

Rules for School...

or..."Rules for taking duals"

Rules for School...

or..."Rules for taking duals"

Standard:

Rules for School...

or..."Rules for taking duals"

Standard:

Rules for School...

or..."Rules for taking duals"

Standard:

$$Ax \leq b, \max cx, x \geq 0 \leftrightarrow y^T A \geq c, \min by, y \geq 0.$$

Rules for School...

or..."Rules for taking duals"

Standard:

$$Ax \leq b, \max cx, x \geq 0 \leftrightarrow y^T A \geq c, \min by, y \geq 0.$$

min \leftrightarrow max

Rules for School...

or..."Rules for taking duals"

Standard:

$$Ax \leq b, \max cx, x \geq 0 \leftrightarrow y^T A \geq c, \min by, y \geq 0.$$

min \leftrightarrow max

$$\geq \leftrightarrow \leq$$

Rules for School...

or..."Rules for taking duals"

Standard:

$$Ax \leq b, \max cx, x \geq 0 \leftrightarrow y^T A \geq c, \min by, y \geq 0.$$

min \leftrightarrow max

$\geq \leftrightarrow \leq$

"inequalities" \leftrightarrow "nonnegative variables"

Rules for School...

or..."Rules for taking duals"

Standard:

$$Ax \leq b, \max cx, x \geq 0 \leftrightarrow y^T A \geq c, \min by, y \geq 0.$$

min \leftrightarrow max

$\geq \leftrightarrow \leq$

"inequalities" \leftrightarrow "nonnegative variables"

"nonnegative variables" \leftrightarrow "inequalities"

Rules for School...

or..."Rules for taking duals"

Standard:

$$Ax \leq b, \max cx, x \geq 0 \leftrightarrow y^T A \geq c, \min by, y \geq 0.$$

min \leftrightarrow max

$\geq \leftrightarrow \leq$

"inequalities" \leftrightarrow "nonnegative variables"

"nonnegative variables" \leftrightarrow "inequalities"

One more useful trick: Equality constraints.

Rules for School...

or..."Rules for taking duals"

Standard:

$$Ax \leq b, \max cx, x \geq 0 \leftrightarrow y^T A \geq c, \min by, y \geq 0.$$

min \leftrightarrow max

$\geq \leftrightarrow \leq$

"inequalities" \leftrightarrow "nonnegative variables"

"nonnegative variables" \leftrightarrow "inequalities"

One more useful trick: Equality constraints.

"equalities" \leftrightarrow "unrestricted variables."

Maximum Weight Matching.

Bipartite Graph $G = (V, E)$, $w : E \rightarrow Z$.

Maximum Weight Matching.

Bipartite Graph $G = (V, E)$, $w : E \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$.

Find maximum weight perfect matching.

Maximum Weight Matching.

Bipartite Graph $G = (V, E)$, $w : E \rightarrow Z$.

Find maximum weight perfect matching.

Solution: x_e indicates whether edge e is in matching.

Maximum Weight Matching.

Bipartite Graph $G = (V, E)$, $w : E \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$.

Find maximum weight perfect matching.

Solution: x_e indicates whether edge e is in matching.

$$\max \sum_e w_e x_e$$

$$\forall v : \sum_{e=(u,v)} x_e = 1$$

$$x_e \geq 0$$

Maximum Weight Matching.

Bipartite Graph $G = (V, E)$, $w : E \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$.

Find maximum weight perfect matching.

Solution: x_e indicates whether edge e is in matching.

$$\begin{aligned} \max \sum_e w_e x_e \\ \forall v : \sum_{e=(u,v)} x_e = 1 \\ x_e \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Dual.

Maximum Weight Matching.

Bipartite Graph $G = (V, E)$, $w : E \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$.

Find maximum weight perfect matching.

Solution: x_e indicates whether edge e is in matching.

$$\begin{aligned} \max \sum_e w_e x_e \\ \forall v : \sum_{e=(u,v)} x_e = 1 \\ x_e \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Dual.

Variable for each constraint.

Maximum Weight Matching.

Bipartite Graph $G = (V, E)$, $w : E \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$.

Find maximum weight perfect matching.

Solution: x_e indicates whether edge e is in matching.

$$\begin{aligned} \max \sum_e w_e x_e \\ \forall v : \sum_{e=(u,v)} x_e &= 1 && p_v \\ x_e &\geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Dual.

Variable for each constraint. p_v

Maximum Weight Matching.

Bipartite Graph $G = (V, E)$, $w : E \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$.

Find maximum weight perfect matching.

Solution: x_e indicates whether edge e is in matching.

$$\begin{aligned} \max \sum_e w_e x_e \\ \forall v : \sum_{e=(u,v)} x_e = 1 \quad \rho_v \\ x_e \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Dual.

Variable for each constraint. ρ_v unrestricted.

Maximum Weight Matching.

Bipartite Graph $G = (V, E)$, $w : E \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$.

Find maximum weight perfect matching.

Solution: x_e indicates whether edge e is in matching.

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_e w_e x_e \\ \forall v : & \sum_{e=(u,v)} x_e = 1 && \rho_v \\ & x_e \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Dual.

Variable for each constraint. ρ_v unrestricted.

Constraint for each variable.

Maximum Weight Matching.

Bipartite Graph $G = (V, E)$, $w : E \rightarrow Z$.

Find maximum weight perfect matching.

Solution: x_e indicates whether edge e is in matching.

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_e w_e x_e \\ \forall v : & \sum_{e=(u,v)} x_e = 1 && p_v \\ & x_e \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Dual.

Variable for each constraint. p_v unrestricted.

Constraint for each variable. Edge e , $p_u + p_v \geq w_e$

Maximum Weight Matching.

Bipartite Graph $G = (V, E)$, $w : E \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$.

Find maximum weight perfect matching.

Solution: x_e indicates whether edge e is in matching.

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_e w_e x_e \\ \forall v : & \sum_{e=(u,v)} x_e = 1 && p_v \\ & x_e \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Dual.

Variable for each constraint. p_v unrestricted.

Constraint for each variable. Edge e , $p_u + p_v \geq w_e$

Objective function from right hand side.

Maximum Weight Matching.

Bipartite Graph $G = (V, E)$, $w : E \rightarrow Z$.

Find maximum weight perfect matching.

Solution: x_e indicates whether edge e is in matching.

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_e w_e x_e \\ \forall v : & \sum_{e=(u,v)} x_e = 1 && p_v \\ & x_e \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Dual.

Variable for each constraint. p_v unrestricted.

Constraint for each variable. Edge e , $p_u + p_v \geq w_e$

Objective function from right hand side. $\min \sum_v p_v$

Maximum Weight Matching.

Bipartite Graph $G = (V, E)$, $w : E \rightarrow Z$.

Find maximum weight perfect matching.

Solution: x_e indicates whether edge e is in matching.

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_e w_e x_e \\ \forall v : & \sum_{e=(u,v)} x_e = 1 && p_v \\ & x_e \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Dual.

Variable for each constraint. p_v unrestricted.

Constraint for each variable. Edge e , $p_u + p_v \geq w_e$

Objective function from right hand side. $\min \sum_v p_v$

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \sum_v p_v \\ \forall e = (u, v) : & (p_u + p_v) \geq w_e \end{aligned}$$

Maximum Weight Matching.

Bipartite Graph $G = (V, E)$, $w : E \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$.

Find maximum weight perfect matching.

Solution: x_e indicates whether edge e is in matching.

$$\begin{aligned} \max \sum_e w_e x_e \\ \forall v : \sum_{e=(u,v)} x_e &= 1 && p_v \\ x_e &\geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Dual.

Variable for each constraint. p_v unrestricted.

Constraint for each variable. Edge e , $p_u + p_v \geq w_e$

Objective function from right hand side. $\min \sum_v p_v$

$$\begin{aligned} \min \sum_v p_v \\ \forall e = (u, v) : (p_u + p_v) \geq w_e \end{aligned}$$

Weak duality?

Maximum Weight Matching.

Bipartite Graph $G = (V, E)$, $w : E \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$.

Find maximum weight perfect matching.

Solution: x_e indicates whether edge e is in matching.

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_e w_e x_e \\ \forall v : & \sum_{e=(u,v)} x_e = 1 && p_v \\ & x_e \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Dual.

Variable for each constraint. p_v unrestricted.

Constraint for each variable. Edge e , $p_u + p_v \geq w_e$

Objective function from right hand side. $\min \sum_v p_v$

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \sum_v p_v \\ \forall e = (u, v) : & (p_u + p_v) \geq w_e \end{aligned}$$

Weak duality? Price function upper bounds matching.

Maximum Weight Matching.

Bipartite Graph $G = (V, E)$, $w : E \rightarrow Z$.

Find maximum weight perfect matching.

Solution: x_e indicates whether edge e is in matching.

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_e w_e x_e \\ \forall v : & \sum_{e=(u,v)} x_e = 1 && p_v \\ & x_e \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Dual.

Variable for each constraint. p_v unrestricted.

Constraint for each variable. Edge e , $p_u + p_v \geq w_e$

Objective function from right hand side. $\min \sum_v p_v$

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \sum_v p_v \\ \forall e = (u, v) : & (p_u + p_v) \geq w_e \end{aligned}$$

Weak duality? Price function upper bounds matching.

$$\sum_{e \in M} w_e x_e \leq \sum_{e=(u,v) \in M} (p_u + p_v) \leq \sum_v p_v.$$

Maximum Weight Matching.

Bipartite Graph $G = (V, E)$, $w : E \rightarrow Z$.

Find maximum weight perfect matching.

Solution: x_e indicates whether edge e is in matching.

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_e w_e x_e \\ \forall v : & \sum_{e=(u,v)} x_e = 1 && p_v \\ & x_e \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Dual.

Variable for each constraint. p_v unrestricted.

Constraint for each variable. Edge e , $p_u + p_v \geq w_e$

Objective function from right hand side. $\min \sum_v p_v$

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \sum_v p_v \\ \forall e = (u, v) : & (p_u + p_v) \geq w_e \end{aligned}$$

Weak duality? Price function upper bounds matching.

$$\sum_{e \in M} w_e x_e \leq \sum_{e=(u,v) \in M} (p_u + p_v) \leq \sum_v p_v.$$

Strong Duality?

Maximum Weight Matching.

Bipartite Graph $G = (V, E)$, $w : E \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$.

Find maximum weight perfect matching.

Solution: x_e indicates whether edge e is in matching.

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_e w_e x_e \\ \forall v : & \sum_{e=(u,v)} x_e = 1 && p_v \\ & x_e \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Dual.

Variable for each constraint. p_v unrestricted.

Constraint for each variable. Edge e , $p_u + p_v \geq w_e$

Objective function from right hand side. $\min \sum_v p_v$

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \sum_v p_v \\ \forall e = (u, v) : & (p_u + p_v) \geq w_e \end{aligned}$$

Weak duality? Price function upper bounds matching.

$$\sum_{e \in M} w_e x_e \leq \sum_{e=(u,v) \in M} (p_u + p_v) \leq \sum_v p_v.$$

Strong Duality? Same value solutions.

Maximum Weight Matching.

Bipartite Graph $G = (V, E)$, $w : E \rightarrow Z$.

Find maximum weight perfect matching.

Solution: x_e indicates whether edge e is in matching.

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_e w_e x_e \\ \forall v : & \sum_{e=(u,v)} x_e = 1 && p_v \\ & x_e \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Dual.

Variable for each constraint. p_v unrestricted.

Constraint for each variable. Edge e , $p_u + p_v \geq w_e$

Objective function from right hand side. $\min \sum_v p_v$

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \sum_v p_v \\ \forall e = (u, v) : & (p_u + p_v) \geq w_e \end{aligned}$$

Weak duality? Price function upper bounds matching.

$$\sum_{e \in M} w_e x_e \leq \sum_{e=(u,v) \in M} (p_u + p_v) \leq \sum_v p_v.$$

Strong Duality? Same value solutions. Hungarian algorithm

Maximum Weight Matching.

Bipartite Graph $G = (V, E)$, $w : E \rightarrow Z$.

Find maximum weight perfect matching.

Solution: x_e indicates whether edge e is in matching.

$$\begin{aligned} \max \sum_e w_e x_e \\ \forall v : \sum_{e=(u,v)} x_e &= 1 && p_v \\ x_e &\geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Dual.

Variable for each constraint. p_v unrestricted.

Constraint for each variable. Edge e , $p_u + p_v \geq w_e$

Objective function from right hand side. $\min \sum_v p_v$

$$\begin{aligned} \min \sum_v p_v \\ \forall e = (u, v) : (p_u + p_v) &\geq w_e \end{aligned}$$

Weak duality? Price function upper bounds matching.

$$\sum_{e \in M} w_e x_e \leq \sum_{e=(u,v) \in M} (p_u + p_v) \leq \sum_v p_v.$$

Strong Duality? Same value solutions. Hungarian algorithm !!!

