (CNN) to graphstructured data. Recently, GCNs and variants have been applied to a wide range of domains, achieving state-of-the-art performances in social networks (Kipf and Welling 2017), traffic prediction (Rahimi, Cohn, and Baldwin 2018), recommendation systems (Ying et al. 2018), applied chemistry and biology (Kearnes et al. 2016; Fout et al. 2017), and natural language processing (Atwood and Towsley 2016; Hamilton, Ying, and Leskovec 2017; Bastings et al. 2017; Marcheggiani and Titov 2017), just to name a few (Zhou et al. 2018; Wu et al. 2019).

GCNs belong to a family of *spectral methods* that deal with spectral representations of graphs (Zhou et al. 2018; Wu et al. 2019). A fundamental ingredient of GCNs is the graph convolution operation defined by the graph Laplacian in the Fourier domain:

$$\boldsymbol{g}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \star \boldsymbol{x} \coloneqq \hat{\boldsymbol{g}}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\boldsymbol{L})\boldsymbol{x},\tag{1}$$

where $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$ is the graph signal on the set of vertices \mathcal{V} and \hat{g}_{θ} is a spectral function applied to the graph Laplacian L := D - A (where D and A are the degree matrix and the adjacency matrix, respectively). Because this operation is computational intensive for large graphs and non-spatially localized (Bruna et al. 2014), early attempts relied on a parameterization with smooth coefficients (Henaff, Bruna, and LeCun 2015) or a truncated expansion in terms of of Chebyshev polynomials (Hammond, Vandergheynst, and Gribonval 2011). By further restricting the Chebyshev polynomial order by 2, the approach in (Kipf and Welling 2017) referred henceforth as the vanilla GCN pushed the state-of-the-art performance of semi-supervised learning. The network has the following layer-wise update rule:

$$\boldsymbol{H}^{(l+1)} \coloneqq \psi \left(\mathcal{A} \boldsymbol{H}^{(l)} \boldsymbol{W}^{(l)} \right), \qquad (2)$$

where $H^{(l)}$ is the *l*-th layer hidden state (with $H^{(1)} := X$ as nodal features), $W^{(l)}$ is the *l*-th layer weight matrix, ψ is the usual point-wise activation function, and A is the convolution operator chosen to be the degree weighted Laplacian with some slight modifications (Kipf and Welling 2017). Subsequent GCN variants have different architectures, but they all share the use of the Laplacian matrix as the convolution operator (Zhou et al. 2018; Wu et al. 2019).

1.1 Why not graph Laplacian?

Undoubtedly, the Laplacian operator (and its variants, e.g., normalized/powered Laplacian) plays a central role in spectral theory, and is a natural choice for a variety of spectral algorithms such as principal component analysis, clustering and linear embeddings (Chung and Graham 1997; Belkin and Niyogi 2002). *So what can be problematic?*

From a spatial perspective, GCNs with d layers cannot acquire nodal information beyond its d-distance neighbors; hence, it severely limits its scope of data fusion. Recent works (Lee et al. 2018; Abu-El-Haija et al. 2018, 2019; Wu et al. 2019) alleviated this issue by directly powering the graph Laplacian.

From a spectral perspective, one could demand better *spectral properties*, given that GCN is fundamentally a particular (yet effective) approximation of the spectral convolution (1). A key desirable property for generic spectral methods is known as "spectral separation," namely the spectrum should comprise a few dominant eigenvalues whose associated eigenvectors reveal the sought structure in the graph. A well-known prototype is the Ramanujan property, for which the second

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[†]This work was conducted during Heng Chang's visit to Professor Somayeh Sojoudi's group at UC Berkeley.

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


Figure 1: From the original graph, we generate a series of graphs, which are weighted by parameters of influence strengths, sparsified, and eventually combined to form a variable power graph.

leading eigenvalue of a *r*-regular graph is no larger than $2\sqrt{r-1}$, which is also enjoyed asymptotically by random *r*-regular graphs (Friedman 2004) and Erdős-Rényi graphs that are not too sparse (Feige and Ofek 2005). In a more realistic scenario, consider the stochastic block model (SBM), which attempts to capture the essence of many networks, including social graphs, citation graphs, and even brain networks (Holland, Laskey, and Leinhardt 1983).

Definition 1 (Simplified stochastic block model). The graph \mathcal{G} with n nodes is drawn under SBM $(n, k, a_{intra}, a_{inter})$ if the nodes are evenly and randomly partitioned into k communities, and nodes i and j are connected with probability $a_{intra}/n \in [0, 1]$ if they belong to the same community, and $a_{inter}/n \in [0, 1]$ if they are from different communities.

It turns out that for community detection, the top k leading eigenvectors of the adjacency matrix A play an important role. In particular, for the case of 2 communities, spectral bisection algorithms simply take the second eigenvector to reveal the community structure. This can be also seen from the expected adjacency matrix $\mathbb{E}[A]$ under SBM $(n, 2, a_{\text{intra}}, a_{\text{inter}})$, which is a rank-2 matrix with the top eigenvalue $\frac{1}{2}(a_{\text{intra}} + a_{\text{inter}})$ and eigenvector 1, and the second eigenvalue $\frac{1}{2}(a_{\text{intra}} - a_{\text{inter}})$ and eigenvector σ such that $\sigma_i = 1$ if i is in community 1 and $\sigma_i = -1$ otherwise. More generally, the second eigenvalue is of particular theoretical interests because it controls at the first order how fast heat diffuses through graph, as depicted by the discrete Cheeger inequality (Lee, Gharan, and Trevisan 2014).

While one would expect taking the second eigenvector of the adjacency matrix suffices, it often fails in practice (even when it is theoretically possible to recover the clusters given the signal-to-noise ratio). This is especially true for sparse networks, whose average nodal degrees is a constant that does not grow with the network size. This is because the spectrum of the Laplacian or adjacency matrix is blurred by "outlier" eigenvalues in the sparse regime, which is often caused by high degree nodes (Kaufmann, Bonald, and Lelarge 2016). Unsurprisingly, powering the Laplacian would be of no avail, because it does not change the eigenvectors or the ordering of eigenvalues. In fact, those outliers can become more salient after powering, thereby weakening the useful spectral signal even further. Besides, pruning the largest degree nodes in the adjacency matrix or normalizing the Laplacian cannot solve the issue. To date, the best results for pruning does not apply down to the theoretical recovery threshold (Coja-Oghlan 2010; Mossel, Neeman, and Sly 2012; Le, Levina, and Vershynin 2015); either outliers would persist or one could prune too much that the graph is destroyed. As for normalized Laplacian, it may overcorrect the large degree nodes, such that the leading eigenvectors would catch the "tails" of the graph, i.e., components weakly connected to the main graph. See the Appendix for an experimental illustration.

In summary, graph Laplacian may not be the ideal choice due to its limited spatial scope of information fusion, and its undesirable artefacts in the spectral domain.

1.2 If not Laplacian, then what?

In searching for alternatives, potential choices are many, so it is necessary to clarify the goals. In view of the aforementioned pitfalls of the graph Laplacian, one would naturally ask the question:

Can we find an operator that has wider spatial scope, more robust spectral properties, and is meanwhile interpretable and can increase the expressive power of GCNs?

From a perspective of *graph data analytics*, this question gauges how information is propagated and fused on a graph, and how we should interpret "adjacency" in a much broader sense. An image can be viewed as a regular grid, yet the operation of a CNN filter goes beyond the nearest pixel to a local neighborhood to extract useful features. How to draw an analogy to graphs?

From a perspective of *robust learning*, this question sheds light on the basic observation that real-world graphs are often noisy and even adversarial. The nice spectral properties of a graph topology can be lost with the presence or absence of edges. What are some principled ways to robustify the convolution operator and graph embeddings?

In this paper, we propose a graph learning paradigm that aims at achieving this goal, as illustrated in Figure 1. The key idea is to generate a sequence of graphs from the given graph that capture a wide range of spectral and spatial behaviors. We propose a new operator based on this derived sequence.

Definition 2 (Variable power operator). Consider an unweighted and undirected graph \mathcal{G} . Let $A^{[k]}$ denote the k-




Figure 2: Our proposed framework can improve both clean and adversarial (10% attack by A_{DW_3} (Bojchevski and Günnemann 2019)) accuracy for semi-supervised learning benchmarks.

distance adjacency matrix, i.e., $[\mathbf{A}^{[k]}]_{ij} = 1$ if and only if the shortest distance (in the original graph) between nodes *i* and *j* is *k*. The variable power operator of order *r* is defined as:

$$\boldsymbol{A}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}^{(r)} = \sum_{k=0}^{r} \theta_k \boldsymbol{A}^{[k]}, \qquad (3)$$

where $\boldsymbol{\theta} \coloneqq (\theta_0, \dots, \theta_r)$ is a set of parameters.

Clearly, $A_{\theta}^{(r)}$ is a natural extension of the classical adjacency matrix (i.e., r = 1 and $\theta_0 = \theta_1 = 1$). With power order r > 1, one can increase the spatial scope of information fusion on the graph when applying the convolution operation. The parameters θ_k also has a natural explanation—the magnitude and the sign of θ_k can be viewed as "global influence strength" and "global influence propensity" at distance k, respectively, which also determines the participation factor of each graph in the sequence in the aggregated operator.

Furthermore, we provide some theoretical justification of the proposed operator by establishing the following asymptotic property of spectral separation under the important SBM setting, which is, nevertheless, not enjoyed by the classical Laplacian operator or its normalized or powered versions. (All proofs are given in the Appendix.)

Theorem 3 (Asymptotic spectral separation of variable power operator). Consider a graph \mathcal{G} drawn from SBM $(n, 2, a_{intra}, a_{inter})$. Assume that the signal-to-noise ratio $\xi_2^2/\xi_1 > 1$, where $\xi_1 = \frac{1}{2}(a_{intra} + a_{inter})$ and $\xi_2 = \frac{1}{2}(a_{intra} - a_{inter})$ (c.f., (Decelle et al. 2011)). Suppose r is on the order of $c \log(n)$ for a constant c, such that $c \log(\xi_1) < 1/4$. Given nonvanishing θ_k for k > r/2, the variable power operator $A_{\theta}^{(r)}$ has the following spectral properties: (i) the leading eigenvalue is on the order of $\Theta(||\theta||_1\xi_1^r)$, the second leading eigenvalue is on the order of $\Theta(||\theta||_1\xi_2^r)$, and the rest are bounded by $||\theta||_1 n^{\epsilon} \xi_1^{r/2} O(\log(n))$ for any fixed $\epsilon > 0$; and (ii) the two leading eigenvectors are sufficient to recover the two communities asymptotically (i.e., as n goes to infinity).

Theorem 3 is the weighted analogue of Theorem 2 from (Abbe et al. 2018). Intuitively, the above theoretical result suggests that the variable power operator is able to *"magnify" benign signals* from the latent graph structure while *"suppressing" noises* due to random artefacts. This is expected to improve spectral methods in general, especially when the benign signals tend to be overwhelmed by noises. For the rest

of the paper, we will apply this insight to propose a robust graph learning paradigm in Section 2, as well as a new GCN architecture in Section 3. We also provide empirical evidence of the gain from this theory in Section 4 and conclude in Section 5.

1.3 Related work

Beyond nearest neighbors. Several works have been proposed to address the issue of limited spatial scope by powering the adjacency matrix (Lee et al. 2018; Wu et al. 2019; Li et al. 2019). However, simply powering the adjacency does not extract spectral gap and may even make the eigenspectrum more sensitive to perturbations. (Abu-El-Haija et al. 2018, 2019) also introduced weight matrices for neighbors at different distances. But this could substantially increase the risk of overfitting in the low-data regime and make the network vulnerable to adversarial attacks.

Robust spectral theory. The robustness of spectral methods has been extensively studied for graph partitioning/clustering (Li et al. 2007; Balakrishnan et al. 2011; Chaudhuri, Chung, and Tsiatas 2012; Amini et al. 2013; Joseph, Yu et al. 2016; Diakonikolas et al. 2019). Most recently, operators based on self-avoiding or nonbacktracking walks have become popular for SBM (Massoulié 2014; Mossel, Neeman, and Sly 2013; Bordenave, Lelarge, and Massoulié 2015), which provably achieve the detection threshold conjectured by (Decelle et al. 2011). Our work is partly motivated by the graph powering approach by (Abbe et al. 2018), which leveraged the result of (Massoulié 2014; Bordenave, Lelarge, and Massoulié 2015) to prove the spectral gap. The main difference with this line of work is that these operators are studied only for spectral clustering without incorporating nodal features. Our proposed variable power operator can be viewed as a kernel version of the graph powering operator (Abbe et al. 2018), thus substantially increasing the capability of learning complex nodal interactions while maintaining the spectral property.

Robust graph neural network. While there is a surge of adversarial attacks on graph neural networks (GNNs) (Dai et al. 2018; Zügner and Günnemann 2019; Bojchevski and Günnemann 2019), very few methods have been proposed for defense (Sun et al. 2018). Existing works employed known techniques from computer vision (Szegedy et al. 2014; Good-fellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2015; Szegedy et al. 2016), such

as adversarial training with "soft labels" (Chen et al. 2019) or outlier detection in the hidden layers (Zhu et al. 2019), but they do not exploit the unique characteristics of graphstructured data. Importantly, our approach simultaneously improves performance in both the benign and adversarial tests, as shown in Figure 2 (details are presented in Section 4).

2 Graph augmentation: Robust training paradigm

Exploration of the spectrum of spectral and spatial behaviors. Given a graph \mathcal{G} , consider a family of its powered graphs, $\{\mathcal{G}^{(2)}, \ldots, \mathcal{G}^{(r)}\}$, where $\mathcal{G}^{(k)}$ is obtained by connecting nodes with distance less than or equal to k. This "graph augmentation" procedure is similar to "data augmentation", because instead of limiting the learning on a single graph that is given, we artificially create a series of graphs that are closely related to each other in the spatial and spectral domains.

As we increase the power order, the graph also becomes more homogenized. In particular, it can help near-isolated nodes (i.e., low-degree vertices), since they become connected beyond their nearest neighbors. By comparison, simply raising the adjacency matrix to its r-th power will make them appear even more isolated, because it inadvertently promotes nodes with high degrees or nearby loops much more substantially as a result of feedback. Furthermore, the powered graphs can extract spectral gaps in the original graph despite local irregularities, thus boosting the signal-to-noise ratio in the spectral domain.