Complementary Slackness.

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_e w_e x_e \\ \forall v : & \sum_{e=(u,v)} x_e = 1 && p_v \\ & x_e \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Dual:

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \sum_v p_v \\ \forall e = (u, v) : & p_u + p_v \geq w_e \end{aligned}$$

Complementary Slackness.

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_e w_e x_e \\ \forall v : & \sum_{e=(u,v)} x_e = 1 && p_v \\ & x_e \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Dual:

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \sum_v p_v \\ \forall e = (u, v) : & p_u + p_v \geq w_e \end{aligned}$$

Complementary slackness:

Complementary Slackness.

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_e w_e x_e \\ \forall v : & \sum_{e=(u,v)} x_e = 1 && p_v \\ & x_e \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Dual:

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \sum_v p_v \\ \forall e = (u, v) : & p_u + p_v \geq w_e \end{aligned}$$

Complementary slackness:

Only match on tight edges.

Complementary Slackness.

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_e w_e x_e \\ \forall v : & \sum_{e=(u,v)} x_e = 1 && p_v \\ & x_e \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Dual:

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \sum_v p_v \\ \forall e = (u, v) : & p_u + p_v \geq w_e \end{aligned}$$

Complementary slackness:

Only match on tight edges.

Nonzero p_u on matched u .

Multicommodity Flow.

Given $G = (V, E)$, and capacity function $c : E \rightarrow Z$, and pairs $(s_1, t_1), \dots, (s_k, t_k)$ with demands d_1, \dots, d_k .

Multicommodity Flow.

Given $G = (V, E)$, and capacity function $c : E \rightarrow Z$, and pairs $(s_1, t_1), \dots, (s_k, t_k)$ with demands d_1, \dots, d_k .
Route D_j flow for each s_j, t_j pair,

Multicommodity Flow.

Given $G = (V, E)$, and capacity function $c : E \rightarrow Z$, and pairs $(s_1, t_1), \dots, (s_k, t_k)$ with demands d_1, \dots, d_k .

Route D_i flow for each s_i, t_i pair,
so every edge has $\leq \mu c(e)$ flow

Multicommodity Flow.

Given $G = (V, E)$, and capacity function $c : E \rightarrow Z$, and pairs $(s_1, t_1), \dots, (s_k, t_k)$ with demands d_1, \dots, d_k .

Route D_i flow for each s_i, t_i pair,
so every edge has $\leq \mu c(e)$ flow
and minimize μ .

Multicommodity Flow.

Given $G = (V, E)$, and capacity function $c : E \rightarrow Z$, and pairs $(s_1, t_1), \dots, (s_k, t_k)$ with demands d_1, \dots, d_k .

Route D_i flow for each s_i, t_i pair,
so every edge has $\leq \mu c(e)$ flow
and minimize μ .

Multicommodity Flow.

Given $G = (V, E)$, and capacity function $c : E \rightarrow Z$, and pairs $(s_1, t_1), \dots, (s_k, t_k)$ with demands d_1, \dots, d_k .

Route D_i flow for each s_i, t_i pair,
so every edge has $\leq \mu c(e)$ flow
and minimize μ .

variables: f_p flow on path p .

Multicommodity Flow.

Given $G = (V, E)$, and capacity function $c : E \rightarrow Z$, and pairs $(s_1, t_1), \dots, (s_k, t_k)$ with demands d_1, \dots, d_k .

Route D_i flow for each s_i, t_i pair,
so every edge has $\leq \mu c(e)$ flow
and minimize μ .

variables: f_p flow on path p .

P_i -set of paths with endpoints s_i, t_i .

Multicommodity Flow.

Given $G = (V, E)$, and capacity function $c : E \rightarrow Z$, and pairs $(s_1, t_1), \dots, (s_k, t_k)$ with demands d_1, \dots, d_k .

Route D_i flow for each s_i, t_i pair,
so every edge has $\leq \mu c(e)$ flow
and minimize μ .

variables: f_p flow on path p .

P_i -set of paths with endpoints s_i, t_i .

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \mu \\ \forall e : & \sum_{p \ni e} f_p \leq \mu c_e \\ \forall i : & \sum_{p \in P_i} f_p = D_i \\ & f_p \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Take the dual.

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \mu \\ \forall e: & \sum_{p \ni e} f_p \leq \mu c_e \\ \forall i: & \sum_{p \in P_i} f_p = D_i \\ & f_p \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Modify to make it \geq , which “goes with” min.

Take the dual.

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \mu \\ \forall e: & \sum_{p \ni e} f_p \leq \mu c_e \\ \forall i: & \sum_{p \in P_i} f_p = D_i \\ & f_p \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Modify to make it \geq , which “goes with” min.
And only constants on right hand side.

Take the dual.

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \mu \\ \forall e : & \sum_{p \ni e} f_p \leq \mu c_e \\ \forall i : & \sum_{p \in P_i} f_p = D_i \\ & f_p \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Modify to make it \geq , which “goes with” min.
And only constants on right hand side.

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \mu \\ \forall e : & \mu c_e - \sum_{p \ni e} f_p \geq 0 \\ \forall i : & \sum_{p \in P_i} f_p = D_i \\ & f_p \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Dual.

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \mu \\ \forall e : & \mu c_e - \sum_{p \ni e} f_p \geq 0 \\ \forall i : & \sum_{p \in P_i} f_p = D_i \end{aligned}$$

Dual.

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \mu \\ \forall e : & \mu c_e - \sum_{p \ni e} f_p \geq 0 & d_e \\ \forall i : & \sum_{p \in P_i} f_p = D_i & d_i \end{aligned}$$

Introduce variable for each constraint.

Dual.

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \mu \\ \forall e : & \mu c_e - \sum_{p \ni e} f_p \geq 0 && d_e \\ \forall i : & \sum_{p \in P_i} f_p = D_i && d_i \end{aligned}$$

Introduce variable for each constraint.

Introduce constraint for each var:

Dual.

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \mu \\ \forall e : & \mu c_e - \sum_{p \ni e} f_p \geq 0 & d_e \\ \forall i : & \sum_{p \in P_i} f_p = D_i & d_i \end{aligned}$$

Introduce variable for each constraint.

Introduce constraint for each var:

μ

Dual.

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \mu \\ \forall e : & \mu c_e - \sum_{p \ni e} f_p \geq 0 & d_e \\ \forall i : & \sum_{p \in P_i} f_p = D_i & d_i \end{aligned}$$

Introduce variable for each constraint.

Introduce constraint for each var:

$$\mu \rightarrow \sum_e c_e d_e = 1.$$

Dual.

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \mu \\ \forall e : & \mu c_e - \sum_{p \ni e} f_p \geq 0 && d_e \\ \forall i : & \sum_{p \in P_i} f_p = D_i && d_i \end{aligned}$$

Introduce variable for each constraint.

Introduce constraint for each var:

$$\mu \rightarrow \sum_e c_e d_e = 1. \quad f_p$$

Dual.

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \mu \\ \forall e : & \mu c_e - \sum_{p \ni e} f_p \geq 0 && d_e \\ \forall i : & \sum_{p \in P_i} f_p = D_i && d_i \end{aligned}$$

Introduce variable for each constraint.

Introduce constraint for each var:

$$\mu \rightarrow \sum_e c_e d_e = 1. \quad f_p \rightarrow \forall p \in P_i \quad d_i - \sum_{e \in p} d_e \leq 0.$$

Dual.

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \mu \\ \forall e : & \mu c_e - \sum_{p \ni e} f_p \geq 0 && d_e \\ \forall i : & \sum_{p \in P_i} f_p = D_i && d_i \end{aligned}$$

Introduce variable for each constraint.

Introduce constraint for each var:

$$\mu \rightarrow \sum_e c_e d_e = 1. \quad f_p \rightarrow \forall p \in P_i \quad d_i - \sum_{e \in p} d_e \leq 0.$$

Dual.

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \mu \\ \forall e : & \mu c_e - \sum_{p \ni e} f_p \geq 0 && d_e \\ \forall i : & \sum_{p \in P_i} f_p = D_i && d_i \end{aligned}$$

Introduce variable for each constraint.

Introduce constraint for each var:

$$\mu \rightarrow \sum_e c_e d_e = 1. \quad f_p \rightarrow \forall p \in P_i \quad d_i - \sum_{e \in p} d_e \leq 0.$$

Objective: right hand sides.

Dual.

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \mu \\ \forall e : & \mu c_e - \sum_{p \ni e} f_p \geq 0 && d_e \\ \forall i : & \sum_{p \in P_i} f_p = D_i && d_i \end{aligned}$$

Introduce variable for each constraint.

Introduce constraint for each var:

$$\mu \rightarrow \sum_e c_e d_e = 1. \quad f_p \rightarrow \forall p \in P_i \quad d_i - \sum_{e \in p} d_e \leq 0.$$

Objective: right hand sides. $\max \sum_i D_i d_i$

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_i D_i d_i \\ \forall p \in P_i : & d_i \leq \sum_{e \in p} d_e \\ & \sum_e c_e d_e = 1 \end{aligned}$$

Dual.

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \mu \\ \forall e : & \mu c_e - \sum_{p \ni e} f_p \geq 0 && d_e \\ \forall i : & \sum_{p \in P_i} f_p = D_i && d_i \end{aligned}$$

Introduce variable for each constraint.

Introduce constraint for each var:

$$\mu \rightarrow \sum_e c_e d_e = 1. \quad f_p \rightarrow \forall p \in P_i \quad d_i - \sum_{e \in p} d_e \leq 0.$$

Objective: right hand sides. $\max \sum_i D_i d_i$

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_i D_i d_i \\ \forall p \in P_i : & d_i \leq \sum_{e \in p} d_e \\ & \sum_e c_e d_e = 1 \end{aligned}$$

d_i - shortest s_j, t_i path length.

Dual.

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \mu \\ \forall e : & \mu c_e - \sum_{p \ni e} f_p \geq 0 && d_e \\ \forall i : & \sum_{p \in P_i} f_p = D_i && d_i \end{aligned}$$

Introduce variable for each constraint.

Introduce constraint for each var:

$$\mu \rightarrow \sum_e c_e d_e = 1. \quad f_p \rightarrow \forall p \in P_i \quad d_i - \sum_{e \in p} d_e \leq 0.$$

Objective: right hand sides. $\max \sum_i D_i d_i$

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_i D_i d_i \\ \forall p \in P_i : & d_i \leq \sum_{e \in p} d_e \\ & \sum_e c_e d_e = 1 \end{aligned}$$

d_i - shortest s_i, t_i path length. Toll problem!

Dual.

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \mu \\ \forall e : & \mu c_e - \sum_{p \ni e} f_p \geq 0 && d_e \\ \forall i : & \sum_{p \in P_i} f_p = D_i && d_i \end{aligned}$$

Introduce variable for each constraint.

Introduce constraint for each var:

$$\mu \rightarrow \sum_e c_e d_e = 1. \quad f_p \rightarrow \forall p \in P_i \quad d_i - \sum_{e \in p} d_e \leq 0.$$

Objective: right hand sides. $\max \sum_i D_i d_i$

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_i D_i d_i \\ \forall p \in P_i : & d_i \leq \sum_{e \in p} d(e) \\ & \sum_e c_e d_e = 1 \end{aligned}$$

d_i - shortest s_i, t_i path length. Toll problem!

Weak duality: toll lower bounds routing.

Dual.

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \mu \\ \forall e : & \mu c_e - \sum_{p \ni e} f_p \geq 0 && d_e \\ \forall i : & \sum_{p \in P_i} f_p = D_i && d_i \end{aligned}$$

Introduce variable for each constraint.

Introduce constraint for each var:

$$\mu \rightarrow \sum_e c_e d_e = 1. \quad f_p \rightarrow \forall p \in P_i \quad d_i - \sum_{e \in p} d_e \leq 0.$$

Objective: right hand sides. $\max \sum_i D_i d_i$

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_i D_i d_i \\ \forall p \in P_i : & d_i \leq \sum_{e \in p} d_e \\ & \sum_e c_e d_e = 1 \end{aligned}$$

d_i - shortest s_i, t_i path length. Toll problem!

Weak duality: toll lower bounds routing.

Strong Duality.

Dual.

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \mu \\ \forall e : & \mu c_e - \sum_{p \ni e} f_p \geq 0 && d_e \\ \forall i : & \sum_{p \in P_i} f_p = D_i && d_i \end{aligned}$$

Introduce variable for each constraint.

Introduce constraint for each var:

$$\mu \rightarrow \sum_e c_e d_e = 1. \quad f_p \rightarrow \forall p \in P_i \quad d_i - \sum_{e \in p} d_e \leq 0.$$

Objective: right hand sides. $\max \sum_i D_i d_i$

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_i D_i d_i \\ \forall p \in P_i : & d_i \leq \sum_{e \in p} d_e \\ & \sum_e c_e d_e = 1 \end{aligned}$$

d_i - shortest s_i, t_i path length. Toll problem!

Weak duality: toll lower bounds routing.

Strong Duality. Tight lower bound.

Dual.

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \mu \\ \forall e : & \mu c_e - \sum_{p \ni e} f_p \geq 0 && d_e \\ \forall i : & \sum_{p \in P_i} f_p = D_i && d_i \end{aligned}$$

Introduce variable for each constraint.

Introduce constraint for each var:

$$\mu \rightarrow \sum_e c_e d_e = 1. \quad f_p \rightarrow \forall p \in P_i \quad d_i - \sum_{e \in p} d_e \leq 0.$$

Objective: right hand sides. $\max \sum_i D_i d_i$

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_i D_i d_i \\ \forall p \in P_i : & d_i \leq \sum_{e \in p} d_e \\ & \sum_e c_e d_e = 1 \end{aligned}$$

d_i - shortest s_i, t_i path length. Toll problem!

Weak duality: toll lower bounds routing.

Strong Duality. Tight lower bound. First lecture.

Dual.

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \mu \\ \forall e : & \mu c_e - \sum_{p \ni e} f_p \geq 0 && d_e \\ \forall i : & \sum_{p \in P_i} f_p = D_i && d_i \end{aligned}$$

Introduce variable for each constraint.

Introduce constraint for each var:

$$\mu \rightarrow \sum_e c_e d_e = 1. \quad f_p \rightarrow \forall p \in P_i \quad d_i - \sum_{e \in p} d_e \leq 0.$$

Objective: right hand sides. $\max \sum_i D_i d_i$

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_i D_i d_i \\ \forall p \in P_i : & d_i \leq \sum_{e \in p} d_e \\ & \sum_e c_e d_e = 1 \end{aligned}$$

d_i - shortest s_i, t_i path length. Toll problem!

Weak duality: toll lower bounds routing.

Strong Duality. Tight lower bound. First lecture. Or Experts.

Dual.

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \mu \\ \forall e : & \mu c_e - \sum_{p \ni e} f_p \geq 0 && d_e \\ \forall i : & \sum_{p \in P_i} f_p = D_i && d_i \end{aligned}$$

Introduce variable for each constraint.

Introduce constraint for each var:

$$\mu \rightarrow \sum_e c_e d_e = 1. \quad f_p \rightarrow \forall p \in P_i \quad d_i - \sum_{e \in p} d_e \leq 0.$$

Objective: right hand sides. $\max \sum_i D_i d_i$

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_i D_i d_i \\ \forall p \in P_i : & d_i \leq \sum_{e \in p} d_e \\ & \sum_e c_e d_e = 1 \end{aligned}$$

d_i - shortest s_i, t_i path length. Toll problem!

Weak duality: toll lower bounds routing.

Strong Duality. Tight lower bound. First lecture. Or Experts.

Complementary Slackness:

Dual.

$$\begin{aligned} \min \mu \\ \forall e : \mu c_e - \sum_{p \ni e} f_p &\geq 0 && d_e \\ \forall i : \sum_{p \in P_i} f_p &= D_i && d_i \end{aligned}$$

Introduce variable for each constraint.

Introduce constraint for each var:

$$\mu \rightarrow \sum_e c_e d_e = 1. \quad f_p \rightarrow \forall p \in P_i \quad d_i - \sum_{e \in p} d_e \leq 0.$$

Objective: right hand sides. $\max \sum_i D_i d_i$

$$\begin{aligned} \max \sum_i D_i d_i \\ \forall p \in P_i : d_i &\leq \sum_{e \in p} d(e) \\ \sum_e c_e d_e &= 1 \end{aligned}$$

d_i - shortest s_i, t_i path length. Toll problem!

Weak duality: toll lower bounds routing.

Strong Duality. Tight lower bound. First lecture. Or Experts.

Complementary Slackness: only route on shortest paths

Dual.

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \mu \\ \forall e : & \mu c_e - \sum_{p \ni e} f_p \geq 0 && d_e \\ \forall i : & \sum_{p \in P_i} f_p = D_i && d_i \end{aligned}$$

Introduce variable for each constraint.

Introduce constraint for each var:

$$\mu \rightarrow \sum_e c_e d_e = 1. \quad f_p \rightarrow \forall p \in P_i \quad d_i - \sum_{e \in p} d_e \leq 0.$$

Objective: right hand sides. $\max \sum_i D_i d_i$

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_i D_i d_i \\ \forall p \in P_i : & d_i \leq \sum_{e \in p} d_e \\ & \sum_e c_e d_e = 1 \end{aligned}$$

d_i - shortest s_i, t_i path length. Toll problem!

Weak duality: toll lower bounds routing.

Strong Duality. Tight lower bound. First lecture. Or Experts.

Complementary Slackness: only route on shortest paths
only have toll on congested edges.

Exponential size.

Multicommodity flow.

$$\min \mu$$

$$\forall e : \mu c_e - \sum_{p \ni e} f_p \geq 0$$

$$\forall i : \sum_{p \in P_i} f_p = d_i$$

$$f_p \geq 0$$

Exponential size.

Multicommodity flow.

$$\min \mu$$

$$\forall e : \mu c_e - \sum_{p \ni e} f_p \geq 0$$

$$\forall i : \sum_{p \in P_i} f_p = d_i$$

$$f_p \geq 0$$

Dual is.

$$\max \sum_i D_i d_i$$

$$\forall p \in P_i : d_i \leq \sum_{e \in p} d(e)$$

Exponential size.

Multicommodity flow.

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \mu \\ \forall e : & \mu c_e - \sum_{p \ni e} f_p \geq 0 \\ \forall i : & \sum_{p \in P_i} f_p = d_i \\ & f_p \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Dual is.

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_i D_i d_i \\ \forall p \in P_i : & d_i \leq \sum_{e \in p} d(e) \end{aligned}$$

Exponential sized programs?

Exponential size.

Multicommodity flow.

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \mu \\ \forall e : & \mu c_e - \sum_{p \ni e} f_p \geq 0 \\ \forall i : & \sum_{p \in P_i} f_p = d_i \\ & f_p \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Dual is.

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_i D_i d_i \\ \forall p \in P_i : & d_i \leq \sum_{e \in p} d(e) \end{aligned}$$

Exponential sized programs?

Answer 1:

Exponential size.

Multicommodity flow.

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \mu \\ \forall e : & \mu c_e - \sum_{p \ni e} f_p \geq 0 \\ \forall i : & \sum_{p \in P_i} f_p = d_i \\ & f_p \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Dual is.

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_i D_i d_i \\ \forall p \in P_i : & d_i \leq \sum_{e \in p} d(e) \end{aligned}$$

Exponential sized programs?

Answer 1: We solved anyway!

Exponential size.

Multicommodity flow.

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \mu \\ \forall e : & \mu c_e - \sum_{p \ni e} f_p \geq 0 \\ \forall i : & \sum_{p \in P_i} f_p = d_i \\ & f_p \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Dual is.

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_i D_i d_i \\ \forall p \in P_i : & d_i \leq \sum_{e \in p} d(e) \end{aligned}$$

Exponential sized programs?

Answer 1: We solved anyway!

Answer 2:

Exponential size.

Multicommodity flow.

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \mu \\ \forall e : & \mu c_e - \sum_{p \ni e} f_p \geq 0 \\ \forall i : & \sum_{p \in P_i} f_p = d_i \\ & f_p \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Dual is.

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_i D_i d_i \\ \forall p \in P_i : & d_i \leq \sum_{e \in p} d(e) \end{aligned}$$

Exponential sized programs?

Answer 1: We solved anyway!

Answer 2: Ellipsoid algorithm.

Exponential size.

Multicommodity flow.

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \mu \\ \forall e : & \mu c_e - \sum_{p \ni e} f_p \geq 0 \\ \forall i : & \sum_{p \in P_i} f_p = d_i \\ & f_p \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Dual is.

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_i D_i d_i \\ \forall p \in P_i : & d_i \leq \sum_{e \in p} d(e) \end{aligned}$$

Exponential sized programs?

Answer 1: We solved anyway!

Answer 2: Ellipsoid algorithm.

Find violated constraint \rightarrow poly time algorithm.

Exponential size.

Multicommodity flow.

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \mu \\ \forall e : & \mu c_e - \sum_{p \ni e} f_p \geq 0 \\ \forall i : & \sum_{p \in P_i} f_p = d_i \\ & f_p \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Dual is.

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_i D_i d_i \\ \forall p \in P_i : & d_i \leq \sum_{e \in p} d(e) \end{aligned}$$

Exponential sized programs?

Answer 1: We solved anyway!

Answer 2: Ellipsoid algorithm.

Find violated constraint \rightarrow poly time algorithm.

Answer 3: there is polynomial sized formulation.

Exponential size.

Multicommodity flow.

$$\begin{aligned} & \min \mu \\ \forall e : & \mu c_e - \sum_{p \ni e} f_p \geq 0 \\ \forall i : & \sum_{p \in P_i} f_p = d_i \\ & f_p \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Dual is.

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \sum_i D_i d_i \\ \forall p \in P_i : & d_i \leq \sum_{e \in p} d(e) \end{aligned}$$

Exponential sized programs?

Answer 1: We solved anyway!

Answer 2: Ellipsoid algorithm.

Find violated constraint \rightarrow poly time algorithm.

Answer 3: there is polynomial sized formulation.

Question: what is it?

Facility location

Set of facilities: F , opening cost f_i for facility i

Facility location

Set of facilities: F , opening cost f_i for facility i

Set of clients: D .

Facility location

Set of facilities: F , opening cost f_i for facility i

Set of clients: D .

d_{ij} - distance between i and j .

Facility location

Set of facilities: F , opening cost f_i for facility i

Set of clients: D .

d_{ij} - distance between i and j .

(notation abuse: clients/facility confusion.)

Facility location

Set of facilities: F , opening cost f_i for facility i

Set of clients: D .

d_{ij} - distance between i and j .

(notation abuse: clients/facility confusion.)

Triangle inequality: $d_{ij} \leq d_{ik} + d_{kj}$.

Facility location


Set of facilities: F , opening cost f_i for facility i

Set of clients: D .

d_{ij} - distance between i and j .

(notation abuse: clients/facility confusion.)

Triangle inequality: $d_{ij} \leq d_{ik} + d_{kj}$.



Facility location


Set of facilities: F , opening cost f_i for facility i

Set of clients: D .

d_{ij} - distance between i and j .

(notation abuse: clients/facility confusion.)

Triangle inequality: $d_{ij} \leq d_{ik} + d_{kj}$.



Facility location


Set of facilities: F , opening cost f_i for facility i

Set of clients: D .

d_{ij} - distance between i and j .

(notation abuse: clients/facility confusion.)

Triangle inequality: $d_{ij} \leq d_{ik} + d_{kj}$.



LP and Dual. Interpretation?

$$\min \sum_{i \in F} y_i f_i + \sum_{i \in F, j \in D} x_{ij} d_{ij}$$

$$\forall j \in D \quad \sum_{i \in F} x_{ij} \geq 1$$

$$\forall i \in F, j \in D \quad x_{ij} \leq y_i,$$

$$x_{ij}, y_i \geq 0$$

LP and Dual. Interpretation?

$$\begin{aligned} \min \quad & \sum_{i \in F} y_i f_i + \sum_{i \in F, j \in D} x_{ij} d_{ij} \\ & \forall j \in D \quad \sum_{i \in F} x_{ij} \geq 1 \\ & \forall i \in F, j \in D \quad x_{ij} \leq y_i, \\ & \quad \quad \quad x_{ij}, y_i \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & \sum_j \alpha_j \\ & \forall i \in F \quad \sum_{j \in D} \beta_{ij} \leq f_i \\ & \forall i \in F, j \in D \quad \alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij} \quad x_{ij} \\ & \quad \quad \quad \alpha_j, \beta_{ij} \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

LP and Dual. Interpretation?

$$\begin{aligned} \min \quad & \sum_{i \in F} y_i f_i + \sum_{i \in F, j \in D} x_{ij} d_{ij} \\ & \forall j \in D \quad \sum_{i \in F} x_{ij} \geq 1 \\ & \forall i \in F, j \in D \quad x_{ij} \leq y_i, \\ & x_{ij}, y_i \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & \sum_j \alpha_j \\ & \forall i \in F \quad \sum_{j \in D} \beta_{ij} \leq f_i \\ & \forall i \in F, j \in D \quad \alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij} \quad x_{ij} \\ & \alpha_j, \beta_{ij} \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

α_j charge to client.