Transfer of knowledge from the powered graph sequence. Consider a generic learning task on a graph \mathcal{G} with data \mathcal{D} . The loss function is denoted by $\ell(\mathcal{W}; \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{D})$ for a particular GCN architecture parametrized by \mathcal{W} . For instance, in semi-supervised learning, \mathcal{D} consists of features and labels on a small set of nodes, and ℓ is the cross-entropy loss over all labeled examples. Instead of minimizing over $\ell(\mathcal{W}; \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{D})$ alone, we use all the powered graphs:

$$\ell(\mathcal{W};\mathcal{G},\mathcal{D}) + \sum_{k=2}^{r} \alpha_k \ell(\mathcal{W};\mathcal{G}^{(k)},\mathcal{D}),$$
 (r-GCN)

where $\alpha_k \geq 0$ gauges how much information one desires to transfer from powered graph $\mathcal{G}^{(k)}$ to the learning process. By minimizing the (r-GCN) objective, one seeks to optimize the network parameter \mathcal{W} on multiple graphs simultaneously, which is beneficial in two ways: (i) in the *low-data regime*, like semi-supervised learning, it helps to reduce the variance to improve generalization and transferability; (ii) in the *adversarial setting*, it robustifies the network since it is more likely that the perturbed network is contained in the wider spectrum during training.

3 From fixed to variable power network

By using the variable power operator illustrated in Figure 1, we substantially increase the search space of graph operators. The proposed operator also leads to a new family of graph algorithms with broader scope of spatial fusion and enhanced spectral robustness. As the power grows, the network eventually becomes dense. To manage this increased complexity and make the network more robust against adversarial attacks in the feature domain, we propose a pruning mechanism.

Graph sparsification. Given a graph $\mathcal{G} \coloneqq (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E}^{[1]})$, consider its powered version $\mathcal{G}^{(r)} \coloneqq (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E}^{(r)})$ and a sequence of intermediate graphs $\mathcal{G}^{[2]}, \ldots, \mathcal{G}^{[r]}$, where $\mathcal{G}^{[k]} \coloneqq (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E}^{[k]})$ is constructed by connecting two vertices if and only if the shortest distance is k in \mathcal{G} . Clearly, $\{\mathcal{E}^{[k]}\}_{k=1}^r$ forms a partition of $\mathcal{E}^{(r)}$. For each node $i \in \mathcal{V}$, denote its r-neighborhood by $\mathcal{N}_r(i) \coloneqq \{j \in \mathcal{V} \mid d_{\mathcal{G}}(i,j) \leq r\}$, which is identical to the set of nodes adjacent to i in $\mathcal{G}^{[r]}$. Next, for each edge within this neighborhood, we associate a value using some suitable distance metric ϕ to measure "aloofness." For instance, it can be the usual Euclidean distance or correlation distance in the feature space. Based on this formulation, we prune an edge e := (i, j) in $\mathcal{E}^{(r)}$ if the value is larger than a threshold $\tau(i, j)$, and denote the edge set after pruning $\bar{\mathcal{E}}^{(r)}$. Then, we can construct a new sequence of sparsified graphs, $\overline{\mathcal{G}}^{[k]}$ with edge sets $\overline{\mathcal{E}}^{[k]} = \mathcal{E}^{[k]} \cap \overline{\mathcal{E}}^{(r)}$ and adjacency matrix $\overline{\mathcal{A}}^{[k]}$. Hence, the variable power operator is given by $\bar{A}_{\theta}^{(r)} = \sum_{k=0}^{r} \theta_k \bar{A}^{[k]}$. Due to the influence of high-degree nodes in the spectral domain, one can *adaptively* choose the thresholds $\tau(i, j)$ to mitigate their effects. Specifically, we choose τ to be a small number if either *i* or *j* are nodes with high degrees, thereby making the sparsification more influential in densely connected neighborhoods than weakly connected parts.

Layer-wise update rule. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed operator, we adopt the vanilla GCN strategy (2). Importantly, we replace the graph convolutional operator \mathcal{A} with the variable power operator to obtain the variable power network (VPN):

$$\mathcal{A} = \boldsymbol{D}^{-\frac{1}{2}} (\boldsymbol{I} + \bar{\boldsymbol{A}}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}^{(r)}) \boldsymbol{D}^{-\frac{1}{2}}, \qquad (\text{VPN})$$

where $D_{ii} = 1 + |\{j \in \mathcal{V} \mid d_{\mathcal{G}}(i, j) = 1\}|$. The introduction of I is reminiscent of the "renormalization trick" (Kipf and Welling 2017), but it can be also viewed as a regularization strategy in this context, which is well-known to improve the spectral robustness (Amini et al. 2013; Joseph, Yu et al. 2016). This construction immediately increases the scope of data fusion by a factor of r.

Proposition 4. By choosing A with (VPN) in the layer-wise update rule (2), the output at each node from a *L*-layer GCN depends on neighbors within L * r hops.

Since we proved that the variable power operator has nice spectral separation in Theorem 3, VPN is expected to promote useful spectral signals from the graph topology (similar to the preservation of useful information in images (Jacobsen, Smeulders, and Oyallon 2018), our method preserves useful information in the graph topology). This claim is substantiated with the following proposition.

Proposition 5. Given a graph with two hidden communities. Consider a 2-layer GCN architecture with layer-wise update rule (2). Suppose that A has a spectral gap. Further, assume that the leading two eigenvectors are asymptotically aligned




Figure 3: Comparison for SBM dataset. Shaded area indicates standard deviation over 10 runs.




Figure 4: Accuracy of first 100 frequency components of VPN (red) and adjacency matrix (blue).

with 1 and ν , i.e., the community membership vector, and that both are in the range of feature matrix X. Then, there exists a configuration of $W^{(1)}$ and $W^{(2)}$ such that the GCN outputs can recover the community with high probability.

4 Experiments

The proposed methods are evaluated against several recent models, including vanilla GCN (Kipf and Welling 2017) and its variant PowerLaplacian where we simply replace the adjacent matrix with its powered version, three baselines using powered Laplacian IGCN (Li et al. 2019), SGC (Wu et al. 2019) and LNet (Liao et al. 2019), the recent method Mix-Hop (Abu-El-Haija et al. 2019) which attempts to increase spatial scope fusion, as well as a state-of-the-art baseline and RGCN (Zhu et al. 2019), which is also aimed at improving the robustness of Vanilla GCN. All baseline methods on based on their public codes.

4.1 Revisiting the stochastic block model

SBM dataset. We generated a set of networks under SBM with 4000 nodes and parameters such that the SNRs range from 0.58 to 0.91. To disentangle the effects from nodal features with that from the spectral signal, we set the nodal features to be one-hot vectors. The label rates are 0.1%, 0.5% and 1%, the validation rate is 1%, and the rest of the nodes are testing points.

Performance. Since the nodal features do not contain any useful information, learning without topology such as multilayer perceptron (MLP) is only as good as random guessing. The incorporation of graph topology improves classification performance—the higher the SNR (i.e., ξ_2^2/ξ_1 , see Theorem 3), the higher the accuracy. Overall, as shown in Figure 3, the performance of the proposed method (VPN) is superior than other baselines, which either use Laplacian (GCN, Chebyshev, RGCN, LNet) or its powered variants (IGCN, PowerLaplacian).

Spectral separation and Fourier modes. From the eigenspectrum of the convolution operators, we see that the spectral separation property is uniquely possessed by VPN, whose first two leading eigenvectors carry useful information about the underlying communities: without the help of nodal features, the accuracy is 87% even with label rate of 0.5%. Let Φ denote the Fourier modes of the the adjacency matrix or VPN, and X be the nodal features (i.e., identity matrix). We analyze the information from spectral signals (e.g., the k-th and k + 1-th eigenvectors) by estimating the accuracy of an MLP with filtered nodal features, namely $\Phi_{:,k:(k+1)} \Phi_{:,k:(k+1)}^{\top} X$, as shown in Figure 4. The accuracy reflects the information content in the frequency components. We see that the two leading eigenvectors of VPN are sufficient to perform classification, whereas those of the adjacency matrix cannot make accurate inferences.

4.2 Semi-supervised node classification

Experimental setup. We followed the setup of (Yang, Cohen, and Salakhutdinov 2016; Kipf and Welling 2017) for citation networks Citeseer, Cora and Pubmed (please refer to the Appendix for more details).

Graph powering order can influence spatial and spec-

Table 1: Results for semi-supervised node classification. We highlighted the best and the second best performances, where we broke the tie by choosing the one with the smallest standard deviation.

Model	Citeseer	Cora	Pubmed
ManiReg (Belkin, Niyogi, and Sindhwani 2006)	60.1	59.5	70.7
SemiEmb (Weston et al. 2012)	59.6	59.0	71.1
LP (Zhu, Ghahramani, and Lafferty 2003)	45.3	68.0	63.0
DeepWalk (Perozzi, Al-Rfou, and Skiena 2014)	43.2	67.2	65.3
ICA (Lu and Getoor 2003)	69.1	75.1	73.9
Planetoid (Yang, Cohen, and Salakhutdinov 2016)	64.7	75.7	77.2
Vanilla GCN (Kipf and Welling 2017)	70.3	81.5	79.0
PowerLaplacian	70.5	80.5	78.3
IGCN(RNM) (Li et al. 2019)	69.0	80.9	77.3
IGCN(AR) (Li et al. 2019)	69.3	81.1	78.2
LNet (Liao et al. 2019)	66.2 ± 1.9	79.5 ± 1.8	78.3 ± 0.3
RGCN (Zhu et al. 2019)	71.2 ± 0.5	$\textbf{82.8}\pm0.6$	79.1 ± 0.3
SGC (Wu et al. 2019)	71.9 ± 0.1	81.0 ± 0.0	78.9 ± 0.0
MixHop (Abu-El-Haija et al. 2019)	71.4 ± 0.8	81.9 ± 0.4	$\textbf{80.8} \pm 0.6$
r-GCN (this paper)	71.3 ± 0.5	81.7 ± 0.2	79.3 ± 0.3
VPN (this paper)	$\textbf{71.7}\pm0.6$	$\textbf{82.3}\pm0.3$	$\textbf{79.8} \pm 0.4$






Figure 5: Robustness merit $\left(\operatorname{accuracy}_{\text{proposed-method}}^{\text{post-attack}} - \operatorname{accuracy}_{\text{vanilla} GCN}^{\text{post-attack}}\right)$ reported in percentage under \mathcal{A}_{DW_3} attack. The error bar indicates standard deviation over 20 independent simulations.




Figure 6: Benign and adversarial accuracy as power order increases. Dahsed lines correspond to vanilla GCN.

tral behaviors. Our theory suggests powering to the order of log(n); in practice, orders of 2 to 4 suffice (Figure 6). Here, we chose the power order to be 4 for r-GCN on Citeseer and Cora, and 3 for Pubmed, and reduced the order by 1 for VPN.

Performance. By replacing Laplacian with VPN, we see

an immediate improvement in performance (Table 1). We also see that a succinct parametrization of the global influence relation in VPN is able to increase the expressivity of the network. For instance, the learned θ at distances 2 and 3 for Citeseer are 3.15e-3 and 3.11e-3 with *p*-value less than 1e-5. This implies that the network tends to put more weights in closer neighbors.

4.3 Defense against evasion attacks

To evaluate the robustness of the learned network, we considered the setting of evasion attacks, where the model is trained on benign data but tested on adversarial data.

Adversarial methods. Five strong global attack methods are considered, including DICE (Zügner and Günnemann 2019), \mathcal{A}_{abr} and \mathcal{A}_{DW_3} (Bojchevski and Günnemann 2019), Meta-Train and Meta-Self (Zügner and Günnemann 2019). We further modulated the severity of attack methods by varying the attack rate, which corresponds to the percentage of






Figure 7: Accuracy of first 500 frequency components for VPN (red) and adjacency matrix (blue). The x axis corresponds to the index k in $\Phi_{:,k:(k+1)}\Phi_{:,k:(k+1)}^{\top}X$ for signal reconstruction.




Figure 8: Accuracy of the leading frequency components in adversarial testing. We use $\tilde{\Phi}_{:,1:k}\tilde{\Phi}_{:,1:k}^{\top} X$ as reconstructed nodal features for testing, where k is 10 for Citeseer and 5 for Cora and Pubmed. Error bar indicates standard deviation over 10 runs.

edges to be attacked.

Robustness evaluation. In general, both r-GCN and VPN are able to improve over baselines for the defense against evasion attacks, e.g., Figure 5 for the A_{DW_3} attack (detailed results for other attacks are listed in the Appendix). It can be also observed that the proposed methods are more robust in Citeseer and Cora than Pubmed. In addition to the low label rates, we conjectured that topological attacks are more difficult to defend for networks with prevalent high-degree nodes, because the attacker can bring in more irrelevant vertices by simply adding a link to the high-degree nodes.

Informative and robust low-frequency spectral signal. It has been observed by (Wu et al. 2019; Maehara 2019) that GCNs share similar characteristics of low-pass filters, in the sense that nodal features filtered by low-frequency Fourier modes lead to accurate classifiers (e.g., MLP). However, one key question left unanswered is how to obtain the Fourier modes. In their experiments, they derive it from the graph Laplacian. By using VPN to construct the Fourier modes, we show that the information content in the low-frequency domain can be improved.

More specifically, we first perform eigendecomposition of the graph convolutional operator (i.e., graph Laplacian or VPN) to obtain the Fourier modes Φ . We then reconstruct the nodal features X using only the k-th and the k + 1-th eigenvectors, i.e., $\Phi_{:,k:(k+1)}\Phi_{:,k:(k+1)}^{\top}X$. We then use the reconstructed features in MLP to perform the classification task in a supervised learning setting. As Figure 7 shows, features filtered by the leading eigenvectors of VPN lead to higher classification accuracy compared to the classical adjacency matrix.

For the adversarial testing, we construct a new basis $\widetilde{\Phi}$ based on the attacked graph, and then use $\widetilde{\Phi}_{:,k:(k+1)}\widetilde{\Phi}_{:,k:(k+1)}^{\top}X$ as test points for the MLP trained in the clean data setting. As can be seen in Figure 8, models trained based on VPN filtered features also have better adversarial robustness in evasion attacks. Since the eigenvalues of the corresponding operator exhibit low-pass filtering characteristics, the enhanced benign and adversarial accuracy of VPN is attributed to the increased signal-to-noise ratio in the low-frequency domain. This is in alignment with the theoretical proof of spectral gap developed in this study.

5 Conclusion

This study goes beyond classical spectral graph theory to defend GCNs against adversarial attacks. We challenge the central building block of existing methods, namely the graph Laplacian, which is not robust to noisy links. For adversarial robustness, spectral separation is a desirable property. We propose a new operator that enjoys this property and can be incorporated in GCNs to improve expressivity and interpretability. Furthermore, by generating a sequence of powered graphs based on the original graph, we can explore a spectrum of spectral and spatial behaviors and encourage transferability across graphs. The proposed methods are shown to improve both benign and adversarial accuracy over various baselines evaluated against a comprehensive set of attack strategies.

6 Ethics Statement

The main result of this work can benefit the family of graph convolutional networks, since the Laplacian operator is the fundamental building block of existing architectures. The method is able to improve accuracy and robustness to adversarial attacks simultaneously, which would further widen the applications of GCN in safety-critical applications, such as power grid and transportation.

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A Proof of Proposition 4

To validate the claim, we prove a more general result. Consider a graph \mathcal{G} and its powered graph $\mathcal{G}^{(r)}$, whose adjacency matrices are \boldsymbol{A} and $\boldsymbol{A}^{(r)}$, respectively. Since the support of $\boldsymbol{A}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}^{(r)}$ is identical to that of $\boldsymbol{A}^{(r)}$, we will focus on $\boldsymbol{A}^{(r)}$ for notational simplicity. For any signal $\boldsymbol{f}: \mathcal{V} \mapsto \mathbb{R}^{|\mathcal{V}|}$ on a graph, denote the support of the signal \boldsymbol{f}_v on node $v \in \mathcal{V}$ by \mathcal{S}_v^f , i.e., f_v only depends on the signals on nodes in \mathcal{S}_v^f . Then, it is easy to see that the signal $\boldsymbol{g} \triangleq \boldsymbol{A}\boldsymbol{f}$ has support $\mathcal{S}_v^g \subseteq \cup_{u \sim_r v} \mathcal{S}_u^f$, where $u \sim_r v$ denotes adjacency relation on $\mathcal{G}^{(r)}$ defined by $\boldsymbol{A}^{(r)}$. Clearly, the set defined by $\{u \in \mathcal{V} \mid u \sim_r v\}$ is identical to $\{u \in \mathcal{V} \mid d_{\mathcal{G}}(u, v) \leq r\}$, where $d_{\mathcal{G}}(u, v)$ denotes the shortest distance from u to v on \mathcal{G} .

Also, we see that element-wise operation does not expand the support, i.e., for any element-wise activation σ , the signal $g_{\sigma} \triangleq \sigma(f)$ has support $S_v^{g_{\sigma}} \subseteq S_v^f$. In particular, we can prove the claim by iteratively applying the function composition layer by layer, since each layer is of the form $\sigma(A_{\theta}^{(r)}H^{(l)}W^{(l)})$, where $H^{(l)}$ is the hidden state at layer l and $W^{(l)}$ is the corresponding weight matrix. Hence after L iterations of layer-wise updates, the support of the output on v is given by $\{u \in \mathcal{V} \mid d_{\mathcal{G}}(u, v) \leq r * L\}$.

B Proof of Proposition 5

Let λ_1 and λ_2 be the two leading eigenvalues of \bar{A} with corresponding eigenvectors ϕ_1 and ϕ_2 , respectively. Without loss of generality, assume that both eigenvalues are nonnegative. Under the assumption that ϕ_1 and ϕ_2 lie in the range of X, there exists a $W^{(1)}$ such that $XW^{(1)} = [\phi_1 \quad \phi_2]$. So the output of the first layer with ReLU activation is given by:

$$\boldsymbol{H}^{(1)} = \sigma \left(\bar{\boldsymbol{A}} \boldsymbol{X} \boldsymbol{W}^{(1)} \right) = \sigma \left(\bar{\boldsymbol{A}} \begin{bmatrix} \phi_1 & \phi_2 \end{bmatrix} \right)$$
(4)

$$= \begin{bmatrix} \lambda_1 \sigma(\phi_1) & \lambda_2 \sigma(\phi_2) \end{bmatrix}$$
(5)

$$= \begin{bmatrix} \lambda_1(\mathbf{1} + \sigma(\mathbf{h}_1)) & \lambda_2(\frac{1}{2}\boldsymbol{\nu} + \frac{1}{2}\mathbf{1} + \sigma(\mathbf{h}_2)) \end{bmatrix}, \quad (6)$$

where
$$\|\boldsymbol{h}_1\| = o(1)$$
 and $\|\boldsymbol{h}_2\| = o(1)$ (7)

where (5) is due to the definition of eigenvectors and that σ is an element-wise operation, and (7) is due to the asymptotic

alignment condition and the fact that $\sigma(\boldsymbol{\nu}) = \frac{1}{2}\boldsymbol{\nu} + \frac{1}{2}\mathbf{1}$. Therefore, by choosing the last layer weight $W^{(2)} = \begin{bmatrix} -\frac{1}{\lambda_1\lambda_2} & \frac{1}{\lambda_1\lambda_2} \\ \frac{2}{\lambda_2^2} & -\frac{2}{\lambda_2^2} \end{bmatrix}$, the output of the last layer is given by: $\boldsymbol{Y} = \bar{\boldsymbol{A}}\boldsymbol{H}^{(1)}\boldsymbol{W}^{(2)}$ $= \bar{\boldsymbol{A}}\left[\lambda_1(\mathbf{1}+\sigma(\boldsymbol{h}_1)) \quad \lambda_2(\frac{1}{2}\boldsymbol{\nu}+\frac{1}{2}\mathbf{1}+\sigma(\boldsymbol{h}_2))\right]\boldsymbol{W}^{(2)}$ $= \left[\lambda_1^2\mathbf{1}+\boldsymbol{h}_1' \quad \frac{\lambda_2^2}{2}\boldsymbol{\nu}+\frac{\lambda_1\lambda_2}{2}\mathbf{1}+\boldsymbol{h}_2'\right]\boldsymbol{W}^{(2)}$ $= \left[\boldsymbol{\nu}+\boldsymbol{h}_1'' \quad -\boldsymbol{\nu}+\boldsymbol{h}_2''\right]$ where $\|\boldsymbol{h}_1'\|_{\boldsymbol{\nu}} = c(1)\|\boldsymbol{h}_1''\|_{\boldsymbol{\nu}} = c(1)$ for k = 1, 2. Therefore

where $\|\boldsymbol{h}_k'\|_2 = o(1), \|\boldsymbol{h}_k''\|_2 = o(1)$ for k = 1, 2. Therefore, after the softmax operation, we can see that the 2-layer output recovers the membership of the elements exactly.

One general remark is that while the above argument is not limited to the leading two eigenvalues/eigenvectors, from the form of $W^{(2)}$ whose elements depend inversely on the corresponding eigenvalues, we can expect more numerical stability (and hence easier learning) when the corresponding eigenvalues are large.

C Proof of Theorem 3

Consider a stochastic block model with two communities, where the intra-community connection probability is a_{intra}/n and the inter-community connection probability is a_{intra}/n , and assume that $a_{intra} > a_{inter}$. Let $\xi_1 = \frac{a_{intra}+a_{inter}}{2}$ and $\xi_2 = \frac{a_{intra}-a_{inter}}{2}$, which correspond to the first and second eigenvalues of the expected adjacency matrix of the above model. Let ν denote the community label vector, with $\nu_i = \pm 1$ depending on the membership of node *i*. For weak recovery, we assume the detectability condition (Decelle et al. 2011):

$$\xi_2^2 > \xi_1.$$
 (8)

With the notations from the main paper, let $A_{\theta}^{(r)} = \sum_{k=0}^{r} \theta_k A^{[k]}$ denote the θ -weighted variable power operator, where $[A^{[k]}]_{ij} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } d_{\mathcal{G}}(i,j) = k \\ 0 & \text{o.w.} \end{cases}$ is the k-distance adjacency matrix. Let $A^{\{k\}}$ denote the nonbacktracking path

adjacency matrix. Let $A^{\{k\}}$ denote the nonbacktracking path counting matrix, where the (i, j)-th component indicate the number of self-avoiding paths of graph edges of length kconnecting i to j (Massoulié 2014). Our goal is to prove that the top eigenvectors of $A_{\theta}^{(r)}$ are asymptotically aligned with those of $A^{\{k\}}$ for k greater than $\log(n)$ up to a constant multiplicative factor. To do so, we first recall the result of (Massoulié 2014), which examines the behaviors of top eigenvectors of $A^{\{k\}}$.

Lemma 6 ((Massoulié 2014)). Assume that (8) holds. Then, w.h.p., for all $k \in \{r/2, ..., r\}$:

- (a) The operator norm ||A^{k}||₂ is up to logarithmic factors Θ(ξ₁^k). The second eigenvalue of A^{k} is up to logarithmic factors Ω(ξ₂^k).
- (b) The leading eigenvector is asymptotically aligned with A^{k}1:

$$\frac{\boldsymbol{A}^{\{k\}}\boldsymbol{A}^{\{k\}}\boldsymbol{1}}{\|\boldsymbol{A}^{\{k\}}\boldsymbol{A}^{\{k\}}\boldsymbol{1}\|_2} = \frac{\boldsymbol{A}^{\{k\}}\boldsymbol{1}}{\|\boldsymbol{A}^{\{k\}}\boldsymbol{1}\|_2} + \boldsymbol{h}_k$$

where $\|\boldsymbol{h}_k\| = o(1)$. The second eigenvector is asymptotically aligned with $\boldsymbol{A}^{\{k\}}\boldsymbol{\nu}$:

$$\frac{\bm{A}^{\{k\}}\bm{A}^{\{k\}}\bm{\nu}}{\|\bm{A}^{\{k\}}\bm{A}^{\{k\}}\bm{\nu}\|_2} = \frac{\bm{A}^{\{k\}}\bm{\nu}}{\|\bm{A}^{\{k\}}\bm{\nu}\|_2} + \bm{h}_k'$$

where $\|h'_k\| = o(1)$.

Now, we first define
$$\Gamma_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}^{\{r\}} = \sum_{k=r/2}^{r} \theta_k \boldsymbol{A}^{\{k\}}$$
, so

$$\boldsymbol{A}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}^{(r)} = \boldsymbol{\Gamma}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}^{\{r\}} + \boldsymbol{\Delta}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}^{\{r\}} = \boldsymbol{\Gamma}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}^{\{r\}} + \boldsymbol{A}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}^{(r/2-1)} + \sum_{k=r/2}^{r} \theta_{k} (\boldsymbol{A}^{[k]} - \boldsymbol{A}^{\{k\}}).$$

Also, by (Massoulié 2014, Theorem 2.3), the local neighborhoods of vertices do not grow fast, and w.h.p., the graph of $A^{(r/2-1)}$ has maximum degree $O(\xi_1^{r/2}(\log n)^2)$. Let ϕ be the leading eigenvector of $A_{\theta}^{(r/2-1)}$, and let v be the node where ϕ is maximum (i.e., $\phi(v) \ge \phi(u)$). Without loss of generality, assume that $\phi(v) > 0$. We have a good control over the first eigenvalue λ_1 of $A_{\theta}^{(r/2-1)}$ as follows:

$$\lambda_{1} = \frac{(\boldsymbol{A}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}^{(r/2-1)}\boldsymbol{\phi})(v)}{\boldsymbol{\phi}(v)} = \frac{\sum_{k=0}^{r/2-1}\sum_{\{u:d_{\mathcal{G}}(u,v)=k\}}\theta_{k}\boldsymbol{\phi}(u)}{\boldsymbol{\phi}(v)}$$
$$= \sum_{k=0}^{r/2-1}\theta_{k}\sum_{\{u:d_{\mathcal{G}}(u,v)=k\}}\frac{\boldsymbol{\phi}(u)}{\boldsymbol{\phi}(v)}$$
$$\leq \sum_{k=0}^{r/2-1}|\theta_{k}|\sum_{\{u:d_{\mathcal{G}}(u,v)=k\}}1$$
$$\leq \|\boldsymbol{\theta}\|_{\infty}\sum_{\{u:d_{\mathcal{G}}(u,v)\leq r/2-1\}}1$$
$$= O(\|\boldsymbol{\theta}\|_{1}\xi_{1}^{r/2}(\log n)^{2})$$

Due to (Abbe et al. 2018, Theorem 2), which proves an identical result of Lemma 6 but for $A^{[k]}$, we know that w.h.p., for $r = \epsilon \log(n)$, we can bound the last term by

$$\begin{split} \|\sum_{k=r/2}^{r} \theta_k (\boldsymbol{A}^{[k]} - \boldsymbol{A}^{\{k\}}) \|_2 &\leq \sum_{k=0}^{r} |\theta_k| \|\boldsymbol{A}^{[k]} - \boldsymbol{A}^{\{k\}} \|_2 \\ &= O\left(\|\boldsymbol{\theta}\|_1 \xi_1^{r/2} (\log n)^4 \right) \end{split}$$

Therefore, by triangle inequality, we can conclude that

$$\|\boldsymbol{\Delta}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}^{\{r\}}\|_{2} = \|\boldsymbol{A}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}^{(r)} - \boldsymbol{\Gamma}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}^{\{r\}}\|_{2} = O\left(\|\boldsymbol{\theta}\|_{1}\xi_{1}^{r/2}(\log n)^{4}\right).$$
(9)