LP and Dual. Interpretation?

$$\begin{aligned} \min \quad & \sum_{i \in F} y_i f_i + \sum_{i \in F, j \in D} x_{ij} d_{ij} \\ & \forall j \in D \quad \sum_{i \in F} x_{ij} \geq 1 \\ & \forall i \in F, j \in D \quad x_{ij} \leq y_i, \\ & x_{ij}, y_i \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & \sum_j \alpha_j \\ & \forall i \in F \quad \sum_{j \in D} \beta_{ij} \leq f_i \\ & \forall i \in F, j \in D \quad \alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij} \quad x_{ij} \\ & \alpha_j, \beta_{ij} \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

α_j charge to client.
maximize price for client to connect!

LP and Dual. Interpretation?

$$\begin{aligned} \min \quad & \sum_{i \in F} y_i f_i + \sum_{i \in F, j \in D} x_{ij} d_{ij} \\ & \forall j \in D \quad \sum_{i \in F} x_{ij} \geq 1 \\ & \forall i \in F, j \in D \quad x_{ij} \leq y_i, \\ & \quad \quad \quad x_{ij}, y_i \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & \sum_j \alpha_j \\ & \forall i \in F \quad \sum_{j \in D} \beta_{ij} \leq f_i \\ & \forall i \in F, j \in D \quad \alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij} \quad x_{ij} \\ & \quad \quad \quad \alpha_j, \beta_{ij} \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

α_j charge to client.

maximize price for client to connect!

Objective: $\sum_j \alpha_j$ total payment.

LP and Dual. Interpretation?

$$\begin{aligned} \min \quad & \sum_{i \in F} y_i f_i + \sum_{i \in F, j \in D} x_{ij} d_{ij} \\ & \forall j \in D \quad \sum_{i \in F} x_{ij} \geq 1 \\ & \forall i \in F, j \in D \quad x_{ij} \leq y_i, \\ & \quad \quad \quad x_{ij}, y_i \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & \sum_j \alpha_j \\ & \forall i \in F \quad \sum_{j \in D} \beta_{ij} \leq f_i \\ & \forall i \in F, j \in D \quad \alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij} \quad x_{ij} \\ & \quad \quad \quad \alpha_j, \beta_{ij} \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

α_j charge to client.

maximize price for client to connect!

Objective: $\sum_j \alpha_j$ total payment.

Client j travels or pays to open facility i .

LP and Dual. Interpretation?

$$\begin{aligned} \min \quad & \sum_{i \in F} y_i f_i + \sum_{i \in F, j \in D} x_{ij} d_{ij} \\ & \forall j \in D \quad \sum_{i \in F} x_{ij} \geq 1 \\ & \forall i \in F, j \in D \quad x_{ij} \leq y_i, \\ & \quad x_{ij}, y_i \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & \sum_j \alpha_j \\ & \forall i \in F \quad \sum_{j \in D} \beta_{ij} \leq f_i \\ & \forall i \in F, j \in D \quad \alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij} \quad x_{ij} \\ & \quad \alpha_j, \beta_{ij} \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

α_j charge to client.

maximize price for client to connect!

Objective: $\sum_j \alpha_j$ total payment.

Client j travels or pays to open facility i .

Costs client d_{ij} to get to there.

LP and Dual. Interpretation?

$$\begin{aligned} \min \quad & \sum_{i \in F} y_i f_i + \sum_{i \in F, j \in D} x_{ij} d_{ij} \\ & \forall j \in D \quad \sum_{i \in F} x_{ij} \geq 1 \\ & \forall i \in F, j \in D \quad x_{ij} \leq y_i, \\ & \quad \quad \quad x_{ij}, y_i \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & \sum_j \alpha_j \\ & \forall i \in F \quad \sum_{j \in D} \beta_{ij} \leq f_i \\ & \forall i \in F, j \in D \quad \alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij} \quad x_{ij} \\ & \quad \quad \quad \alpha_j, \beta_{ij} \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

α_j charge to client.

maximize price for client to connect!

Objective: $\sum_j \alpha_j$ total payment.

Client j travels or pays to open facility i .

Costs client d_{ij} to get to there.

Savings is $\alpha_j - d_{ij}$.

LP and Dual. Interpretation?

$$\begin{aligned} \min \quad & \sum_{i \in F} y_i f_i + \sum_{i \in F, j \in D} x_{ij} d_{ij} \\ \forall j \in D \quad & \sum_{i \in F} x_{ij} \geq 1 \\ \forall i \in F, j \in D \quad & x_{ij} \leq y_i, \\ & x_{ij}, y_i \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & \sum_j \alpha_j \\ \forall i \in F \quad & \sum_{j \in D} \beta_{ij} \leq f_i \\ \forall i \in F, j \in D \quad & \alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij} \quad x_{ij} \\ & \alpha_j, \beta_{ij} \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

α_j charge to client.

maximize price for client to connect!


Objective: $\sum_j \alpha_j$ total payment.

Client j travels or pays to open facility i .

Costs client d_{ij} to get to there.

Savings is $\alpha_j - d_{ij}$.

Willing to pay $\beta_{ij} = \alpha_j - d_{ij}$.



LP and Dual. Interpretation?

$$\begin{aligned} \min \quad & \sum_{i \in F} y_i f_i + \sum_{i \in F, j \in D} x_{ij} d_{ij} \\ & \forall j \in D \quad \sum_{i \in F} x_{ij} \geq 1 \\ & \forall i \in F, j \in D \quad x_{ij} \leq y_i, \\ & x_{ij}, y_i \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & \sum_j \alpha_j \\ & \forall i \in F \quad \sum_{j \in D} \beta_{ij} \leq f_i \\ & \forall i \in F, j \in D \quad \alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij} \quad x_{ij} \\ & \alpha_j, \beta_{ij} \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

α_j charge to client.

maximize price for client to connect!

Objective: $\sum_j \alpha_j$ total payment.


Client j travels or pays to open facility i .

Costs client d_{ij} to get to there.

Savings is $\alpha_j - d_{ij}$.

Willing to pay $\beta_{ij} = \alpha_j - d_{ij}$.

Total payment to facility i at most f_i before opening.



LP and Dual. Interpretation?

$$\begin{aligned} \min \quad & \sum_{i \in F} y_i f_i + \sum_{i \in F, j \in D} x_{ij} d_{ij} \\ \forall j \in D \quad & \sum_{i \in F} x_{ij} \geq 1 \\ \forall i \in F, j \in D \quad & x_{ij} \leq y_i, \\ & x_{ij}, y_i \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & \sum_j \alpha_j \\ \forall i \in F \quad & \sum_{j \in D} \beta_{ij} \leq f_i \\ \forall i \in F, j \in D \quad & \alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij} \quad x_{ij} \\ & \alpha_j, \beta_{ij} \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

α_j charge to client.

maximize price for client to connect!

Objective: $\sum_j \alpha_j$ total payment.

Client j travels or pays to open facility i .


Costs client d_{ij} to get to there.

Savings is $\alpha_j - d_{ij}$.

Willing to pay $\beta_{ij} = \alpha_j - d_{ij}$.

Total payment to facility i at most f_i before opening.

Complementary slackness:



LP and Dual. Interpretation?

$$\begin{aligned} \min \quad & \sum_{i \in F} y_i f_i + \sum_{i \in F, j \in D} x_{ij} d_{ij} \\ \forall j \in D \quad & \sum_{i \in F} x_{ij} \geq 1 \\ \forall i \in F, j \in D \quad & x_{ij} \leq y_i, \\ & x_{ij}, y_i \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & \sum_j \alpha_j \\ \forall i \in F \quad & \sum_{j \in D} \beta_{ij} \leq f_i \\ \forall i \in F, j \in D \quad & \alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij} \quad x_{ij} \\ & \alpha_j, \beta_{ij} \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

α_j charge to client.

maximize price for client to connect!

Objective: $\sum_j \alpha_j$ total payment.

Client j travels or pays to open facility i .


Costs client d_{ij} to get to there.

Savings is $\alpha_j - d_{ij}$.

Willing to pay $\beta_{ij} = \alpha_j - d_{ij}$.

Total payment to facility i at most f_i before opening.

Complementary slackness: $x_{ij} \geq 0$ if and only if $\alpha_j \geq d_{ij}$.



LP and Dual. Interpretation?

$$\begin{aligned} \min \quad & \sum_{i \in F} y_i f_i + \sum_{i \in F, j \in D} x_{ij} d_{ij} \\ \forall j \in D \quad & \sum_{i \in F} x_{ij} \geq 1 \\ \forall i \in F, j \in D \quad & x_{ij} \leq y_i, \\ & x_{ij}, y_i \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & \sum_j \alpha_j \\ \forall i \in F \quad & \sum_{j \in D} \beta_{ij} \leq f_i \\ \forall i \in F, j \in D \quad & \alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij} \quad x_{ij} \\ & \alpha_j, \beta_{ij} \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

α_j charge to client.

maximize price for client to connect!

Objective: $\sum_j \alpha_j$ total payment.

Client j travels or pays to open facility i .

Costs client d_{ij} to get to there.


Savings is $\alpha_j - d_{ij}$.

Willing to pay $\beta_{ij} = \alpha_j - d_{ij}$.


Total payment to facility i at most f_i before opening.

Complementary slackness: $x_{ij} \geq 0$ if and only if $\alpha_j \geq d_{ij}$.


only assign client to "paid to" facilities.



Use Dual.




Use Dual.




1. Find solution to primal, (x, y) , and dual, (α, β) .

Use Dual.




1. Find solution to primal, (x, y) , and dual, (α, β) .
2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,

Use Dual.




1. Find solution to primal, (x, y) , and dual, (α, β) .
2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,
 - (a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.

Use Dual.




1. Find solution to primal, (x, y) , and dual, (α, β) .
2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,
 - (a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.
 - (b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .

Use Dual.




1. Find solution to primal, (x, y) , and dual, (α, β) .
2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,
 - (a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.
 - (b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .
Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .

Use Dual.




1. Find solution to primal, (x, y) , and dual, (α, β) .
2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,
 - (a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.
 - (b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .
Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .
("Balls" overlap.)

Use Dual.




1. Find solution to primal, (x, y) , and dual, (α, β) .
2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,
 - (a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.
 - (b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .
Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .
("Balls" overlap.)

Use Dual.




1. Find solution to primal, (x, y) , and dual, (α, β) .
2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,
 - (a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.
 - (b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .
Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .
("Balls" overlap.)
3. Removed assigned clients, goto 2.

Use Dual.




1. Find solution to primal, (x, y) , and dual, (α, β) .
 2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,
 - (a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.
 - (b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .
Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .
("Balls" overlap.)
 3. Removed assigned clients, goto 2.
- Choose facilities to cover all clients.

Use Dual.



1. Find solution to primal, (x, y) , and dual, (α, β) .
 2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,
 - (a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.
 - (b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .
Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .
("Balls" overlap.)
 3. Removed assigned clients, goto 2.
- Choose facilities to cover all clients.
Use "balls" of clients to pick which facilities.

Use Dual.



1. Find solution to primal, (x, y) , and dual, (α, β) .
 2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,
 - (a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.
 - (b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .
Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .
("Balls" overlap.)
 3. Removed assigned clients, goto 2.
- Choose facilities to cover all clients.
Use "balls" of clients to pick which facilities.

Integral facility cost at most LP facility cost.

Claim: Total facility cost is at most $\sum_i f_i y_i$.

Integral facility cost at most LP facility cost.

Claim: Total facility cost is at most $\sum_i f_i y_i$.

Note: Recall LP minimized: $\sum_i y_i f_i + \sum_{ij} x_{ij} d_{ij}$.

Integral facility cost at most LP facility cost.

Claim: Total facility cost is at most $\sum_i f_i y_i$.

Note: Recall LP minimized: $\sum_i y_i f_i + \sum_{ij} x_{ij} d_{ij}$.

2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,

Integral facility cost at most LP facility cost.

Claim: Total facility cost is at most $\sum_i f_i y_i$.

Note: Recall LP minimized: $\sum_i y_i f_i + x_{ij} d_{ij}$.

2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,

(a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.

Integral facility cost at most LP facility cost.

Claim: Total facility cost is at most $\sum_i f_i y_i$.

Note: Recall LP minimized: $\sum_i y_i f_i + x_{ij} d_{ij}$.

2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,
 - (a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.
 - (b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .

Integral facility cost at most LP facility cost.

Claim: Total facility cost is at most $\sum_i f_i y_i$.

Note: Recall LP minimized: $\sum_i y_i f_i + \sum_{ij} x_{ij} d_{ij}$.

2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,

(a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.

(b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .

Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .

Integral facility cost at most LP facility cost.

Claim: Total facility cost is at most $\sum_i f_i y_i$.

Note: Recall LP minimized: $\sum_i y_i f_i + x_{ij} d_{ij}$.


2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,

(a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.

(b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .

Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .

Proof: Step 2 picks client j .



Integral facility cost at most LP facility cost.

Claim: Total facility cost is at most $\sum_i f_i y_i$.

Note: Recall LP minimized: $\sum_i y_i f_i + x_{ij} d_{ij}$.

2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,


(a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.

(b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .

Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .

Proof: Step 2 picks client j .

f_{\min} - min cost facility in N_j



Integral facility cost at most LP facility cost.

Claim: Total facility cost is at most $\sum_i f_i y_i$.

Note: Recall LP minimized: $\sum_i y_i f_i + x_{ij} d_{ij}$.

2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,

(a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.


(b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .

Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .

Proof: Step 2 picks client j .

f_{\min} - min cost facility in N_j

f_{\min}



Integral facility cost at most LP facility cost.

Claim: Total facility cost is at most $\sum_i f_i y_i$.

Note: Recall LP minimized: $\sum_i y_i f_i + x_{ij} d_{ij}$.

2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,

(a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.


(b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .

Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .

Proof: Step 2 picks client j .

f_{\min} - min cost facility in N_j

$$f_{\min} \leq f_{\min} \cdot \sum_{i \in N_j} x_{ij}$$



Integral facility cost at most LP facility cost.

Claim: Total facility cost is at most $\sum_i f_i y_i$.

Note: Recall LP minimized: $\sum_i y_i f_i + x_{ij} d_{ij}$.

2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,

(a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.


(b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .

Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .

Proof: Step 2 picks client j .

f_{\min} - min cost facility in N_j

$$f_{\min} \leq f_{\min} \cdot \sum_{i \in N_j} x_{ij} \leq f_{\min} \sum_{i \in N_j} y_i$$



Integral facility cost at most LP facility cost.

Claim: Total facility cost is at most $\sum_i f_i y_i$.

Note: Recall LP minimized: $\sum_i y_i f_i + x_{ij} d_{ij}$.

2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,

(a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.


(b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .

Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .

Proof: Step 2 picks client j .

f_{\min} - min cost facility in N_j

$$f_{\min} \leq f_{\min} \cdot \sum_{i \in N_j} x_{ij} \leq f_{\min} \sum_{i \in N_j} y_i \leq \sum_{i \in N_j} y_i f_i.$$



Integral facility cost at most LP facility cost.

Claim: Total facility cost is at most $\sum_i f_i y_i$.


Note: Recall LP minimized: $\sum_i y_i f_i + x_{ij} d_{ij}$.

2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,

(a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.

(b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .

Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .



Proof: Step 2 picks client j .

f_{\min} - min cost facility in N_j

$$f_{\min} \leq f_{\min} \cdot \sum_{i \in N_j} x_{ij} \leq f_{\min} \sum_{i \in N_j} y_i \leq \sum_{i \in N_j} y_i f_i.$$

For $k \neq j$ used in Step 2.

Integral facility cost at most LP facility cost.

Claim: Total facility cost is at most $\sum_i f_i y_i$.


Note: Recall LP minimized: $\sum_i y_i f_i + x_{ij} d_{ij}$.

2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,

(a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.

(b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .

Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .



Proof: Step 2 picks client j .

f_{\min} - min cost facility in N_j

$$f_{\min} \leq f_{\min} \cdot \sum_{i \in N_j} x_{ij} \leq f_{\min} \sum_{i \in N_j} y_i \leq \sum_{i \in N_j} y_i f_i.$$

For $k \neq j$ used in Step 2.

$N_j \cap N_k = \emptyset$ for j and k in step 2.

Integral facility cost at most LP facility cost.

Claim: Total facility cost is at most $\sum_i f_i y_i$.


Note: Recall LP minimized: $\sum_i y_i f_i + x_{ij} d_{ij}$.

2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,

(a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.

(b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .

Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .



Proof: Step 2 picks client j .

f_{\min} - min cost facility in N_j

$$f_{\min} \leq f_{\min} \cdot \sum_{i \in N_j} x_{ij} \leq f_{\min} \sum_{i \in N_j} y_i \leq \sum_{i \in N_j} y_i f_i.$$

For $k \neq j$ used in Step 2.

$N_j \cap N_k = \emptyset$ for j and k in step 2.

→ Any facility in ≤ 1 sum from step 2.

Integral facility cost at most LP facility cost.

Claim: Total facility cost is at most $\sum_i f_i y_i$.


Note: Recall LP minimized: $\sum_i y_i f_i + x_{ij} d_{ij}$.

2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,

(a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.

(b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .

Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .



Proof: Step 2 picks client j .

f_{\min} - min cost facility in N_j

$$f_{\min} \leq f_{\min} \cdot \sum_{i \in N_j} x_{ij} \leq f_{\min} \sum_{i \in N_j} y_i \leq \sum_{i \in N_j} y_i f_i.$$

For $k \neq j$ used in Step 2.

$N_j \cap N_k = \emptyset$ for j and k in step 2.

→ Any facility in ≤ 1 sum from step 2.

→ total step 2 facility cost is $\leq \sum_i y_i f_i$.

Integral facility cost at most LP facility cost.

Claim: Total facility cost is at most $\sum_i f_i y_i$.


Note: Recall LP minimized: $\sum_i y_i f_i + x_{ij} d_{ij}$.

2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,

(a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.

(b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .

Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .



Proof: Step 2 picks client j .

f_{\min} - min cost facility in N_j

$$f_{\min} \leq f_{\min} \cdot \sum_{i \in N_j} x_{ij} \leq f_{\min} \sum_{i \in N_j} y_i \leq \sum_{i \in N_j} y_i f_i.$$

For $k \neq j$ used in Step 2.

$N_j \cap N_k = \emptyset$ for j and k in step 2.

→ Any facility in ≤ 1 sum from step 2.

→ total step 2 facility cost is $\leq \sum_i y_i f_i$.

Connection Cost.

2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,

Connection Cost.

2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,
 - (a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.

Connection Cost.

2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,
 - (a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.
 - (b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .

Connection Cost.

2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,
 - (a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.
 - (b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .
Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .

Connection Cost.

2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,
 - (a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.
 - (b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .
Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .

Connection Cost.

2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,
 - (a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.
 - (b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .
Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .

Recall: Dual maximizes: $\sum_j \alpha_j$

Connection Cost.

2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,
 - (a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.
 - (b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .
Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .

Recall: Dual maximizes: $\sum_j \alpha_j$


Client j is directly connected. Clients j' are indirectly connected.

Connection Cost.

2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,
 - (a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.
 - (b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .
Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .

Recall: Dual maximizes: $\sum_j \alpha_j$

Client j is directly connected. Clients j' are indirectly connected.




Connection Cost.

2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,
 - (a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.
 - (b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .
Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .

Recall: Dual maximizes: $\sum_j \alpha_j$

Client j is directly connected. Clients j' are indirectly connected.

Connection Cost of j :




Connection Cost.

2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,
 - (a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.
 - (b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .
Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .

Recall: Dual maximizes: $\sum_j \alpha_j$

Client j is directly connected. Clients j' are indirectly connected.

Connection Cost of j :




Connection Cost.

2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,
 - (a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.
 - (b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .
Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .

Recall: Dual maximizes: $\sum_j \alpha_j$

Client j is directly connected. Clients j' are indirectly connected.

Connection Cost of j : $\leq \alpha_j$.




Connection Cost.

2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,
 - (a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.
 - (b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .
Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .

Recall: Dual maximizes: $\sum_j \alpha_j$

Client j is directly connected. Clients j' are indirectly connected.



Connection Cost of j : $\leq \alpha_j$.

Connection Cost of j' :

Connection Cost.

2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,


(a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.

(b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .

Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .

Recall: Dual maximizes: $\sum_j \alpha_j$

Client j is directly connected. Clients j' are indirectly connected.



Connection Cost of j : $\leq \alpha_j$.


Connection Cost of j' :

Connection Cost.

2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,
 - (a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.
 - (b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .
Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .

Recall: Dual maximizes: $\sum_j \alpha_j$

Client j is directly connected. Clients j' are indirectly connected.



Connection Cost of j : $\leq \alpha_j$.

Connection Cost of j' :

$$\leq \alpha_{j'} + \alpha_j + \alpha_j$$

Connection Cost.

2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,


(a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.

(b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .

Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .

Recall: Dual maximizes: $\sum_j \alpha_j$

Client j is directly connected. Clients j' are indirectly connected.



Connection Cost of j : $\leq \alpha_j$.

Connection Cost of j' :

$$\leq \alpha_{j'} + \alpha_j + \alpha_j \leq 3\alpha_{j'}.$$

Connection Cost.

2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,


(a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.

(b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .

Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .

Recall: Dual maximizes: $\sum_j \alpha_j$

Client j is directly connected. Clients j' are indirectly connected.



Connection Cost of j : $\leq \alpha_j$.

Connection Cost of j' :

$$\leq \alpha_{j'} + \alpha_j + \alpha_j \leq 3\alpha_{j'}.$$

$$\text{since } \alpha_j \leq \alpha_{j'}$$

Connection Cost.

2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,


(a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.

(b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .

Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .

Recall: Dual maximizes: $\sum_j \alpha_j$

Client j is directly connected. Clients j' are indirectly connected.



Connection Cost of j : $\leq \alpha_j$.

Connection Cost of j' :

$$\leq \alpha_{j'} + \alpha_j + \alpha_j \leq 3\alpha_{j'}.$$

$$\text{since } \alpha_j \leq \alpha_{j'}$$

Total connection cost:

at most $3\sum_j \alpha_j \leq 3$ times Dual OPT.

Connection Cost.

2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,


(a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.

(b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .

Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .

Recall: Dual maximizes: $\sum_j \alpha_j$

Client j is directly connected. Clients j' are indirectly connected.



Connection Cost of j : $\leq \alpha_j$.

Connection Cost of j' :

$$\leq \alpha_{j'} + \alpha_j + \alpha_j \leq 3\alpha_{j'}$$

$$\text{since } \alpha_j \leq \alpha_{j'}$$

Total connection cost:

at most $3\sum_j \alpha_j \leq 3$ times Dual OPT.

Previous Slide: Facility cost:

Connection Cost.

2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,


(a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.

(b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .

Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .

Recall: Dual maximizes: $\sum_j \alpha_j$

Client j is directly connected. Clients j' are indirectly connected.



Connection Cost of j : $\leq \alpha_j$.

Connection Cost of j' :

$$\leq \alpha_{j'} + \alpha_j + \alpha_j \leq 3\alpha_{j'}.$$

$$\text{since } \alpha_j \leq \alpha_{j'}$$

Total connection cost:

at most $3\sum_j \alpha_j \leq 3$ times Dual OPT.

Previous Slide: Facility cost:


\leq primal “facility” cost \leq Primal OPT.

Connection Cost.

2. For smallest (remaining) α_j ,
 - (a) Let $N_j = \{i : x_{ij} > 0\}$.
 - (b) Open cheapest facility i in N_j .
Every client j' with $N_{j'} \cap N_j \neq \emptyset$ assigned to i .

Recall: Dual maximizes: $\sum_j \alpha_j$

Client j is directly connected. Clients j' are indirectly connected.



Connection Cost of j : $\leq \alpha_j$.

Connection Cost of j' :

$$\leq \alpha_{j'} + \alpha_j + \alpha_j \leq 3\alpha_{j'}.$$

$$\text{since } \alpha_j \leq \alpha_{j'}$$

Total connection cost:

at most $3\sum_j \alpha_j \leq 3$ times Dual OPT.

Previous Slide: Facility cost:

\leq primal "facility" cost \leq Primal OPT.

Total Cost: 4 OPT.

Twist on randomized rounding.

Client j :

Twist on randomized rounding.

Client j : $\sum_i x_{ij} = 1$,

Twist on randomized rounding.

Client j : $\sum_i x_{ij} = 1$, $x_{ij} \geq 0$.

Twist on randomized rounding.

Client j : $\sum_i x_{ij} = 1$, $x_{ij} \geq 0$.

Probability distribution!

Twist on randomized rounding.

Client j : $\sum_i x_{ij} = 1$, $x_{ij} \geq 0$.

Probability distribution! \rightarrow Choose from distribution, x_{ij} , in step 2.

Twist on randomized rounding.

Client j : $\sum_i x_{ij} = 1$, $x_{ij} \geq 0$.

Probability distribution! \rightarrow Choose from distribution, x_{ij} , in step 2.

Expected opening cost:

Twist on randomized rounding.

Client j : $\sum_i x_{ij} = 1$, $x_{ij} \geq 0$.

Probability distribution! \rightarrow Choose from distribution, x_{ij} , in step 2.

Expected opening cost: (note: larger than f_{\min} .)

Twist on randomized rounding.

Client j : $\sum_i x_{ij} = 1$, $x_{ij} \geq 0$.

Probability distribution! \rightarrow Choose from distribution, x_{ij} , in step 2.

Expected opening cost: (note: larger than f_{\min} .)

$$\sum_{i \in N_j} x_{ij} f_i$$

Twist on randomized rounding.

Client j : $\sum_i x_{ij} = 1$, $x_{ij} \geq 0$.

Probability distribution! \rightarrow Choose from distribution, x_{ij} , in step 2.