Now, our goal is to show a similar result as Lemma 6 for

 $\Gamma_{\theta}^{\{r\}}$. In particular,

$$\frac{\|\boldsymbol{\Gamma}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}^{\{r\}} \boldsymbol{A}^{\{r\}} \boldsymbol{1}\|_{2}}{\|\boldsymbol{A}^{\{r\}} \boldsymbol{1}\|_{2}} = \left\| \sum_{k=r/2}^{r} \theta_{k} \boldsymbol{A}^{\{k\}} \frac{\boldsymbol{A}^{\{r\}} \boldsymbol{1}}{\|\boldsymbol{A}^{\{r\}} \boldsymbol{1}\|_{2}} \right\|_{2}$$
(10)

$$= \left\| \sum_{k=r/2}^{r} \theta_{k} \mathbf{A}^{\{k\}} \frac{\mathbf{A}^{\{k\}} \mathbf{1}}{\|\mathbf{A}^{\{k\}} \mathbf{1}\|_{2}} \right\|_{2} + O\left(\sum_{k=r/2}^{r} |\theta_{k}| \|\mathbf{A}^{\{k\}} \|_{2} \left\| \frac{\mathbf{A}^{\{r\}} \mathbf{1}}{\|\mathbf{A}^{\{r\}} \mathbf{1}\|_{2}} - \frac{\mathbf{A}^{\{k\}} \mathbf{1}}{\|\mathbf{A}^{\{k\}} \mathbf{1}\|_{2}} \right\| \right) \right)$$

$$= \left\| \sum_{k=r/2}^{r} \theta_{k} \mathbf{A}^{\{k\}} \frac{\mathbf{A}^{\{k\}} \mathbf{1}}{\|\mathbf{A}^{\{k\}} \mathbf{1}\|_{2}} \right\|_{2} + O\left(\sum_{k=r/2}^{r} |\theta_{k}| \xi_{1}^{k} n^{-\delta} \right)$$

$$(12)$$

$$= \left\| \sum_{k=r/2}^{r} \theta_{k} \mathbf{A}^{\{k\}} \frac{\mathbf{A}^{\{k\}} \mathbf{1}}{\|\mathbf{A}^{\{k\}} \mathbf{1}\|_{2}} \right\|_{2} + O\left(\|\boldsymbol{\theta}\|_{1} \xi_{1}^{r} n^{-\delta} \right) \quad (13)$$
$$= \left\| \sum_{k=r/2}^{r} \theta_{k} \left(\frac{\mathbf{A}^{\{k\}} \mathbf{1}}{\|\mathbf{A}^{\{k\}} \mathbf{1}\|_{2}} + \mathbf{h}_{k} \right) \frac{\|\mathbf{A}^{\{k\}} \mathbf{A}^{\{k\}} \mathbf{1}\|_{2}}{\|\mathbf{A}^{\{k\}} \mathbf{1}\|_{2}} \right\| +$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& = \left\| \sum_{k=r/2}^{r} \theta_{k} \left(\frac{\mathbf{A}^{\{r\}} \mathbf{1}}{\|\mathbf{A}^{\{r\}} \mathbf{1}\|_{2}} + \mathbf{h}_{k} \right) \frac{\|\mathbf{A}^{\{k\}} \mathbf{A}^{\{k\}} \mathbf{1}\|_{2}}{\|\mathbf{A}^{\{k\}} \mathbf{1}\|_{2}} \right\|_{2} + \\
& = \left\| \sum_{k=r/2}^{r} \theta_{k} \left(\frac{\mathbf{A}^{\{r\}} \mathbf{1}}{\|\mathbf{A}^{\{k\}} \mathbf{1}\|_{2}} + \mathbf{h}_{k} \right) \frac{\|\mathbf{A}^{\{k\}} \mathbf{A}^{\{k\}} \mathbf{1}\|_{2}}{\|\mathbf{A}^{\{k\}} \mathbf{1}\|_{2}} \right\|_{2} + \\
& = O\left(\left\| \sum_{k=r/2}^{r} \theta_{k} \frac{\|\mathbf{A}^{\{k\}} \mathbf{A}^{\{k\}} \mathbf{1}\|_{2}}{\|\mathbf{A}^{\{k\}} \mathbf{1}\|_{2}} \right\|_{2} \left\| \frac{\mathbf{A}^{\{r\}} \mathbf{1}}{\|\mathbf{A}^{\{r\}} \mathbf{1}\|_{2}} - \frac{\mathbf{A}^{\{k\}} \mathbf{1}}{\|\mathbf{A}^{\{k\}} \mathbf{1}\|_{2}} \right\| \right) + \\
& = \left\| \sum_{k=r/2}^{r} \theta_{k} \left(\frac{\mathbf{A}^{\{r\}} \mathbf{1}}{\|\mathbf{A}^{\{r\}} \mathbf{1}\|_{2}} + \mathbf{h}_{k} \right) \frac{\|\mathbf{A}^{\{k\}} \mathbf{A}^{\{k\}} \mathbf{1}\|_{2}}{\|\mathbf{A}^{\{k\}} \mathbf{1}\|_{2}} \right\|_{2} + \\
& = O\left(\|\boldsymbol{\theta}\|_{1} \xi_{1}^{r} n^{-\delta} \right) \qquad (16) \\
& = \left(\sum_{k=r/2}^{r} |\theta_{k}| \frac{\|\mathbf{A}^{\{k\}} \mathbf{A}^{\{k\}} \mathbf{1}\|_{2}}{\|\mathbf{A}^{\{k\}} \mathbf{1}\|_{2}} \right) (1 + o(1)) + O\left(\|\boldsymbol{\theta}\|_{1} \xi_{1}^{r} n^{-\delta} \right) \end{aligned}$$

$$= O\left(\|\boldsymbol{\theta}\|_1 \xi_1^r n^{-\delta}\right),\tag{18}$$

where (11) and (15) are due to triangle inequalities, (12) and (16) are due to results in (Massoulié 2014), and (14) is due to Lemma 6. Therefore, we have $\|\mathbf{\Gamma}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}^{\{r\}} \mathbf{A}^{\{r\}} \mathbf{1}\|_2 = \Theta (\|\boldsymbol{\theta}\|_1 \xi_1^r \|\mathbf{A}^{\{r\}} \mathbf{1}\|_2)$. Similarly, we can prove that $\|\mathbf{\Gamma}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}^{\{r\}} \mathbf{A}^{\{r\}} \boldsymbol{\nu}\|_2 = \Theta (\|\boldsymbol{\theta}\|_1 \xi_2^r \|\mathbf{A}^{\{r\}} \boldsymbol{\nu}\|_2)$.

Furthermore, we can show that $\Gamma_{\theta}^{\{r\}}$ satisfies the weak Ramanujan property (the proof is similar to (Massoulié 2014) and is deferred to Section C.1).

Lemma 7. For any fixed $\epsilon > 0$, $\Gamma_{\theta}^{\{r\}}$ satisfies the following

weak Ramanujan property w.h.p.,

Hence,

$$\sup_{\|\boldsymbol{u}\|_{2}=1,\boldsymbol{u}^{\top}\boldsymbol{A}^{\{r\}}\boldsymbol{1}=\boldsymbol{u}^{\top}\boldsymbol{A}^{\{r\}}\boldsymbol{\nu}=0}\|\boldsymbol{\Gamma}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}^{\{r\}}\boldsymbol{u}\|_{2}=\|\boldsymbol{\theta}\|_{1}n^{\epsilon}\xi_{1}^{r/2}O(\log(n))$$

By Lemma 7, the leading two eigenvectors of $\Gamma_{\theta}^{\{r\}}$ will be asymptotically in the span of $A^{\{r\}}\mathbf{1}$ and $A^{\{r\}}\nu$ according to the variational definition of eigenvalues. By our previous analysis, this means that the top eigenvalue of $\Gamma_{\theta}^{\{r\}}$ will be $\Theta(||\theta||_1\xi_1^r)$ with eigenvector asymptotically aligned with $A^{\{r\}}\mathbf{1}$. Since by (Massoulié 2014, Lemma 4.4), $A^{\{r\}}\mathbf{1}$ and $A^{\{r\}}\nu$ are asymptotically orthogonal, the second eigenvalue of $\Gamma_{\theta}^{\{r\}}$ will be $\Theta(||\theta||_1\xi_2^r)$ with eigenvector asymptotically aligned with $A^{\{r\}}\nu$.

Since the perturbation term $\|\Delta_{\theta}^{\{r\}}\|_{2} = o\left(\lambda_{2}(\Gamma_{\theta}^{\{r\}})\right)$ by (9), using Weyl's inequality (Weyl 1912), we can conclude that the leading eigenvalue $\lambda_{1}\left(A_{\theta}^{(r)}\right) = \Theta\left(\|\theta\|_{1}\xi_{1}^{r}\right)$, the second eigenvalue $\lambda_{2}\left(A_{\theta}^{(r)}\right) = \Theta\left(\|\theta\|_{1}\xi_{2}^{r}\right)$, and the rest of the eigenvalues are bounded by $\|\theta\|_{1}n^{\epsilon}\xi_{1}^{r/2}O(\log(n))$. Moreover, since $\|\Delta_{\theta}^{\{r\}}\|_{2} = o\left(\max\left\{\lambda_{1}(\Gamma_{\theta}^{\{r\}}) - \lambda_{2}(\Gamma_{\theta}^{\{r\}}), \lambda_{2}(\Gamma_{\theta}^{\{r\}}) - \lambda_{3}(\Gamma_{\theta}^{\{r\}})\right\}\right)$, by the Davis-Kahan Theorem (Davis and Kahan 1970), the leading two eigenvectors of $A_{\theta}^{(r)}$ are asymptotically aligned with $A^{\{r\}}\mathbf{1}$ and $A^{\{r\}}\nu$, which is shown to be enough for the rounding procedure of (Massoulié 2014) to achieve weak recovery.

C.1 Proof of Lemma 7

Denote $\widetilde{A} = \frac{a_{\text{intra}}}{n} \left[\frac{1}{2} (\mathbf{1}\mathbf{1}^{\top} + \boldsymbol{\nu}\boldsymbol{\nu}^{\top}) - \boldsymbol{I} \right] + \frac{a_{\text{inter}}}{2n} (\mathbf{1}\mathbf{1}^{\top} - \boldsymbol{\nu}\boldsymbol{\nu}^{\top})$ as the expected adjacency matrix conditioned on community labels $\boldsymbol{\nu}$. Let P_{ij} denote the set of all self-avoiding paths $i_0^k \coloneqq \{i_0, \ldots, i_k\}$ from *i* to *j*, such that no nodes appear twice in the path, and define $Q_{ij}^{\{m\}} \coloneqq \sum_{i_0^m \in P_{ij}} \prod_{t=1}^m (\boldsymbol{A} - \widetilde{\boldsymbol{A}})_{i_{t-1}i_t}$. Let T_{ij}^m be the concatenation of self-avoiding paths i_0^{k-m} and i_{k-m+1}^k , and let R_{ij}^m denote $T_{ij}^m \setminus P_{ij}$. Define $W_{ij}^{\{k,m\}} \coloneqq \sum_{i_0^k \in R_{ij}^m} \prod_{t=1}^{k-m} (\boldsymbol{A} - \widetilde{\boldsymbol{A}})_{i_{t-1}i_t} \widetilde{\boldsymbol{A}}_{i_{k-m}i_{k-m+1}} \prod_{t=k-m+2}^k (\boldsymbol{A})_{i_{t-1}i_t}$. Then, by (Massoulié 2014, Theorem 2.2), we can have

$$m{A}^{\{k\}} = m{Q}^{\{k\}} + \sum_{m=1}^{k} (m{Q}^{\{k-m\}} \widetilde{m{A}} m{A}^{\{m-1\}}) - \sum_{m=1}^{k} m{W}^{\{k,m\}}.$$

$$\begin{split} \mathbf{\Gamma}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}^{\{r\}} &= \sum_{k=r/2}^{r} \theta_k \boldsymbol{A}^{\{k\}} \\ &= \sum_{k=r/2}^{r} \theta_k \boldsymbol{Q}^{\{k\}} + \sum_{k=r/2}^{r} \theta_k \sum_{m=1}^{k} \left(\boldsymbol{Q}^{\{k-m\}} \widetilde{\boldsymbol{A}} \boldsymbol{A}^{\{m-1\}} \right) - \\ &\sum_{k=r/2}^{r} \sum_{m=1}^{k} \theta_k \boldsymbol{W}^{\{k,m\}} \\ &= \sum_{k=r/2}^{r} \theta_k \boldsymbol{Q}^{\{k\}} + \sum_{m=1}^{r} \left(\sum_{k=\max(r/2,m)}^{r} \theta_k \boldsymbol{Q}^{\{k-m\}} \widetilde{\boldsymbol{A}} \right) \boldsymbol{A}^{\{m-1\}} \cdot \\ &\sum_{k=r/2}^{r} \sum_{m=1}^{k} \theta_k \boldsymbol{W}^{\{k,m\}} \cdot \end{split}$$

In particular, for any u that is orthogonal to $A^{\{m\}}\mathbf{1}$ and $A^{\{m\}}\nu$ with norm-1 (i.e., a feasible vector of the variational definition in Lemma 7), we have:

$$\begin{split} \left\| \boldsymbol{\Gamma}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}^{\{r\}} \boldsymbol{u} \right\|_{2} &\leq \rho \left(\sum_{k=r/2}^{r} \theta_{k} \boldsymbol{Q}^{\{k\}} \right) + \\ &\sum_{m=1}^{r} \sum_{k=\max(r/2,m)}^{r} |\theta_{k}| \rho \left(\boldsymbol{Q}^{\{k-m\}} \right) \left\| \widetilde{\boldsymbol{A}} \boldsymbol{A}^{\{m-1\}} \boldsymbol{u} \right\|_{2} + \\ &\rho \left(\sum_{k=r/2}^{r} \theta_{k} \sum_{m=1}^{k} \boldsymbol{W}^{\{k,m\}} \right) \end{split}$$

Since by (Massoulié 2014), the terms $\rho(\mathbf{Q}^{\{k\}})$ and $\rho(\mathbf{W}^{\{k,m\}})$ are bounded by $n^{\epsilon}\xi_1^{r/2}$, $\left\|\widetilde{\mathbf{A}}\mathbf{A}^{\{m-1\}}\mathbf{x}\right\|_2$ is bounded by $O(\log(n) + \sqrt{\log(n)\xi_1^{m-1}})$, with some elementary calculations, we have that $\left\|\mathbf{\Gamma}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}^{\{r\}}\mathbf{u}\right\|_2$ is bounded by $\|\boldsymbol{\theta}\|_1 n^{\epsilon}\xi_1^{r/2}O(\log(n))$.

Table 2: Citation datasets. Label rate denotes the fraction of training labels in each dataset.