Expected opening cost: (note: larger than f_{\min} .)

$$\sum_{i \in N_j} x_{ij} f_i \leq \sum_{i \in N_j} y_i f_i.$$

Twist on randomized rounding.

Client j : $\sum_i x_{ij} = 1$, $x_{ij} \geq 0$.

Probability distribution! \rightarrow Choose from distribution, x_{ij} , in step 2.

Expected opening cost: (note: larger than f_{\min} .)

$$\sum_{i \in N_j} x_{ij} f_i \leq \sum_{i \in N_j} y_i f_i.$$

and separate balls implies total $\leq \sum_i y_i f_i$.

Twist on randomized rounding.

Client j : $\sum_i x_{ij} = 1$, $x_{ij} \geq 0$.

Probability distribution! \rightarrow Choose from distribution, x_{ij} , in step 2.

Expected opening cost: (note: larger than f_{\min} .)

$$\sum_{i \in N_j} x_{ij} f_i \leq \sum_{i \in N_j} y_i f_i.$$

and separate balls implies total $\leq \sum_i y_i f_i$.

Twist on randomized rounding.

Client j : $\sum_i x_{ij} = 1$, $x_{ij} \geq 0$.

Probability distribution! \rightarrow Choose from distribution, x_{ij} , in step 2.

Expected opening cost: (note: larger than f_{\min} .)

$$\sum_{i \in N_j} x_{ij} f_i \leq \sum_{i \in N_j} y_i f_i.$$

and separate balls implies total $\leq \sum_i y_i f_i$.

$$D_j = \sum_i x_{ij} d_{ij}$$

Twist on randomized rounding.

Client j : $\sum_i x_{ij} = 1$, $x_{ij} \geq 0$.

Probability distribution! \rightarrow Choose from distribution, x_{ij} , in step 2.

Expected opening cost: (note: larger than f_{\min} .)

$$\sum_{i \in N_j} x_{ij} f_i \leq \sum_{i \in N_j} y_i f_i.$$

and separate balls implies total $\leq \sum_i y_i f_i$.

$D_j = \sum_i x_{ij} d_{ij}$ Expected connection cost of primal for j .

Twist on randomized rounding.

Client j : $\sum_i x_{ij} = 1$, $x_{ij} \geq 0$.

Probability distribution! \rightarrow Choose from distribution, x_{ij} , in step 2.

Expected opening cost: (note: larger than f_{\min} .)

$$\sum_{i \in N_j} x_{ij} f_i \leq \sum_{i \in N_j} y_i f_i.$$

and separate balls implies total $\leq \sum_i y_i f_i$.

$D_j = \sum_i x_{ij} d_{ij}$ Expected connection cost of primal for j .

Expected connection cost j'

Twist on randomized rounding.

Client j : $\sum_i x_{ij} = 1$, $x_{ij} \geq 0$.

Probability distribution! \rightarrow Choose from distribution, x_{ij} , in step 2.

Expected opening cost: (note: larger than f_{\min} .)

$$\sum_{i \in N_j} x_{ij} f_i \leq \sum_{i \in N_j} y_i f_i.$$

and separate balls implies total $\leq \sum_i y_i f_i$.

$D_j = \sum_i x_{ij} d_{ij}$ Expected connection cost of primal for j .

Expected connection cost j' $\alpha_j + \alpha_{j'} + D_j$.

Twist on randomized rounding.

Client j : $\sum_i x_{ij} = 1, x_{ij} \geq 0$.

Probability distribution! \rightarrow Choose from distribution, x_{ij} , in step 2.

Expected opening cost: (note: larger than f_{\min} .)

$$\sum_{i \in N_j} x_{ij} f_i \leq \sum_{i \in N_j} y_i f_i.$$

and separate balls implies total $\leq \sum_i y_i f_i$.

$D_j = \sum_i x_{ij} d_{ij}$ Expected connection cost of primal for j .

Expected connection cost j' $\alpha_j + \alpha_{j'} + D_j$.

In step 2: pick in increasing order of $\alpha_j + D_j$.

Twist on randomized rounding.

Client j : $\sum_i x_{ij} = 1$, $x_{ij} \geq 0$.

Probability distribution! \rightarrow Choose from distribution, x_{ij} , in step 2.

Expected opening cost: (note: larger than f_{\min} .)

$$\sum_{i \in N_j} x_{ij} f_i \leq \sum_{i \in N_j} y_i f_i.$$

and separate balls implies total $\leq \sum_i y_i f_i$.

$D_j = \sum_i x_{ij} d_{ij}$ Expected connection cost of primal for j .

Expected connection cost j' $\alpha_j + \alpha_{j'} + D_j$.

In step 2: pick in increasing order of $\alpha_j + D_j$.

\rightarrow Expected cost is $\leq (2\alpha_{j'} + D_{j'})$.

Twist on randomized rounding.

Client j : $\sum_i x_{ij} = 1$, $x_{ij} \geq 0$.

Probability distribution! \rightarrow Choose from distribution, x_{ij} , in step 2.

Expected opening cost: (note: larger than f_{\min} .)

$$\sum_{i \in N_j} x_{ij} f_i \leq \sum_{i \in N_j} y_i f_i.$$

and separate balls implies total $\leq \sum_i y_i f_i$.

$D_j = \sum_i x_{ij} d_{ij}$ Expected connection cost of primal for j .

Expected connection cost j' $\alpha_j + \alpha_{j'} + D_j$.

In step 2: pick in increasing order of $\alpha_j + D_j$.

\rightarrow Expected cost is $\leq (2\alpha_{j'} + D_{j'})$.

Connection cost: $2\sum_j \alpha_j + \sum_j D_j$.

Twist on randomized rounding.

Client j : $\sum_i x_{ij} = 1$, $x_{ij} \geq 0$.

Probability distribution! \rightarrow Choose from distribution, x_{ij} , in step 2.

Expected opening cost: (note: larger than f_{\min} .)

$$\sum_{i \in N_j} x_{ij} f_i \leq \sum_{i \in N_j} y_i f_i.$$

and separate balls implies total $\leq \sum_i y_i f_i$.

$D_j = \sum_i x_{ij} d_{ij}$ Expected connection cost of primal for j .

Expected connection cost j' $\alpha_j + \alpha_{j'} + D_j$.

In step 2: pick in increasing order of $\alpha_j + D_j$.

\rightarrow Expected cost is $\leq (2\alpha_{j'} + D_{j'})$.

Connection cost: $2\sum_j \alpha_j + \sum_j D_j$.

$2OPT(D)$ plus connection cost of primal.

Twist on randomized rounding.

Client j : $\sum_i x_{ij} = 1$, $x_{ij} \geq 0$.

Probability distribution! \rightarrow Choose from distribution, x_{ij} , in step 2.

Expected opening cost: (note: larger than f_{\min} .)

$$\sum_{i \in N_j} x_{ij} f_i \leq \sum_{i \in N_j} y_i f_i.$$

and separate balls implies total $\leq \sum_i y_i f_i$.

$D_j = \sum_i x_{ij} d_{ij}$ Expected connection cost of primal for j .

Expected connection cost j' $\alpha_j + \alpha_{j'} + D_j$.

In step 2: pick in increasing order of $\alpha_j + D_j$.

\rightarrow Expected cost is $\leq (2\alpha_{j'} + D_{j'})$.

Connection cost: $2\sum_j \alpha_j + \sum_j D_j$.

$2OPT(D)$ plus connection cost of primal.

Total expected cost:

Twist on randomized rounding.

Client j : $\sum_i x_{ij} = 1$, $x_{ij} \geq 0$.

Probability distribution! \rightarrow Choose from distribution, x_{ij} , in step 2.

Expected opening cost: (note: larger than f_{\min} .)

$$\sum_{i \in N_j} x_{ij} f_i \leq \sum_{i \in N_j} y_i f_i.$$

and separate balls implies total $\leq \sum_i y_i f_i$.

$D_j = \sum_i x_{ij} d_{ij}$ Expected connection cost of primal for j .

Expected connection cost j' $\alpha_j + \alpha_{j'} + D_j$.

In step 2: pick in increasing order of $\alpha_j + D_j$.

\rightarrow Expected cost is $\leq (2\alpha_{j'} + D_{j'})$.

Connection cost: $2\sum_j \alpha_j + \sum_j D_j$.

$2OPT(D)$ plus connection cost of primal.

Total expected cost:

Facility cost is at most facility cost of primal.

Twist on randomized rounding.

Client j : $\sum_i x_{ij} = 1$, $x_{ij} \geq 0$.

Probability distribution! \rightarrow Choose from distribution, x_{ij} , in step 2.

Expected opening cost: (note: larger than f_{\min} .)

$$\sum_{i \in N_j} x_{ij} f_i \leq \sum_{i \in N_j} y_i f_i.$$

and separate balls implies total $\leq \sum_i y_i f_i$.

$D_j = \sum_i x_{ij} d_{ij}$ Expected connection cost of primal for j .

Expected connection cost j' $\alpha_j + \alpha_{j'} + D_j$.

In step 2: pick in increasing order of $\alpha_j + D_j$.

\rightarrow Expected cost is $\leq (2\alpha_{j'} + D_{j'})$.

Connection cost: $2\sum_j \alpha_j + \sum_j D_j$.

$2OPT(D)$ plus connection cost of primal.

Total expected cost:

Facility cost is at most facility cost of primal.

Connection cost at most $2OPT$ + connection cost of primal.

Twist on randomized rounding.

Client j : $\sum_i x_{ij} = 1$, $x_{ij} \geq 0$.

Probability distribution! \rightarrow Choose from distribution, x_{ij} , in step 2.

Expected opening cost: (note: larger than f_{\min} .)

$$\sum_{i \in N_j} x_{ij} f_i \leq \sum_{i \in N_j} y_i f_i.$$

and separate balls implies total $\leq \sum_i y_i f_i$.

$D_j = \sum_i x_{ij} d_{ij}$ Expected connection cost of primal for j .

Expected connection cost j' $\alpha_j + \alpha_{j'} + D_j$.

In step 2: pick in increasing order of $\alpha_j + D_j$.

\rightarrow Expected cost is $\leq (2\alpha_{j'} + D_{j'})$.

Connection cost: $2\sum_j \alpha_j + \sum_j D_j$.

$2OPT(D)$ plus connection cost of primal.

Total expected cost:

Facility cost is at most facility cost of primal.

Connection cost at most $2OPT$ + connection cost of primal.

\rightarrow at most $3OPT$.

Primal dual algorithm.

1. Feasible integer solution.

Primal dual algorithm.

1. Feasible integer solution.
2. Feasible dual solution.

Primal dual algorithm.

1. Feasible integer solution.
2. Feasible dual solution.
3. Cost of integer solution $\leq \alpha$ times dual value.

Primal dual algorithm.

1. Feasible integer solution.
2. Feasible dual solution.
3. Cost of integer solution $\leq \alpha$ times dual value.

Primal dual algorithm.

1. Feasible integer solution.
2. Feasible dual solution.
3. Cost of integer solution $\leq \alpha$ times dual value.

Just did it.

Primal dual algorithm.

1. Feasible integer solution.
2. Feasible dual solution.
3. Cost of integer solution $\leq \alpha$ times dual value.

Just did it. Used linear program.

Primal dual algorithm.

1. Feasible integer solution.
2. Feasible dual solution.
3. Cost of integer solution $\leq \alpha$ times dual value.

Just did it. Used linear program. Faster?

Primal dual algorithm.

1. Feasible integer solution.
2. Feasible dual solution.
3. Cost of integer solution $\leq \alpha$ times dual value.

Just did it. Used linear program. Faster?

Typically. (If dual is maximization.)

Primal dual algorithm.

1. Feasible integer solution.
2. Feasible dual solution.
3. Cost of integer solution $\leq \alpha$ times dual value.

Just did it. Used linear program. Faster?

Typically. (If dual is maximization.)

Begin with feasible dual.

Primal dual algorithm.

1. Feasible integer solution.
2. Feasible dual solution.
3. Cost of integer solution $\leq \alpha$ times dual value.

Just did it. Used linear program. Faster?

Typically. (If dual is maximization.)

Begin with feasible dual.

Raise dual variables until tight constraint.

Primal dual algorithm.

1. Feasible integer solution.
2. Feasible dual solution.
3. Cost of integer solution $\leq \alpha$ times dual value.

Just did it. Used linear program. Faster?

Typically. (If dual is maximization.)

Begin with feasible dual.

Raise dual variables until tight constraint.

Set corresponding primal variable to an integer.

Primal dual algorithm.

1. Feasible integer solution.
2. Feasible dual solution.
3. Cost of integer solution $\leq \alpha$ times dual value.

Just did it. Used linear program. Faster?

Typically. (If dual is maximization.)

Begin with feasible dual.

Raise dual variables until tight constraint.

Set corresponding primal variable to an integer.

Recall Dual:

Primal dual algorithm.