Dataset	Nodes	Edges	Features	Classes	Label rates
Citeseer	3,327	4,732	3,703	6	0.036
Cora	2,708	5,429	1,433	7	0.052
Pubmed	19,717	44,338	500	3	0.003

D More experimental details and results

Experimental setup. We followed the setup of (Yang, Cohen, and Salakhutdinov 2016; Kipf and Welling 2017) for citation networks Citeseer, Cora and Pubmed. The statistics of datasets is in Table 2. Degree distribution in the original graph and the powered graphs for Citeseer and Cora is shown in Figure 9. We used the same dataset splits as in (Yang, Cohen, and Salakhutdinov 2016; Kipf and Welling 2017)




Figure 9: Degree distribution in the original graph and the powered graphs for Citeseer and Cora. The graph becomes more homogeneous and high degree nodes become more prevalent as we increase the powers.

with 20 labels per class for training, 500 labeled samples for hyper-parameter setting, and 1,000 samples for testing. To facilitate comparison, we use the same hyper-parameters as Vanilla GCN (Kipf and Welling 2017), including number of layers (2), number of hidden units (16), dropout rates (0.5), weight decay (5×10^{-4}) , and weight initialization following (Glorot and Bengio 2010) implemented in Tensorflow. The training process is terminated if validation accuracy does not improve for 40 consecutive steps. We note that the citation datasets are extremely sensitive to initializations; as such, we report the test accuracy for the top 50 runs out of 100 random initializations sorted by the validation accuracy. We used Adam (Kingma and Ba 2014) with a learning rate of 0.01 except for θ (VPN), which was chosen to be 1×10^{-5} to stabilize training. For VPN, we consider two-step training process, *i.e.*, we first employ graph sparsification on adjacency matrix $\bar{A}^{[k]}$ based on X for the first-step training, then process second graph sparsification on adjacency matrix $\bar{A}^{[k]}$ with respect to the feature embedding from hidden layer and fetch them back into model for second-step training with warm restart (continue training with the parameters from first-step). We set α_k to be 0.5 for the corresponding power order and 0 other wise in r-GCN.

To enhance robustness against evasion attack, we adaptively chose the threshold of graph sparsification. For each node, we consider all its neighbors within r hops, where ris the order of the powered graph. We order these neighbors based on their Euclidean distance to the current node in the feature space. We then set the threshold for this node such that only the first s * d neighbors with the smallest distance are selected, where s is the sparsification rate, and d is the degree of the node in the original graph. If this node is a highdegree node (determined by if the degree is higher than the average degree by more than 2 standard deviations), we set s = 1; otherwise, we set s to be a small number slightly larger than 1. Nevertheless, we do not observe that the robustness performance is sensitive to this parameter. In addition, one can define their own distance function that better measures proximity between nodes, such as correlation distance or cosine distance. As a side remark, one can easily obtain $A^{(r)}$ with $\mathbb{1}[(I + A)^r > 0]$, and recursively calculate $A^{[k]}$. The proposed methods have similar computational complexity as vanilla GCN as a result of sparsification.

It is true that the performance on **clean** datasets can be better with many simpler tricks, due to the fast development of this society and the simplicity of these citation datasets. However, we aim to demonstrate that both models we proposed can remarkably enhance the robustness of GNNs on **perturbed** graphs, while not losing the performance on **clean** ones, which should be highlighted as our main contribution.

Revisiting SBM. To obtain networks with different SNRs (0.58, 0.68, 0.79, 0.85, 0.91), we set the intra-degree average $a_{intra} = 2.1$ and inter-degree average a_{inter} to be 0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.15, 0.1 respectively. We generate 10 networks for each SNR. One of the networks with SNR of 0.91 is analyzed in Figure 12 for different convolution operators. As predicted by Theorem 3, the proposed operators have nontrivial spectral gap. This is *not* enjoyed by other operators, so it is a quite unique property. Furthermore, our learned operator w/ or w/o normalization obtained 81% accuracy based on the second eigenvector, whereas adjacency matrix catches "high-degree nodes" and normalized (or powered) Laplacians catch "tails", with spectral clustering accuracy of only 51%.

Robust accuracy against power orders. We illustrate how the robust accuracy performs when we increase the power order in both r-GCN and VPN on Citeseer in Figure 11. As shown, since the other r - 1 graphs are also generated from the original adjacency, once the original graph is perturbed, then all graphs are poisoned in the model. Thus the robustness is proved if the accuracy has less decrease as verified.

Visualization of network embeddings. We used t-SNE (Maaten and Hinton 2008) to visualize the network embeddings learned by r-GCN (Figure 13) and VPN (Figure 14) for Citeseer, Cora and Pubmed. As can be seen, with very limited labels, the proposed methods can learn an effective embedding of the nodes.

Evasion experiment. Five representative global adversar-




Figure 10: Eigenspectrum of (a) the adjacency matrix and (b) VPN raised to different powers. The convolution operator becomes similar to low-pass filters as we increase powers. The eigenspectrum of VPN also has sharper edges than the original adjacency matrix.



Figure 11: Robust accuracy for Citeseer (under DICE) as we increase power orders.

ial attack methods are considered as comparisons:

- DICE (Zügner and Günnemann 2019) (remove internally, insert externally): it randomly disconnects nodes from the same class and connects nodes from different classes.
- \mathcal{A}_{abr} and \mathcal{A}_{DW_3} (Bojchevski and Günnemann 2019):

both attack methods are matrix perturbation theory based. \mathcal{A}_{DW_3} is the closed-form attack for edge deletion and \mathcal{A}_{abr} is the add-by-remove strategy based method for edge insertion.

 Meta-Train and Meta-Self (Zügner and Günnemann 2019): both attack approaches are meta learning based. The metagradient approach with self-training is denoted as Meta-Self and the variant without self-training is denoted as Meta-Train. Note that both attack methods result in OOM (out of memory) on Pubmed, we choose to report the performance against them only on Citeseer and Cora.

We provide the post-evasion accuracy in Table 3 and Table 4 and robustness enhancement in Figure 15, Figure 16 and Figure 17 for Citeseer, Cora, and Pubmed. Results are obtained with 20 random initializations on a given attacked network.

Computational efficiency. The adjacency matrix could be much denser after being powered several times, which poses a general challenge for all high-order matrix-based approaches. To alleviate this issue, we employ a simple sparsification strategy as described in the main paper. To demonstrate the computational efficiency of the proposed method, we introduce a running time comparison experiment on the real world social network (Social circles: Facebook) (Leskovec and Mcauley

Table 3: Summary of evasion attack performance on DICE, A_{abr} and A_{DW_3} in terms of post-evasion accuracy (in percent). Best performance under each setting is in bold.

		Attack Method						DICE					
$ \begin{array}{c} \mbox{Auch Res}(*) & OCN & IGCNR900 & IGCNAD & LacoNNe & ROCN & PsecLup 2 & PsecLup 3 & SOC & Multipe & FoCN & VYN \\ \hline \begin{tabular}{lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$		Attack Wellou											
$ \begin{array}{c} 5 & 65.5 & 10.7 & 61.1 \pm 0.6 & 61.4 \pm 0.6 & 60.9 \pm 0.7 & 61.8 \pm 1.4 & 60.3 \pm 0.7 & 62.8 \pm 0.6 & 70.8 \pm 1.0 & 70.1 $		Attack Rate (%)	GCN	IGCN(RNM)	IGCN(AR)	LanczosNet	RGCN		PowerLap 3	SGC	MixHop	r-GCN	VPN
$ \begin{array}{c} \mbox{Here} \\ He$													
		10	66.3 ± 0.1	61.6 ± 0.3	61.9 ± 0.2	57.6 ± 0.4	67.9 ± 0.5	62.5 ± 0.4	62.9 ± 0.4	67.5 ± 0.7	67.7 ± 0.7	68.6 ± 0.6	68.3 ± 0.9
25 000 1.06 35.4 1.0 05.3 1.1 2	Citeseer					55.7 ± 0.5					65.4 ± 1.1		
	Cheseer										64.0 ± 1.0 63.2 ± 0.4		
$ \begin{array}{c} \mathbf{s} & 772 \pm 0.3 & 772 \pm 0.9 & 783 \pm 0.3 & 773 \pm 0.0 & 775 \pm 0.1 & 775 \pm 0.1 & 775 \pm 0.5 & 775 \pm 0.0 & 704 \pm 0.0 & 775 \pm 1.0 & 704 \pm 0.0 & 755 \pm 1.0 & 704 \pm 0.0 & 755 \pm 1.0 & 704 \pm 0.0 & 755 \pm 0.0 & 704 \pm 0.0 & 775 \pm 0.0 & 775$	Cora Pubmed Citeseer Cora Pubmed												61.4 ± 0.4
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$		Attack Rate (%)	GCN	IGCN(RNM)	IGCN(AR)	LanczosNet	RGCN	PowerLap 2	PowerLap 3	SGC	MixHop	r-GCN	VPN
$ \begin{array}{c} 10 & 76.7 & 0.7 & 70.7 & 70.7 & 10.2 & 74.5 \pm 10 & 74.5 \pm $		5	79.2 ± 0.3	77.2 ± 0.9	78.0 ± 0.3	73.0 ± 0.9	79.5 ± 0.4	77.5 ± 1.1	74.0 ± 0.5	78.2 ± 0.2	80.1 ± 0.2	80.6 ± 0.8	78.4 ± 0.2
$ \begin{array}{c} \text{Cors} & 20 & 72.5 \pm 0.6 & 68.9 \pm 0.2 & 69.8 \pm 0.6 & 62.8 \pm 0.7 & 72.9 \pm 0.2 & 69.9 \pm 0.7 & 61.0 \pm 0.3 & 71.6 \pm 1.0 & 71.6 \pm 0.8 & 71.3 \pm 0.3 \\ 71.0 \pm 0.0 & 62.2 \pm 0.5 & 67.4 \pm 0.9 & 63.4 \pm 1.3 & 70.4 \pm 1.4 & 70.4 \pm 0.6 & 71.1 \pm 1.0 & 71.4 \pm 0.0 & 72.7 \pm 0.2 & 60.4 \pm 0.3 \\ 80.9 \pm 0.1 & 67.5 \pm 0.0 & 67.5 \pm 0.0 & 63.9 \pm 1.4 & 70.9 \pm 0.0 & 66.1 \pm 1.0 & 58.8 \pm 0.0 & 70.1 \pm 0.0 & 72.7 \pm 0.0 & 60.1 \pm 0.3 \\ 77.3 \pm 0.4 & 71.8 \pm 0.8 & 75.8 \pm 0.2 & 72.8 \pm 0.8 & 70.1 \pm 0.0 & 71.4 \pm 0.0 \\ 77.3 \pm 0.4 & 71.8 \pm 0.8 & 75.8 \pm 0.2 & 72.8 \pm 0.8 & 70.1 \pm 0.0 & 71.2 \pm 0.0 & 60.2 \pm 2.7 & 73.6 \pm 0.5 & 70.1 \pm 0.5 & 77.1 \pm 0.0 \\ 77.3 \pm 0.0 & 77.3 \pm 0.0 & 77.8 \pm 0.0 & 63.8 \pm 0.0 & 77.8 \pm 0$			76.7 ± 0.7	73.7 ± 0.2	74.5 ± 0.7	69.6 ± 1.5	77.5 ± 0.5	74.6 ± 0.8	70.9 ± 0.5	76.1 ± 0.1	76.9 ± 0.1	78.6 ± 0.8	75.0 ± 0.3
$ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	Cora												
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$													
$ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $		30											69.7 ± 0.5
$ \begin{array}{c} \mbox{Pubmed} \\ \begin{tabular}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$		Attack Rate (%)	GCN	IGCN(RNM)	IGCN(AR)	LanczosNet	RGCN	PowerLap 2	PowerLap 3	SGC	MixHop	r-GCN	VPN
$ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $													77.1 ± 0.6
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$													
$ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	Pubmed												70.1 ± 0.7
Attack Method A_{obc} Model Model 5 60.2 ± 0.2 61.7 ± 0.1 60.4 ± 0.1 57.3 ± 0.7 70.4 ± 0.8 68.3 ± 0.2 61.1 ± 0.0 77.4 ± 0.8 70.8 ± 1.0 70.8 ± 1.0 70.8 ± 1.0 70.8 ± 1.0 70.8 ± 0.2 50.1 ± 2.7 70.4 ± 0.8 70.8 ± 1.0 70.2 ± 1.0 63.2 ± 2.2 60.8 ± 0.4 77.7 ± 1.7 70.8 ± 0.0 80.1 ± 0.0 80.1 ± 0.0 80.1 ± 0.0 80.1 ± 0.0 80.1 ± 0.0 80.1 ± 0.0 80.1 ± 0.0 80.1 ± 0.0 80.1 ± 0.0 80.1 ± 0.0 81.1 ± 0.0 77.4 ± 0.8 80.4 ± 0.0 77.4 ± 0.8 80.4 ± 0.0 77.4 ± 0.8 80.4 ± 0.0 77.4 ± 0.8 77.4 ± 0.8 77.4 ± 0.8 77.4 ± 0.8 77.4 ± 0.8 77.4 ± 0.8 77.4 ± 0.8 77.4 ± 0.8 77.4 ± 0.8 <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>63.6 ± 0.3</td> <td>65.7 ± 0.2</td> <td>61.5 ± 1.6</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>68.8 ± 0.1</td>				63.6 ± 0.3	65.7 ± 0.2	61.5 ± 1.6							68.8 ± 0.1
		30	57.5 ± 0.9	63.7 ± 0.2	65.0 ± 1.0	62.2 ± 0.3	66.3 ± 0.2	63.5 ± 0.7	56.3 ± 1.0	66.0 ± 0.5	64.5 ± 0.3	66.5 ± 0.1	67.1 ± 0.3
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$		Attack Method											
$ \begin{array}{c} 5 \\ \text{Cfteseer} & \begin{array}{c} 602 \pm 0.2 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ $		A.u. 1 D	CON	ICON(D) D C	ICON () E	7 X7	DCCN		D 1 2	000	NC 11	000	VIDY
$ \begin{array}{c} 10 \\ \text{Ctieseer} & 10 \\ 15 \\ 16 \\ 66 \\ 61 \\ 20 \\ 66 \\ 64 \\ 10 \\ 20 \\ 66 \\ 10 \\ 10 \\ 30 \\ 63 \\ 10 \\ 10 \\ 30 \\ 63 \\ 10 \\ 10 \\ 30 \\ 63 \\ 10 \\ 10 \\ 10 \\ 10 \\ 10 \\ 10 \\ 10 \\ 1$													
$ \begin{array}{c} \text{Ctieseer} & 20 & 66.4\pm0.5 & 40.7\pm0.5 & 47.4\pm0.8 & 69.9\pm0.8 & 62.0\pm0.3 & 52.2\pm22 & 69.5\pm0.5 & 67.9\pm1.2 & 70.3\pm0.2 & 70.1\pm0.3 \\ 25 & 65.6\pm0.5 & 45.4\pm0.6 & 45.2\pm0.6 & 40.2\pm0.0 & 69.1\pm0.4 & 69.1\pm0.6 \\ \hline & 41.8\pm0.6 & 40.2\pm0.6 & 40.5\pm0.9 & 68.7\pm1.0 & 57.2\pm0.1 & 57.2\pm0.4 & 67.7\pm0.3 & 67.5\pm0.4 & 69.7\pm0.4 \\ \hline & 60.1\pm0.6 & 60.1\pm0.6 & 77.5\pm1.0 & 81.0\pm0.4 & 79.8\pm0.4 & 75.2\pm1.1 & 79.7\pm0.6 & 81.1\pm0.3 & 80.9\pm0.9 & 81.5\pm0.2 \\ \hline & 60.8 & 10.1 & 77.6\pm0.1 & 77.5\pm0.1 & 77.5\pm1.1 & 80.1\pm0.7 & 73.9\pm1.6 & 80.1\pm0.3 & 80.9\pm0.9 & 81.5\pm0.9 \\ \hline & 50.8 & 11.0 & 77.6\pm0.2 & 77.2\pm0.2 & 77.2\pm0.1 & 79.8\pm0.4 & 79.8\pm0.4 & 75.2\pm1.1 & 79.7\pm0.6 & 81.1\pm0.3 & 80.9\pm0.9 & 81.5\pm0.2 \\ \hline & 60.8 & 10.1 & 77.6\pm0.2 & 77.2\pm0.2 & 77.2\pm0.1 & 79.8\pm0.6 & 80.1\pm0.3 & 80.9\pm0.9 & 81.5\pm0.9 \\ \hline & 60.7 & 20.0 & 77.2\pm0.2 & 77.2\pm0.2 & 77.2\pm0.2 & 77.2\pm0.2 & 77.5\pm0.1 & 60.9\pm5.7 & 78.2\pm0.4 & 79.9\pm0.8 & 80.9\pm0.9 & 80.9\pm0.9 \\ \hline & 67.7\pm0.0 & 77.2\pm0.2 & 77.2\pm0.2 & 77.2\pm0.2 & 77.2\pm0.2 & 77.2\pm0.8 & 77.7\pm0.8 & 80.9\pm0.3 & 77.8\pm0.8 & 80.9\pm0.3 & 70.9\pm0.8 & 80.9\pm0.3 \\ \hline & 77.7\pm0.0 & 77.5\pm0.4 & 75.9\pm0.2 & 77.2\pm0.2 & 77.2\pm0.8 & 77.7\pm0.8 & 77.1\pm0.8 & 77.1\pm0.8 & 77.8\pm0.8 & 80.9\pm0.3 & 77.8\pm0.8 & 77.7\pm0.8 & 80.9\pm0.3 & 77.8\pm0.8 & 77.8\pm0.8 & 77.1\pm0.8 & 77.1\pm0.8 & 77.8\pm0.8 & 77$						57.3 ± 0.7 55.0 ± 0.2							
$ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	~	15		53.6 ± 0.4	52.1 ± 0.4	50.7 ± 0.9	70.2 ± 1.0		55.3 ± 2.3		68.7 ± 0.4	70.4 ± 0.4	70.6 ± 0.7
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	Citeseer												
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$													
$ \begin{array}{c} 5 \\ \text{Cora} & \begin{array}{c} 5 \\ \text{Cora} & \begin{array}{c} 811\pm0.1 & 77.6\pm0.1 \\ \text{N} & 77.5\pm0.2 \\ \text{N} & 77.5\pm0.2 \\ \text{Cora} & \begin{array}{c} 77.5\pm0.2 \\ \text{N} & 77.5\pm0.3 \\ \text{N} & 77.5\pm0.4 \\ \text{N} & 77.5\pm0.3 \\ \text{N} & 77.5\pm0.3 \\ \text{N} & 77.5\pm0.4 \\ \text{N} & 77.5\pm0.3 \\ \text{N} & 77.5\pm0.4 \\ \text{N} & 77.5\pm0.4 \\ \text{N} & 77.5\pm0.3 \\ \text{N} & 77.5\pm0.3 \\ \text{N} & 77.5\pm0.3 \\ \text{N} & 77.5\pm0.4 \\ \text{N} & 77.5\pm0.3 \\ \text{N} & 78.2\pm0.3 \\ \text{N} & 78$		Attack Rate (%)					RGCN						
$ \begin{array}{c} \mbox{Cora} & 15 & 79.7 \pm 0.2 & 74.3 \pm 0.4 & 77.7 \pm 0.2 & 72.7 \pm 1.0 & 80.1 \pm 0.4 & 77.1 \pm 1.2 & 69.9 \pm 1.7 & 78.6 \pm 0.1 & 79.7 \pm 1.5 & 79.7 \pm 1.0 & 79.3 \pm 0.6 \\ 25 & 77.4 \pm 0.3 & 64.9 \pm 0.6 & 70.1 \pm 0.3 & 68.2 \pm 0.2 & 72.5 \pm 0.4 & 79.2 \pm 0.4 & 79.2 \pm 0.4 & 79.2 \pm 0.2 & 79.3 \pm 0.6 \\ 30 & 75.6 \pm 0.6 & 59.2 \pm 0.7 & 66.2 \pm 0.4 & 65.5 \pm 0.8 & 77.7 \pm 0.8 & 71.0 \pm 1.9 & 77.4 \pm 0.8 & 77.4 \pm 0.8 & 77.4 \pm 0.8 \\ 77.6 \pm 0.6 & 77.5 \pm 0.6 & 77.5 \pm 0.4 & 79.2 \pm 0.4 & 65.5 \pm 0.8 & 77.7 \pm 0.8 & 77.4 \pm 0.8 & 77.4 \pm 0.8 & 77.8 \pm 0.4 & 79.4 \pm 0.8 \\ 77.5 \pm 0.6 & 77.3 \pm 0.8 & 76.4 \pm 0.2 & 75.9 \pm 0.4 & 75.0 \pm 0.2 & 77.6 \pm 0.1 & 75.6 \pm 0.6 & 67.3 \pm 1.2 & 77.8 \pm 0.8 & 78.2 \pm 0.3 & 78.6 \pm 0.8 \\ 77.3 \pm 0.8 & 76.4 \pm 0.2 & 75.9 \pm 0.4 & 75.0 \pm 0.7 & 77.6 \pm 0.1 & 75.6 \pm 0.6 & 67.3 \pm 1.2 & 77.8 \pm 0.8 & 78.2 \pm 0.3 & 78.6 \pm 0.6 \\ 10 & 74.3 \pm 0.5 & 77.4 \pm 0.1 & 77.0 \pm 0.6 & 76.1 \pm 0.1 & 76.5 \pm 0.5 & 77.5 \pm 0.4 & 77.7 \pm 0.5 & 77.7 \pm 0.4 \\ 15 & 73.5 \pm 0.7 & 71.9 \pm 0.4 & 60.4 \pm 0.0 & 70.5 \pm 0.6 & 76.5 \pm 0.1 & 75.5 \pm 0.4 & 75.5 \pm 0.4 & 75.7 \pm 0.4 & 77.7 \pm 0.4 \\ 20 & 73.7 \pm 0.1 & 68.7 \pm 0.7 & 66.2 \pm 0.0 & 69.1 \pm 0.8 & 76.5 \pm 0.1 & 73.1 \pm 0.5 & 58.0 \pm 0.6 & 76.3 \pm 1.1 & 77.3 \pm 1.2 & 77.3 \pm 0.4 & 77.7 \pm 0.4 \\ 25 & 72.2 \pm 0.11 & 64.9 \pm 0.2 & 63.2 \pm 0.5 & 67.6 \pm 0.3 & 75.1 \pm 0.3 & 75.1 \pm 0.4 & 76.7 \pm 0.4 & 76.7 \pm 0.7 & 77.2 \pm 0.4 \\ 25 & 72.2 \pm 0.1 & 64.9 \pm 0.2 & 63.1 \pm 0.6 & 65.8 \pm 1.2 & 75.9 \pm 0.2 & 72.4 \pm 0.6 & 58.4 \pm 0.6 & 76.2 \pm 0.3 & 75.9 \pm 0.5 & 77.2 \pm 0.6 & 76.7 \pm 0.5 \\ 77.2 \pm 0.4 & 16.4 \pm 0.2 & 63.1 \pm 0.6 & 65.1 \pm 0.2 & 60.0 \pm 0.5 & 70.3 \pm 0.6 & 50.2 \pm 0.0 & 70.1 \pm 0.8 & 70.5 \pm 0.4 & 75.7 \pm 0.4 & 76.7 \pm 0.7 & 77.2 \pm 0.4 & 76.7 \pm $		5	81.1 ± 0.1	77.6 ± 0.1	80.5 ± 0.1		81.0 ± 0.4	79.8 ± 0.4		79.7 ± 0.6	81.1 ± 0.3	80.9 ± 0.9	81.5 ± 0.2
$ \begin{array}{c} \mbox{Cora} & 20 & 78.9 \pm 0.2 & 71.2 \pm 0.5 & 73.2 \pm 0.2 & 70.5 \pm 0.2 & 70.9 \pm 1.6 & 66.8 \pm 2.5 & 78.2 \pm 0.4 & 79.0 \pm 0.4 & 79.1 \pm 0.2 & 79.3 \pm 0.6 \\ 30 & 75.6 \pm 0.6 & 59.2 \pm 0.7 & 61.0 \pm 0.8 & 55.2 \pm 0.6 & 78.5 \pm 1.1 & 73.2 \pm 1.6 & 67.1 \pm 0.3 & 77.8 \pm 0.0 & 77.3 \pm 0.8 & 77.8 \pm 0.0 \\ 30 & 75.6 \pm 0.6 & 59.2 \pm 0.7 & 65.2 \pm 0.6 & 75.5 \pm 1.1 & 73.2 \pm 1.6 & 67.1 \pm 0.3 & 77.8 \pm 0.0 & 77.3 \pm 0.8 & 77.8 \pm 0.0 \\ \mbox{Attack Rate} (\%) & GCN & IGCN(RNM) & IGCN(AR) & LanczosNet & RGCN & PowerLap 2 & PowerLap 3 & SGC & MixHop & r-GCN & VPN \\ \mbox{Pubmed} & 25 & 75.3 \pm 0.8 & 76.4 \pm 0.2 & 77.6 \pm 0.0 & 70.4 \pm 0.3 & 77.4 \pm 0.6 & 77.3 \pm 0.8 & 77.7 \pm 0.8 & 77.4 \pm 0.6 & 77.3 \pm 0.8 & 77.7 \pm 0.4 & 77.5 \pm 0.9 & 77.2 \pm 0.2 & 77.7 \pm 0.5 & 77.7 \pm 0.4 & 77.5 \pm 0.9 & 77.2 \pm 0.3 & 77.4 \pm 0.6 & 73.5 \pm 0.1 & 77.5 \pm 0.4 & 77.7 \pm 0.8 & 77.4 \pm 0.6 & 75.4 \pm 0.4 & 75.5 \pm 0.1 & 77.3 \pm 0.8 & 77.4 \pm 0.6 & 75.4 \pm 0.4 & 77.5 \pm 0.9 & 77.2 \pm 0.3 & 77.4 \pm 0.6 & 73.4 \pm 0.6 & 75.4 \pm 0.4 & 77.5 \pm 0.4 & 77.7 \pm 0.4 & $						74.0 ± 1.7	80.0 ± 0.6	78.9 ± 0.7	73.0 ± 1.5		80.6 ± 0.3		81.1 ± 0.8
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Cora					72.7 ± 1.0 70.5 ± 0.2							
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$		25	77.4 ± 0.3		70.1 ± 0.3		78.5 ± 1.1						
$ \begin{array}{c} 5 \\ \mbox{T} 5 & 5 & 0.6 \\ 10 \\ \mbox{T} 4 & 3 & 0.5 \\ 15 \\ \mbox{T} 3 & 5 & 0.7 \\ \mbox{T} 1 & 3 & 0.0 \\ 15 \\ \mbox{T} 3 & 5 & 0.1 \\ 15 \\ \mbox{T} 3 & 5 & 0.1 \\ 15 \\ \mbox{T} 3 & 5 & 0.1 \\ 15 \\ \mbox{T} 3 & 5 & 0.1 \\ 15 \\ \mbox{T} 3 & 5 & 0.1 \\ \mbox{T} 1 & 5 & 0.0 \\ \mbox{T} 1 & 0.0 \\ \m$		30		59.2 ± 0.7	66.2 ± 0.4	65.5 ± 0.8		71.0 ± 1.9	57.4 ± 2.8		77.1 ± 0.6	77.3 ± 0.8	77.6 ± 1.0
$ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $		Attack Rate (%)		IGCN(RNM)		LanczosNet		PowerLap 2	PowerLap 3	SGC		r-GCN	
$ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $													
$ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $													
$ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	Pubmed												77.7 ± 0.1
Attack Method A_{DW_3} Model Attack Rate (%) GCN IGCN(RNM) IGCN(AR) LanczosNet RGCN PowerLap 2 PowerLap 3 SGC MixHop r-GCN VPN 5 68.8 ± 0.1 63.5 ± 0.4 65.1 ± 0.2 60.0 ± 0.5 70.3 ± 0.6 69.2 ± 1.0 70.0 ± 0.8 70.5 ± 0.5 70.4 ± 1.0 71.8 ± 0.3 70.6 ± 0.6 70.1 ± 0.8 69.4 ± 0.4 71.2 ± 0.7 70.2 ± 0.7 70.2 ± 0.7 70.2 ± 0.7 70.2 ± 0.7 70.2 ± 0.7 70.2 ± 0.7 70.2 ± 0.7 70.2 ± 0.7 70.2 ± 0.7 70.2 ± 0.7 70.2 ± 0.7 70.4 ± 0.7				64.9 ± 0.2		67.6 ± 0.9	75.8 ± 0.3			75.5 ± 0.4	75.7 ± 0.4		77.2 ± 0.3
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$			72.8 ± 0.9	03.1 ± 0.0	01.1 ± 0.0	65.8 ± 1.2	75.9 ± 0.2	72.4 ± 0.6	55.4 ± 0.0	76.2 ± 0.3	75.9 ± 0.5	77.2 ± 0.6	76.7 ± 0.5
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$		Attack Method											
$ \begin{array}{c} 5 & 68.8 \pm 0.1 & 63.5 \pm 0.4 & 65.1 \pm 0.2 & 60.0 \pm 0.5 & 70.3 \pm 0.6 & 69.2 \pm 1.0 & 70.0 \pm 0.8 & 70.5 \pm 0.5 & 70.4 \pm 1.0 & 71.8 \pm 0.3 & 70.6 \pm 0.6 & 70.2 \pm 0.7 & 70.4 \pm 0.7 & 71.2 \pm 0.1 & 70.1 \pm 0.2 & 70.4 \pm 0.7 & 70.1 \pm$		4	CON		ICONTRA	×	DOON					6.01	1/01/
$ \begin{array}{c} 10 & 68.4 \pm 0.2 & 63.1 \pm 0.6 & 63.6 \pm 0.5 & 59.5 \pm 0.9 & 70.1 \pm 0.6 & 69.3 \pm 1.1 & 69.6 \pm 0.6 & 70.1 \pm 0.8 & 69.4 \pm 0.4 & 71.2 \pm 0.7 & 70.2 \pm 0.7 \\ 68.9 \pm 0.1 & 62.9 \pm 0.7 & 63.2 \pm 0.8 & 59.5 \pm 0.9 & 70.3 \pm 0.4 & 69.4 \pm 1.0 & 69.8 \pm 0.7 & 70.6 \pm 0.8 & 68.7 \pm 1.4 & 71.2 \pm 0.1 & 70.6 \pm 0.4 \\ 20 & 68.8 \pm 0.5 & 63.5 \pm 0.8 & 63.4 \pm 0.7 & 59.1 \pm 0.8 & 69.8 \pm 0.4 & 69.4 \pm 1.0 & 69.5 \pm 0.7 & 70.3 \pm 0.2 & 67.9 \pm 1.4 & 71.2 \pm 0.1 & 70.1 \pm 0.2 \\ 25 & 68.8 \pm 0.4 & 63.6 \pm 0.7 & 63.8 \pm 0.6 & 59.3 \pm 0.4 & 69.9 \pm 0.5 & 69.2 \pm 0.9 & 69.3 \pm 0.9 & 70.2 \pm 0.5 & 67.7 \pm 0.8 & 71.2 \pm 0.1 & 70.1 \pm 0.2 \\ 30 & 68.8 \pm 0.4 & 63.6 \pm 0.7 & 63.8 \pm 0.6 & 59.3 \pm 0.1 & 69.9 \pm 0.5 & 69.2 \pm 0.9 & 69.3 \pm 0.9 & 70.2 \pm 0.7 & 67.3 \pm 0.1 & 71.2 \pm 0.0 & 70.1 \pm 0.9 \\ \hline \\ $											-		
$ \begin{array}{c} \mbox{Citescer} & 15 & 68.9 \pm 0.1 & 62.9 \pm 0.7 & 63.2 \pm 0.8 & 59.5 \pm 0.9 & 70.3 \pm 0.4 & 69.5 \pm 1.1 & 69.8 \pm 0.7 & 70.6 \pm 0.8 & 68.7 \pm 1.4 & 71.2 \pm 0.1 & 70.6 \pm 0.4 \\ 68.8 \pm 0.5 & 63.5 \pm 0.8 & 63.4 \pm 0.7 & 59.1 \pm 0.8 & 69.8 \pm 0.4 & 69.4 \pm 1.0 & 69.5 \pm 0.7 & 70.3 \pm 0.2 & 67.9 \pm 1.4 & 71.2 \pm 0.1 & 70.4 \pm 0.7 \\ 71.2 \pm 0.1 & 70.4 \pm 0.7 & 70.4 \pm 0.7 & 70.3 \pm 0.2 & 67.9 \pm 1.4 & 71.2 \pm 0.1 & 70.4 \pm 0.7 \\ 71.2 \pm 0.1 & 70.4 \pm 0.7 & 70.4 \pm 0.7 & 70.3 \pm 0.2 & 67.9 \pm 1.4 & 71.2 \pm 0.1 & 70.4 \pm 0.7 \\ 71.2 \pm 0.1 & 70.4 \pm 0.7 & 70.4 \pm 0.7 & 70.3 \pm 0.2 & 67.9 \pm 1.4 & 71.2 \pm 0.1 & 70.4 \pm 0.7 \\ 71.2 \pm 0.0 & 70.1 \pm 0.2 & 70.4 \pm 0.7 & 63.8 \pm 0.6 & 59.3 \pm 0.1 & 69.9 \pm 0.5 & 69.2 \pm 0.9 & 69.3 \pm 0.9 & 70.2 \pm 0.7 & 67.3 \pm 0.1 & 71.2 \pm 0.0 & 70.1 \pm 0.9 \\ \hline \mbox{Attack Rate (\%)} & \mbox{GCN} & \mbox{IGCN(RM)} & \mbox{IGCN(AR)} & \mbox{LanczosNet} & \mbox{RGCN} & \mbox{PowerLap 2} & \mbox{PowerLap 3} & \mbox{SGC} & \mbox{MiHop} & \mbox{r-GCN} & \mbox{VPN} \\ \hline \mbox{Scale} & 5 & 80.0 \pm 0.7 & 78.9 \pm 0.2 & 79.2 \pm 0.4 & 78.1 \pm 0.8 & 80.5 \pm 0.9 & 77.8 \pm 0.9 & 77.0 \pm 1.4 & 78.3 \pm 0.3 & 80.3 \pm 0.3 & 80.8 \pm 0.7 & 80.8 \pm 0.5 & 0.3 \\ 10 & 79.7 \pm 0.9 & 78.7 \pm 0.2 & 78.9 \pm 0.4 & 77.8 \pm 1.0 & 80.1 \pm 0.6 & 77.8 \pm 0.8 & 80.0 \pm 0.7 & 78.0 \pm 0.8 & 80.5 \pm 0.3 \\ 15 & 79.3 \pm 0.7 & 77.1 \pm 0.2 & 77.7 \pm 0.4 & 76.8 \pm 1.0 & 70.8 \pm 1.0 & 70.8 \pm 0.0 & 80.1 \pm 0.2 & 80.7 \pm 0.8 & 80.5 \pm 0.3 \\ 20 & 78.3 \pm 1.0 & 75.5 \pm 0.2 & 75.6 \pm 0.3 & 75.7 \pm 0.3 & 79.3 \pm 0.6 & 76.9 \pm 1.2 & 77.1 \pm 0.5 & 78.0 \pm 0.2 & 79.8 \pm 1.0 & 80.3 \pm 0.5 & 80.3 \pm 0.2 \\ 25 & 77.8 \pm 0.6 & 75.3 \pm 0.3 & 74.4 \pm 0.7 & 74.6 \pm 1.8 & 78.7 \pm 0.5 & 76.6 \pm 1.1 & 75.9 \pm 0.6 & 77.3 \pm 0.0 & 79.2 \pm 0.0 & 77.8 \pm 0.0 & 79.1 \pm 0.5 \\ 30 & 77.8 \pm 0.8 & 75.0 \pm 0.2 & 73.8 \pm 0.7 & 74.5 \pm 1.8 & 77.8 \pm 0.1 & 74.8 \pm 1.7 & 76.5 \pm 0.5 & 78.0 \pm 0.4 & 79.3 \pm 0.9 & 78.6 \pm 1.0 \\ 30 & 77.8 \pm 0.8 & 75.0 \pm 0.2 & 78.6 \pm 0.7 & 75.3 \pm 1.0 & 77.9 \pm 0.3 & 74.7 \pm 1.9 & 77.4 \pm 0.4 & 77.3 \pm 0.4 & 77.3 \pm 0.3 & 77.8 \pm 0.3 & 78.4 \pm 0.7 \\ 10 & 77.8 \pm 0.2 & 78.6 \pm 0.7 & 75.3 \pm 1.0 & 77.5 \pm 0.3 & 74.2 \pm 1.5 & 76.9 \pm 0.4 & 77.3 \pm 0.4 & 77.8 $								09.2 ± 1.0 69.3 ± 1.1					
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$ \begin{array}{c} 5 \\ \text{Cora} \\ \begin{array}{c} 5 \\ 10 \\ 10 \\ 79.7 \pm 0.9 \\ 15 \\ 20 \\ 78.3 \pm 0.5 \\ 78.3 \pm 0.5 \\ 77.8 \pm 0.8 \\ 75.0 \pm 0.2 \\ 75.3 \pm 0.3 \\ 77.8 \pm 0.2 \\ 77.8 \pm 0.4 \\ 77.8 \pm 0.4 \\ 77.8 \pm 0.4 \\ 77.8 \pm 0.4 \\ 77.8 \pm 1.0 \\ 77.8 \pm 1.1 \\ 77.8 \pm 0.4 \\ 77.8 \pm 0.5 \\ 78.1 \pm 1.1 \\ 77.8 \pm 1.1 \\ 77.8 \pm 1.1 \\ 77.8 \pm 1.1 \\ 77.8 \pm 0.5 \\ 77.8 \pm$													
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		5	80.0 ± 0.7	78.9 ± 0.2	79.2 ± 0.4	78.1 ± 0.8	80.5 ± 0.9	77.8 ± 0.9	77.0 ± 1.4	78.3 ± 0.3	80.3 ± 0.3	80.8 ± 0.7	80.8 ± 0.5
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$			79.7 ± 0.9	78.7 ± 0.2	78.9 ± 0.4	77.8 ± 1.0	80.1 ± 0.6	78.1 ± 1.1	77.8 ± 1.1	78.0 ± 0.9	80.1 ± 0.2	80.7 ± 0.8	80.5 ± 0.3
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Cora												
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$		25	77.8 ± 0.6	75.3 ± 0.3	74.4 ± 0.7	74.6 ± 1.8	78.7 ± 0.5	76.1 ± 1.0	76.8 ± 0.2	77.3 ± 0.2	79.1 ± 0.7	79.2 ± 0.0	79.1 ± 0.5
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$													78.6 ± 1.0
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Pubmed 15 77.4 ± 0.4 77.0 ± 0.4 77.2 ± 0.3 74.7 ± 0.3 77.5 ± 0.3 74.2 ± 1.5 76.9 ± 0.4 77.3 ± 0.4 77.3 ± 0.8 77.8 ± 0.3 78.3 ± 0.2 Pubmed 20 77.4 ± 0.4 75.8 ± 0.3 76.3 ± 0.4 77.8 ± 0.4 77.3 ± 0.4 77.3 ± 0.8 77.8 ± 0.3 78.3 ± 0.2 25 77.2 ± 0.5 75.2 ± 0.1 75.9 ± 0.4 77.5 ± 1.1 77.6 ± 0.3 73.7 ± 1.1 77.6 ± 0.3 73.7 ± 1.1 77.6 ± 0.3 77.1 ± 0.2 77.0 ± 0.3 78.1 ± 0.8 78.2 ± 0.2													
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	D 1	15	77.4 ± 0.4	77.0 ± 0.4	77.2 ± 0.3	74.7 ± 0.3	77.5 ± 0.3	74.2 ± 1.5	76.9 ± 0.4	77.3 ± 0.4	77.3 ± 0.8	77.8 ± 0.3	78.3 ± 0.2
	Pubmed												78.3 ± 0.4
						73.4 ± 0.3				77.1 ± 0.2 77.1 ± 0.3			
			=	=	= 0.0								