1. Feasible integer solution.
2. Feasible dual solution.
3. Cost of integer solution $\leq \alpha$ times dual value.

Just did it. Used linear program. Faster?

Typically. (If dual is maximization.)

Begin with feasible dual.

Raise dual variables until tight constraint.

Set corresponding primal variable to an integer.

Recall Dual:

$$\begin{aligned} \max \sum_j \alpha_j \\ \forall i \in F \quad \sum_{j \in D} \beta_{ij} \leq f_i \\ \forall i \in F, j \in D \quad \alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij} \\ \alpha_j, \beta_{ij} \leq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Facility location primal dual.

Phase 1:

Facility location primal dual.

Phase 1: 1. Initially $\alpha_j, \beta_{ij} = 0$.

Facility location primal dual.

- Phase 1:**
1. Initially $\alpha_j, \beta_{ij} = 0$.
 2. Raise α_j for every (unconnected) client.

Facility location primal dual.

- Phase 1:**
1. Initially $\alpha_j, \beta_{ij} = 0$.
 2. Raise α_j for every (unconnected) client.
When $\alpha_j = d_{ij}$ for some i

Facility location primal dual.

Phase 1: 1. Initially $\alpha_j, \beta_{ij} = 0$.

2. Raise α_j for every (unconnected) client.

When $\alpha_j = d_{ij}$ for some i

raise β_{ij} at same rate

Facility location primal dual.

Phase 1: 1. Initially $\alpha_j, \beta_{ij} = 0$.

2. Raise α_j for every (unconnected) client.

When $\alpha_j = d_{ij}$ for some i

raise β_{ij} at same rate Why?

Facility location primal dual.

Phase 1: 1. Initially $\alpha_j, \beta_{ij} = 0$.

2. Raise α_j for every (unconnected) client.

When $\alpha_j = d_{ij}$ for some i

raise β_{ij} at same rate Why? Dual: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.

Facility location primal dual.

Phase 1: 1. Initially $\alpha_j, \beta_{ij} = 0$.

2. Raise α_j for every (unconnected) client.

When $\alpha_j = d_{ij}$ for some i

raise β_{ij} at same rate Why? Dual: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.

Intuition: Paying β_{ij} to open i .

Facility location primal dual.

Phase 1: 1. Initially $\alpha_j, \beta_{ij} = 0$.

2. Raise α_j for every (unconnected) client.

When $\alpha_j = d_{ij}$ for some i

raise β_{ij} at same rate Why? Dual: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.

Intuition: Paying β_{ij} to open i .

Stop when $\sum_i \beta_{ij} = f_i$.

Facility location primal dual.

Phase 1: 1. Initially $\alpha_j, \beta_{ij} = 0$.

2. Raise α_j for every (unconnected) client.

When $\alpha_j = d_{ij}$ for some i

raise β_{ij} at same rate Why? Dual: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.

Intuition: Paying β_{ij} to open i .

Stop when $\sum_i \beta_{ij} = f_j$.

Why?

Facility location primal dual.

Phase 1: 1. Initially $\alpha_j, \beta_{ij} = 0$.

2. Raise α_j for every (unconnected) client.

When $\alpha_j = d_{ij}$ for some i

raise β_{ij} at same rate Why? Dual: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.

Intuition: Paying β_{ij} to open i .

Stop when $\sum_i \beta_{ij} = f_j$.

Why? Dual: $\sum_i \beta_{ij} \leq f_j$

Facility location primal dual.

Phase 1: 1. Initially $\alpha_j, \beta_{ij} = 0$.

2. Raise α_j for every (unconnected) client.

When $\alpha_j = d_{ij}$ for some i

raise β_{ij} at same rate Why? Dual: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.

Intuition: Paying β_{ij} to open i .

Stop when $\sum_i \beta_{ij} = f_i$.

Why? Dual: $\sum_i \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$

Intuition: facility paid for.

Facility location primal dual.

Phase 1: 1. Initially $\alpha_j, \beta_{ij} = 0$.

2. Raise α_j for every (unconnected) client.

When $\alpha_j = d_{ij}$ for some i

raise β_{ij} at same rate Why? Dual: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.

Intuition: Paying β_{ij} to open i .

Stop when $\sum_i \beta_{ij} = f_i$.

Why? Dual: $\sum_i \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$

Intuition: facility paid for.

Temporarily open i .

Facility location primal dual.

Phase 1: 1. Initially $\alpha_j, \beta_{ij} = 0$.

2. Raise α_j for every (unconnected) client.

When $\alpha_j = d_{ij}$ for some i

raise β_{ij} at same rate Why? Dual: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.

Intuition: Paying β_{ij} to open i .

Stop when $\sum_i \beta_{ij} = f_i$.

Why? Dual: $\sum_i \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$

Intuition: facility paid for.

Temporarily open i .

Connect all tight ji clients j to i .

Facility location primal dual.

Phase 1: 1. Initially $\alpha_j, \beta_{ij} = 0$.

2. Raise α_j for every (unconnected) client.

When $\alpha_j = d_{ij}$ for some i

raise β_{ij} at same rate Why? Dual: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.

Intuition: Paying β_{ij} to open i .

Stop when $\sum_i \beta_{ij} = f_i$.

Why? Dual: $\sum_i \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$

Intuition: facility paid for.

Temporarily open i .

Connect all tight ji clients j to i .

Facility location primal dual.

Phase 1: 1. Initially $\alpha_j, \beta_{ij} = 0$.

2. Raise α_j for every (unconnected) client.

When $\alpha_j = d_{ij}$ for some i

raise β_{ij} at same rate Why? Dual: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.

Intuition: Paying β_{ij} to open i .

Stop when $\sum_i \beta_{ij} = f_i$.

Why? Dual: $\sum_i \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$

Intuition: facility paid for.

Temporarily open i .

Connect all tight ji clients j to i .

3. Continue until all clients connected.

Facility location primal dual.

Phase 1: 1. Initially $\alpha_j, \beta_{ij} = 0$.

2. Raise α_j for every (unconnected) client.

When $\alpha_j = d_{ij}$ for some i

raise β_{ij} at same rate Why? Dual: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.

Intuition: Paying β_{ij} to open i .

Stop when $\sum_i \beta_{ij} = f_i$.

Why? Dual: $\sum_i \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$

Intuition: facility paid for.

Temporarily open i .

Connect all tight ji clients j to i .

3. Continue until all clients connected.

Phase 2:

Facility location primal dual.

Phase 1: 1. Initially $\alpha_j, \beta_{ij} = 0$.

2. Raise α_j for every (unconnected) client.

When $\alpha_j = d_{ij}$ for some i

raise β_{ij} at same rate Why? Dual: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.

Intuition: Paying β_{ij} to open i .

Stop when $\sum_i \beta_{ij} = f_i$.

Why? Dual: $\sum_i \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$

Intuition: facility paid for.

Temporarily open i .

Connect all tight ji clients j to i .

3. Continue until all clients connected.

Phase 2:

Make “edge” between two facilities if paid by a common client.

Facility location primal dual.

Phase 1: 1. Initially $\alpha_j, \beta_{ij} = 0$.

2. Raise α_j for every (unconnected) client.

When $\alpha_j = d_{ij}$ for some i

raise β_{ij} at same rate Why? Dual: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.

Intuition: Paying β_{ij} to open i .

Stop when $\sum_i \beta_{ij} = f_j$.

Why? Dual: $\sum_i \beta_{ij} \leq f_j$

Intuition: facility paid for.

Temporarily open i .

Connect all tight ji clients j to i .

3. Continue until all clients connected.

Phase 2:

Make “edge” between two facilities if paid by a common client.

Permanently open an independent set of facilities in graph.

Facility location primal dual.

Phase 1: 1. Initially $\alpha_j, \beta_{ij} = 0$.

2. Raise α_j for every (unconnected) client.

When $\alpha_j = d_{ij}$ for some i

raise β_{ij} at same rate Why? Dual: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.

Intuition: Paying β_{ij} to open i .

Stop when $\sum_i \beta_{ij} = f_i$.

Why? Dual: $\sum_i \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$

Intuition: facility paid for.

Temporarily open i .

Connect all tight ji clients j to i .

3. Continue until all clients connected.

Phase 2:

Make “edge” between two facilities if paid by a common client.

Permanently open an independent set of facilities in graph.

Facility location primal dual.

Phase 1: 1. Initially $\alpha_j, \beta_{ij} = 0$.

2. Raise α_j for every (unconnected) client.

When $\alpha_j = d_{ij}$ for some i

raise β_{ij} at same rate Why? Dual: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.

Intuition: Paying β_{ij} to open i .

Stop when $\sum_i \beta_{ij} = f_i$.

Why? Dual: $\sum_i \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$

Intuition: facility paid for.

Temporarily open i .

Connect all tight ji clients j to i .

3. Continue until all clients connected.

Phase 2:

Make “edge” between two facilities if paid by a common client.

Permanently open an independent set of facilities in graph.

For client j , connected facility i is opened.

Facility location primal dual.

Phase 1: 1. Initially $\alpha_j, \beta_{ij} = 0$.

2. Raise α_j for every (unconnected) client.

When $\alpha_j = d_{ij}$ for some i

raise β_{ij} at same rate Why? Dual: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.

Intuition: Paying β_{ij} to open i .

Stop when $\sum_i \beta_{ij} = f_i$.

Why? Dual: $\sum_i \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$

Intuition: facility paid for.

Temporarily open i .

Connect all tight ji clients j to i .

3. Continue until all clients connected.

Phase 2:

Make “edge” between two facilities if paid by a common client.

Permanently open an independent set of facilities in graph.

For client j , connected facility i is opened. Good.

Facility location primal dual.

Phase 1: 1. Initially $\alpha_j, \beta_{ij} = 0$.

2. Raise α_j for every (unconnected) client.

When $\alpha_j = d_{ij}$ for some i

raise β_{ij} at same rate Why? Dual: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.

Intuition: Paying β_{ij} to open i .

Stop when $\sum_i \beta_{ij} = f_i$.

Why? Dual: $\sum_i \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$

Intuition: facility paid for.

Temporarily open i .

Connect all tight ji clients j to i .

3. Continue until all clients connected.

Phase 2:

Make “edge” between two facilities if paid by a common client.

Permanently open an independent set of facilities in graph.

For client j , connected facility i is opened. Good.

Connected facility not open

Facility location primal dual.

Phase 1: 1. Initially $\alpha_j, \beta_{ij} = 0$.

2. Raise α_j for every (unconnected) client.

When $\alpha_j = d_{ij}$ for some i

raise β_{ij} at same rate Why? Dual: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.

Intuition: Paying β_{ij} to open i .

Stop when $\sum_i \beta_{ij} = f_i$.

Why? Dual: $\sum_i \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$

Intuition: facility paid for.

Temporarily open i .

Connect all tight ji clients j to i .

3. Continue until all clients connected.

Phase 2:

Make “edge” between two facilities if paid by a common client.

Permanently open an independent set of facilities in graph.

For client j , connected facility i is opened. Good.

Connected facility not open

→ exists client j' paid i and connected to open facility.

Facility location primal dual.

Phase 1: 1. Initially $\alpha_j, \beta_{ij} = 0$.

2. Raise α_j for every (unconnected) client.

When $\alpha_j = d_{ij}$ for some i

raise β_{ij} at same rate Why? Dual: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.

Intuition: Paying β_{ij} to open i .

Stop when $\sum_i \beta_{ij} = f_i$.

Why? Dual: $\sum_i \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$

Intuition: facility paid for.

Temporarily open i .

Connect all tight ji clients j to i .

3. Continue until all clients connected.

Phase 2:

Make “edge” between two facilities if paid by a common client.

Permanently open an independent set of facilities in graph.

For client j , connected facility i is opened. Good.


Connected facility not open

→ exists client j' paid i and connected to open facility.

Connect j to j' 's open facility.

Example.


Constraints for dual.



Example.

Constraints for dual.

$$\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$$




Example.

Constraints for dual.

$$\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$$

$$\alpha_i - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}.$$




Example.

Constraints for dual.

$$\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$$

$$\alpha_i - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}.$$

Grow α_j .




Example.

Constraints for dual.

$$\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$$

$$\alpha_i - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}.$$

Grow α_j .



Example.


Constraints for dual.

$$\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$$


$$\alpha_i - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}.$$

Grow α_j .

$$\alpha_j = d_{ij}!$$



Example.



Constraints for dual.

$$\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$$


$$\alpha_i - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}.$$

Grow α_j .

$$\alpha_j = d_{ij}!$$

Tight constraint:

Example.



Constraints for dual.

$$\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$$


$$\alpha_i - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}.$$

Grow α_j .

$$\alpha_j = d_{ij}!$$

Tight constraint: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.

Example.



Constraints for dual.

$$\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$$

$$\alpha_i - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}.$$


Grow α_j .

$$\alpha_j = d_{ij}!$$

Tight constraint: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.

Grow β_{ij} (and α_j).