Figure 12: Illustration of operators for SBM, showing (top to bottom) the eigenspectrum, plots of the first 2 leading eigenvectors, and the detected clusters. We consider (from left to right) the adjacency matrix \boldsymbol{A} , normalized Laplacian $\boldsymbol{I} - \boldsymbol{D}_r^{-1/2} \boldsymbol{A} \boldsymbol{D}_r^{-1/2}$, powered normalized Laplacian $\boldsymbol{I} - \boldsymbol{D}_r^{-1/2} \boldsymbol{A}^r \boldsymbol{D}_r^{-1/2}$ (\boldsymbol{D}_r is the degree matrix of \boldsymbol{A}^r), VPN $\boldsymbol{A}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}^{(r)}$ with order 5 ($\boldsymbol{\theta}_k$ is 1 when k = 1 and 0.1 otherwise), and the normalized version $\boldsymbol{D}^{-1/2} (\boldsymbol{I} + \boldsymbol{A}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}^{(r)}) \boldsymbol{D}^{-1/2}$.

2012). This small dataset consists of "circles" (or "friends lists") from Facebook and becomes very dense from first order (4.71%) to second order (92.12%), thus is suitable to be used for computational efficiency evaluation. The results are shown in Table 5. We can find that the running efficiency of the proposed method is compatible with baselines and the density does not affect the efficiency significantly when the dataset is not too large. Moreover, in this paper, our primary goal is to improve the robustness. We leave the solution to resolve the scalability issue as a future direction.

E Discussiones

In this paper, we proposed a new graph operator to replace the graph Laplacian in the classic GCN. It is worth mentioning that our approach is very different from the k-th order polynomials of the Laplacian developed in (Defferrard, Bresson, and Vandergheynst 2016) or the high-order graph Laplacian employed in (Lee et al. 2018; Li et al. 2019; Abu-El-Haija et al. 2019; Wu et al. 2019). If the graph Laplacian L is powered to the k-th order, the resulting matrix has the same eigenvectors as L, with only the eigenvalues powered to the

k-th order. Thus, the corresponding k-th order polynomial has the same eigenvectors, with the polynomial function applied only to the eigenvalues. However, the proposed variable power operator has radically different eigenvectors as the graph Laplacian or its powered variant. This is an important difference because we observed empirically that the leading eigenvectors of a graph Laplacian are extremely sensitive to outliers under the SBM, and they often correspond to either tails or high-degree nodes (please see Figure 12 for an illustration). However, our result in Theorem 3 suggests that the leading eigenvectors of the proposed operator asymptotically recovers the underlying community under SBM, and enjoys the "spectral gap" property.

We also remark that the meaning of robustness in the machine learning literature ("adversarial robustness") and in the spectral theory literature ("spectral robustness") appear to be different. However, in this work, we argue that spectral robustness is closely related to adversarial robustness. This can be explained from a matrix perturbation point of view. Let λ_k and ϕ_k be the eigenvalue and the corresponding eigenvector of the adjacency matrix A. Then, the sensitivity of the eigenvector to the perturbation is given by (Trefethen and




Figure 13: t-SNE visualization of network embeddings learned by r-GCN.




Figure 14: t-SNE visualization of network embeddings learned by VPN.

Bau III 1997):

$$rac{\partial oldsymbol{\phi}_k}{\partial oldsymbol{A}_{(ij)}} = \sum_{\ell=1,\ell
eq k}^n rac{\phi_{\ell(i)}\phi_{k(j)}(2-\delta_{(ij)})}{\lambda_k-\lambda_\ell} oldsymbol{\phi}_\ell$$

where $A_{(ij)}$ is the (i, j)-th entry of A, $\phi_{k(j)}$ is the *j*-th entry of ϕ_k , $\delta_{(ij)}$ is the perturbation of the (i, j)-th entry of A, and *n* is the dimension of A. It can be seen that the perturbation of the convolutional operator is controlled by the inverse of the spectral gap. When the spectral gaps between the leading eigenvalues (i.e., λ_1 and λ_2) and the rest of the eigenvalues are large, the perturbations of the leading eigenvectors due to the adversarial attack are controlled. Since the eigenvalues of the graph convolutional operator decays very quickly (see Figure 10 as an illustration), the learned representation is heavily influenced by the leading eigenvectors. Thus, by controlling the perturbations of the leading eigenvectors, one can expect to control the perturbations of the outputs.

Our theoretical result in Theorem 3 was based on the standard SBM, which is a classic model proposed in mathematical sociology and has been adopted to model and analyze real-world social and biological networks (Funke and Becker 2019). The main advantage of SBM is that it encodes the structural information that nodes belong to the same community tend to be more connected with each other. Nevertheless, we recognize one limitation of our analysis is that SBM might not be a suitable model for some existing or future applications, in which case, models with more flexibility in the degree distributions, such as the degree-corrected SBM proposed by (Karrer and Newman 2011), labeled SBM by (Heimlicher, Lelarge, and Massoulié 2012), or hiearchical SBM proposed by (Peixoto 2017) could be more applicable. Also our analysis is limited to two communities, and the extension to more than two communities is a challenging open problem. Nevertheless, through extensive experiments, we observed that our theory has strong implications for real-world graphs. This is evident from the informative and robust lowfrequency spectral signal results in Figures 7 and 8, which show that the proposed graph convolution operator has a clear advantage in the low-frequency regime over the classic graph Laplacian in terms of classification accuracy.

In the case of sparse graph (the expected degree is constant w.r.t. the size of the graph n), the largest eigenvalue of adjacency matrix A is on the order of $\Theta(\sqrt{\frac{\log(n)}{\log\log(n)}})$ that corresponds to the high-degree nodes. To see this, the (squared) eigenvalue created by a node v is $e_v^T A^2 e_v = ||Ae_v||_2^2$, which is the degree of vertex v, where e_v is a vector with only a one on the vertex v and zero elsewhere. Then max of this term over all vertices is the maximum degree. Since the degree in the sparse case is roughly Poisson of a constant expectation, the maximum of n weakly correlated Poisson r.v.s behaves like $\Theta(\frac{\log(n)}{\log\log(n)})$, which can be arbitrarily large as the size n grows. Therefore, without proper adjustments, the "useful" second eigenvalue is hiding in a bunch of outliers created by the high-degree nodes.


Table 4: Summary of evasion attack performance on Meta-Train and Meta-Self in terms of post-evasion accuracy (in percent). **OOM** (out of memory) for both methods on Pubmed.


	Attack Method						Meta-Train					
							Model					
	Attack Rate (%)	GCN	IGCN(RNM)	IGCN(AR)	LanczosNet	RGCN	PowerLap 2	PowerLap 3	SGC	MixHop	r-GCN	VPN
	5	67.6 ± 0.3	62.8 ± 0.8	63.1 ± 1.2	57.7 ± 0.7	69.3 ± 0.5	66.8 ± 1.1	64.9 ± 1.5	70.0 ± 0.3	69.6 ± 0.6	70.4 ± 0.7	70.4 ± 0.6
	10	66.0 ± 1.0	61.0 ± 1.1	61.4 ± 1.0	56.4 ± 0.3	68.3 ± 0.7	65.2 ± 0.9	61.9 ± 1.4	68.3 ± 0.2	68.9 ± 1.0	68.7 ± 0.4	69.4 ± 1.0
	15	66.1 ± 0.6	60.9 ± 1.1	61.4 ± 1.0	55.4 ± 0.8	67.3 ± 0.4	64.5 ± 1.3	60.9 ± 1.9	67.3 ± 0.8	67.8 ± 0.8	67.9 ± 0.6	68.6 ± 0.3
Citeseer	20	64.9 ± 0.9	59.1 ± 1.4	59.7 ± 0.8	54.5 ± 0.1	66.6 ± 0.6	63.0 ± 1.2	58.2 ± 2.1	67.2 ± 0.5	67.1 ± 0.9	67.6 ± 0.4	68.5 ± 0.8
	25	64.3 ± 0.7	57.9 ± 1.8	59.8 ± 1.0	54.0 ± 0.4	66.3 ± 0.7	62.7 ± 1.1	55.8 ± 2.6	66.1 ± 0.5	66.5 ± 1.7	67.0 ± 0.5	67.0 ± 0.2
	30	64.8 ± 1.1	59.8 ± 1.0	59.0 ± 0.8	53.5 ± 0.8	65.2 ± 0.4	61.8 ± 0.8	56.1 ± 1.9	65.0 ± 0.8	65.5 ± 0.7	66.0 ± 0.8	66.1 ± 0.1
	Attack Rate (%)	GCN	IGCN(RNM)	IGCN(AR)	LanczosNet	RGCN	PowerLap 2	PowerLap 3	SGC	MixHop	r-GCN	VPN
	5	79.8 ± 0.9	76.5 ± 0.1	77.4 ± 0.3	75.1 ± 1.1	80.2 ± 0.7	75.2 ± 1.2	75.1 ± 1.1	79.5 ± 0.5	80.5 ± 0.8	79.8 ± 0.6	80.8 ± 0.2
	10	78.4 ± 0.7	75.8 ± 0.4	76.6 ± 0.3	73.3 ± 1.7	79.0 ± 0.5	74.2 ± 1.2	72.9 ± 1.0	78.1 ± 0.7	79.0 ± 0.1	78.5 ± 0.9	79.2 ± 0.1
	15	77.9 ± 0.6	73.8 ± 0.9	76.7 ± 0.6	71.8 ± 1.1	79.0 ± 0.7	73.4 ± 1.7	71.0 ± 1.1	77.9 ± 1.8	78.3 ± 0.6	78.2 ± 0.6	79.7 ± 0.1
Cora	20	76.0 ± 1.4	71.8 ± 1.0	73.8 ± 0.3	70.2 ± 1.9	77.1 ± 0.5	71.0 ± 1.5	68.4 ± 1.0	76.3 ± 1.0	77.2 ± 0.2	76.6 ± 0.9	77.6 ± 1.0
	25	79.1 ± 0.6	77.7 ± 0.6	78.7 ± 0.6	74.3 ± 0.7	79.7 ± 0.6	74.3 ± 1.6	73.8 ± 1.0	78.0 ± 0.4	77.7 ± 1.0	78.9 ± 1.0	79.8 ± 0.9
	30	77.7 ± 0.9	75.6 ± 0.7	76.7 ± 0.6	73.8 ± 0.7	78.6 ± 0.4	73.5 ± 1.6	73.4 ± 0.7	78.3 ± 0.4	78.4 ± 0.9	78.6 ± 0.9	79.0 ± 0.0


	Attack Method						Meta-Self					
							Model					
	Attack Rate (%)	GCN	IGCN(RNM)	IGCN(AR)	LanczosNet	RGCN	PowerLap 2	PowerLap 3	SGC	MixHop	r-GCN	VPN
Citeseer	5	66.2 ± 0.9	61.8 ± 0.1	60.9 ± 0.8	60.2 ± 0.2	69.1 ± 0.4	66.3 ± 0.9	66.0 ± 1.2	69.1 ± 0.3	69.6 ± 0.4	70.1 ± 0.7	69.1 ± 0.8
	10	64.7 ± 0.8	59.3 ± 0.4	59.1 ± 0.9	57.3 ± 0.1	67.3 ± 0.6	64.4 ± 0.8	62.5 ± 1.3	67.9 ± 0.7	67.1 ± 0.5	68.0 ± 0.0	68.2 ± 0.7
	15	64.0 ± 0.9	57.2 ± 0.3	58.1 ± 0.7	55.2 ± 0.2	65.9 ± 0.9	62.9 ± 1.7	60.6 ± 0.7	66.3 ± 0.9	66.2 ± 0.4	67.3 ± 0.9	66.2 ± 0.1
	20	62.4 ± 1.2	55.5 ± 0.2	56.8 ± 0.8	55.9 ± 0.4	65.3 ± 1.2	61.2 ± 1.5	58.6 ± 1.9	65.3 ± 1.0	64.9 ± 0.1	66.3 ± 0.4	65.6 ± 0.4
	25	62.7 ± 1.0	56.6 ± 0.7	58.4 ± 1.1	55.3 ± 0.3	65.1 ± 0.7	60.5 ± 1.6	57.6 ± 1.9	65.6 ± 0.8	65.0 ± 0.6	65.9 ± 0.5	65.5 ± 0.5
	30	61.1 ± 0.9	55.9 ± 0.5	56.4 ± 0.7	54.9 ± 0.1	64.7 ± 0.3	60.3 ± 1.5	57.5 ± 1.4	64.1 ± 0.8	64.5 ± 1.2	66.0 ± 1.0	64.5 ± 0.9
	Attack Rate (%)	GCN	IGCN(RNM)	IGCN(AR)	LanczosNet	RGCN	PowerLap 2	PowerLap 3	SGC	MixHop	r-GCN	VPN
	5	78.7 ± 0.2	76.1 ± 0.3	75.0 ± 0.4	73.4 ± 0.5	79.6 ± 0.6	77.9 ± 1.4	74.7 ± 0.7	77.9 ± 0.6	79.0 ± 0.8	79.3 ± 0.8	79.1 ± 0.5
	10	76.8 ± 0.3	76.0 ± 0.5	74.3 ± 0.7	71.0 ± 1.8	78.4 ± 0.3	76.0 ± 0.9	72.6 ± 0.6	76.8 ± 0.2	77.2 ± 0.1	77.8 ± 0.9	78.0 ± 0.7
	15	75.3 ± 0.9	74.0 ± 0.5	72.1 ± 0.4	69.4 ± 0.0	77.1 ± 0.7	74.2 ± 1.4	69.5 ± 1.2	76.6 ± 0.4	77.0 ± 0.6	77.0 ± 0.7	77.5 ± 0.9
Cora	20	75.8 ± 0.7	72.6 ± 0.7	71.1 ± 0.8	69.5 ± 1.4	76.3 ± 0.5	73.3 ± 1.2	70.4 ± 1.4	75.9 ± 0.3	76.3 ± 0.4	76.1 ± 0.9	76.4 ± 0.5
	25	77.5 ± 0.2	73.8 ± 0.2	73.4 ± 0.6	70.3 ± 0.2	78.4 ± 0.4	74.2 ± 1.0	70.9 ± 1.0	76.9 ± 0.3	77.6 ± 0.2	77.9 ± 0.2	77.8 ± 0.1
	30	76.7 ± 0.6	73.7 ± 0.6	72.2 ± 1.0	66.7 ± 0.0	78.4 ± 0.5	72.6 ± 1.2	67.0 ± 1.4	77.9 ± 0.2	78.0 ± 0.7	78.1 ± 0.5	78.5 ± 0.4


Table 5: Running time comparison on a social network dataset (Leskovec and Mcauley 2012).

Methods	Vanilla GCN	PowerLaplacian	IGCN(RNM)	IGCN(AR)	LNet	RGCN	SGC	MixHop	r-GCN	VPN
Running Time (sec)	6.02	6.36	3.33	7.21	5.56	18.14	0.231	11.38	6.73	7.18















Figure 15: Illustration of evasion attack performance in terms of robustness enhancement on different attack methods (from top to bottom) for **Citeseer**: A_{abr} (Bojchevski and Günnemann 2019), DICE (Zügner and Günnemann 2019), Meta-Self and Meta-Train (Zügner and Günnemann 2019). Evaluated methods include IGCN (Li et al. 2019), LanczosNet (Liao et al. 2019), SGC (Wu et al. 2019), MixHop (Abu-El-Haija et al. 2019) and RGCN (Zhu et al. 2019). PowerLap 2 and 3 are methods to be the value of t



Cora attacked by ADW3 ¹IGCN(RNM) • IGCN(AR) • LanczosNet • PowerLap 2 • PowerLap 3 • SGC • MixHop • RGCN • r-GCN • VPN ³ ⁶ ⁶ ⁶ ⁶ ⁷ ⁶ ⁷ ⁷ ⁷ ⁹ ⁹ ⁹ ¹⁰ ¹⁵ ²⁰ ²⁵ ³⁰



Cora attacked by Meta-Self ■ IGCN(RNM) ■ IGCN(AR) ■ LanczosNet ■ PowerLap 2 ■ PowerLap 3 ■ SGC ■ MixHop ■ RGCN ■ r-GCN ■ VPN 6 enhancement (%) i i i i Robustness 0 -6 -12 5 10 15 20 25 30 Attack rate (%)






Figure 17: Illustration of evasion attack performance in terms of robustness enhancement on different attack methods for **Pubmed**.