Example.



Constraints for dual.

$$\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$$

$$\alpha_i - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}.$$


Grow α_j .

$$\alpha_j = d_{ij}!$$

Tight constraint: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.

Grow β_{ij} (and α_j).

Example.



Constraints for dual.

$$\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$$

$$\alpha_i - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}.$$


Grow α_j .

$$\alpha_j = d_{ij}!$$

Tight constraint: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.

Grow β_{ij} (and α_j).

Example.



Constraints for dual.

$$\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$$

$$\alpha_i - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}.$$

Grow α_j .


$$\alpha_j = d_{ij}!$$

Tight constraint: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.

Grow β_{ij} (and α_j).

$$\sum_j \beta_{ij} = f_i \text{ for all facilities.}$$

Example.



Constraints for dual.

$$\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$$

$$\alpha_i - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}.$$

Grow α_j .

$$\alpha_j = d_{ij}!$$


Tight constraint: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.

Grow β_{ij} (and α_j).

$\sum_j \beta_{ij} = f_i$ for all facilities.

Tight: $\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$

Example.



Constraints for dual.

$$\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$$

$$\alpha_i - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}.$$

Grow α_j .

$$\alpha_j = d_{ij}!$$


Tight constraint: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.

Grow β_{ij} (and α_j).

$\sum_j \beta_{ij} = f_i$ for all facilities.

Tight: $\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$

Example.



Constraints for dual.

$$\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$$

$$\alpha_i - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}.$$

Grow α_j .

$$\alpha_j = d_{ij}!$$

Tight constraint: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.


Grow β_{ij} (and α_j).

$\sum_j \beta_{ij} = f_i$ for all facilities.

Tight: $\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$

LP Cost: $\sum_j \alpha_j$

Example.



Constraints for dual.

$$\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$$

$$\alpha_i - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}.$$

Grow α_j .

$$\alpha_j = d_{ij}!$$

Tight constraint: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.


Grow β_{ij} (and α_j).

$\sum_j \beta_{ij} = f_i$ for all facilities.

Tight: $\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$

LP Cost: $\sum_j \alpha_j = 4.5$

Example.



Constraints for dual.

$$\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$$

$$\alpha_i - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}.$$

Grow α_j .

$$\alpha_j = d_{ij}!$$

Tight constraint: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.

Grow β_{ij} (and α_j).


$$\sum_j \beta_{ij} = f_i \text{ for all facilities.}$$

Tight: $\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$

$$\text{LP Cost: } \sum_j \alpha_j = 4.5$$

Temporarily open all facilities.

Example.



Constraints for dual.

$$\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$$

$$\alpha_i - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}.$$

Grow α_j .

$$\alpha_j = d_{ij}!$$

Tight constraint: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.

Grow β_{ij} (and α_j).


$$\sum_j \beta_{ij} = f_i \text{ for all facilities.}$$

Tight: $\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$

$$\text{LP Cost: } \sum_j \alpha_j = 4.5$$

Temporarily open all facilities.

Example.



Constraints for dual.

$$\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$$

$$\alpha_i - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}.$$

Grow α_j .

$$\alpha_j = d_{ij}!$$

Tight constraint: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.

Grow β_{ij} (and α_j).

$\sum_j \beta_{ij} = f_i$ for all facilities.


Tight: $\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$

LP Cost: $\sum_j \alpha_j = 4.5$

Temporarily open all facilities.

Assign Clients to “paid to” open facility.

Example.



Constraints for dual.

$$\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$$

$$\alpha_i - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}.$$

Grow α_j .

$$\alpha_j = d_{ij}!$$

Tight constraint: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.

Grow β_{ij} (and α_j).

$$\sum_j \beta_{ij} = f_i \text{ for all facilities.}$$

Tight: $\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$


$$\text{LP Cost: } \sum_j \alpha_j = 4.5$$

Temporarily open all facilities.

Assign Clients to “paid to” open facility.

Connect facilities with common client.

Example.



Constraints for dual.

$$\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$$

$$\alpha_i - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}.$$

Grow α_j .

$$\alpha_j = d_{ij}!$$

Tight constraint: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.

Grow β_{ij} (and α_j).

$$\sum_j \beta_{ij} = f_i \text{ for all facilities.}$$

Tight: $\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$

$$\text{LP Cost: } \sum_j \alpha_j = 4.5$$


Temporarily open all facilities.

Assign Clients to “paid to” open facility.

Connect facilities with common client.

Open independent set.

Example.



Constraints for dual.

$$\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$$

$$\alpha_i - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}.$$

Grow α_j .

$$\alpha_j = d_{ij}!$$

Tight constraint: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.

Grow β_{ij} (and α_j).

$$\sum_j \beta_{ij} = f_i \text{ for all facilities.}$$

Tight: $\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$

$$\text{LP Cost: } \sum_j \alpha_j = 4.5$$

Temporarily open all facilities.


Assign Clients to “paid to” open facility.

Connect facilities with common client.

Open independent set.

Connect to “killer” client’s facility.

Example.



Constraints for dual.

$$\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$$

$$\alpha_i - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}.$$

Grow α_j .

$$\alpha_j = d_{ij}!$$

Tight constraint: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.

Grow β_{ij} (and α_j).

$$\sum_j \beta_{ij} = f_i \text{ for all facilities.}$$

Tight: $\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$

$$\text{LP Cost: } \sum_j \alpha_j = 4.5$$

Temporarily open all facilities.

Assign Clients to “paid to” open facility.


Connect facilities with common client.

Open independent set.

Connect to “killer” client’s facility.

Cost: $1 + 3.7$

Example.



Constraints for dual.

$$\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$$

$$\alpha_i - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}.$$

Grow α_j .

$$\alpha_j = d_{ij}!$$

Tight constraint: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.

Grow β_{ij} (and α_j).

$$\sum_j \beta_{ij} = f_i \text{ for all facilities.}$$

$$\text{Tight: } \sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$$

$$\text{LP Cost: } \sum_j \alpha_j = 4.5$$

Temporarily open all facilities.

Assign Clients to "paid to" open facility.


Connect facilities with common client.

Open independent set.

Connect to "killer" client's facility.

$$\text{Cost: } 1 + 3.7 = 4.7.$$

Example.



Constraints for dual.

$$\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$$

$$\alpha_i - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}.$$

Grow α_j .

$$\alpha_j = d_{ij}!$$

Tight constraint: $\alpha_j - \beta_{ij} \leq d_{ij}$.

Grow β_{ij} (and α_j).

$$\sum_j \beta_{ij} = f_i \text{ for all facilities.}$$

Tight: $\sum_j \beta_{ij} \leq f_i$

$$\text{LP Cost: } \sum_j \alpha_j = 4.5$$

Temporarily open all facilities.

Assign Clients to “paid to” open facility.

Connect facilities with common client.

Open independent set.

Connect to “killer” client’s facility.

$$\text{Cost: } 1 + 3.7 = 4.7.$$

A bit more than the LP cost.

Analysis

Claim: Client only pays one facility.

Analysis

Claim: Client only pays one facility.

Independent set of facilities.

Analysis

Claim: Client only pays one facility.

Independent set of facilities.

Claim: S_i - directly connected clients to open facility i .

Analysis

Claim: Client only pays one facility.

Independent set of facilities.

Claim: S_i - directly connected clients to open facility i .

$$f_i + \sum_{j \in S_i} d_{ij} \leq \sum_j \alpha_j.$$

Analysis

Claim: Client only pays one facility.

Independent set of facilities.

Claim: S_i - directly connected clients to open facility i .

$$f_i + \sum_{j \in S_i} d_{ij} \leq \sum_j \alpha_j.$$

Proof:

Analysis

Claim: Client only pays one facility.

Independent set of facilities.

Claim: S_i - directly connected clients to open facility i .

$$f_i + \sum_{j \in S_i} d_{ij} \leq \sum_j \alpha_j.$$

Proof:

$$f_i = \sum_{j \in S_i} \beta_{ij}$$

Analysis

Claim: Client only pays one facility.

Independent set of facilities.

Claim: S_i - directly connected clients to open facility i .

$$f_i + \sum_{j \in S_i} d_{ij} \leq \sum_j \alpha_j.$$

Proof:

$$f_i = \sum_{j \in S_i} \beta_{ij} = \sum_{j \in S_i} \alpha_j - d_{ij}.$$

Analysis

Claim: Client only pays one facility.

Independent set of facilities.

Claim: S_i - directly connected clients to open facility i .

$$f_i + \sum_{j \in S_i} d_{ij} \leq \sum_j \alpha_j.$$

Proof:

$$f_i = \sum_{j \in S_i} \beta_{ij} = \sum_{j \in S_i} \alpha_j - d_{ij}.$$

Since directly connected: $\beta_{ij} = \alpha_j - d_{ij}$.

Analysis

Claim: Client only pays one facility.

Independent set of facilities.

Claim: S_i - directly connected clients to open facility i .

$$f_i + \sum_{j \in S_i} d_{ij} \leq \sum_j \alpha_j.$$

Proof:

$$f_i = \sum_{j \in S_i} \beta_{ij} = \sum_{j \in S_i} \alpha_j - d_{ij}.$$

Since directly connected: $\beta_{ij} = \alpha_j - d_{ij}$.



Analysis.

Claim: Client j is indirectly connected to i

Analysis.

Claim: Client j is indirectly connected to i


$$\rightarrow d_{ij} \leq 3\alpha_j.$$

Analysis.

Claim: Client j is indirectly connected to i

$$\rightarrow d_{ij} \leq 3\alpha_j.$$

Directly connected to (temp open) i'




Analysis.

Claim: Client j is indirectly connected to i

$$\rightarrow d_{ij} \leq 3\alpha_j.$$


Directly connected to (temp open) i'
has common client j' with some facility i .



Analysis.

Claim: Client j is indirectly connected to i


$$\rightarrow d_{ij} \leq 3\alpha_j.$$



Directly connected to (temp open) i'
has common client j' with some facility i .
client j' has $\alpha_{j'} \geq d_{ij'}$ and $\alpha_j \geq d_{ij'}$.

Analysis.


Claim: Client j is indirectly connected to i
 $\rightarrow d_{ij} \leq 3\alpha_j$.



Directly connected to (temp open) i'
has common client j' with some facility i .
client j' has $\alpha_{j'} \geq d_{ij'}$ and $\alpha_j \geq d_{ij'}$.
When i' opens, stops both α_j and $\alpha_{j'}$.

Analysis.

Claim: Client j is indirectly connected to i
 $\rightarrow d_{ij} \leq 3\alpha_j$.




Directly connected to (temp open) i'
has common client j' with some facility i .
client j' has $\alpha_{j'} \geq d_{ij'}$ and $\alpha_j \geq d_{ji'}$.
When i' opens, stops both α_j and $\alpha_{j'}$.
 $\alpha_{j'}$ stopped no later

Analysis.

Claim: Client j is indirectly connected to i


$$\rightarrow d_{ij} \leq 3\alpha_j.$$



Directly connected to (temp open) i'
has common client j' with some facility i .
client j' has $\alpha_{j'} \geq d_{ij'}$ and $\alpha_j \geq d_{ji'}$.
When i' opens, stops both α_j and $\alpha_{j'}$.
 $\alpha_{j'}$ stopped no later (..maybe earlier..)

Analysis.


Claim: Client j is indirectly connected to i
 $\rightarrow d_{ij} \leq 3\alpha_j$.



Directly connected to (temp open) i'
has common client j' with some facility i .
client j' has $\alpha_{j'} \geq d_{ij'}$ and $\alpha_j \geq d_{ij'}$.
When i' opens, stops both α_j and $\alpha_{j'}$.
 $\alpha_{j'}$ stopped no later (..maybe earlier..)
 $\alpha_{j'} \leq \alpha_j$.

Analysis.

Claim: Client j is indirectly connected to i
 $\rightarrow d_{ij} \leq 3\alpha_j$.




Directly connected to (temp open) i'
has common client j' with some facility i .
client j' has $\alpha_{j'} \geq d_{ij'}$ and $\alpha_j \geq d_{ij'}$.
When i' opens, stops both α_j and $\alpha_{j'}$.
 $\alpha_{j'}$ stopped no later (..maybe earlier..)
 $\alpha_{j'} \leq \alpha_j$.
Total distance from j to j' .

Analysis.

Claim: Client j is indirectly connected to i

$$\rightarrow d_{ij} \leq 3\alpha_j.$$



Directly connected to (temp open) i'
has common client j' with some facility i .

client j' has $\alpha_{j'} \geq d_{ij'}$ and $\alpha_j \geq d_{ij'}$.

When i' opens, stops both α_j and $\alpha_{j'}$.

$\alpha_{j'}$ stopped no later (..maybe earlier..)

$$\alpha_{j'} \leq \alpha_j.$$


Total distance from j to j' .

$$d_{jj'} +$$

Analysis.

Claim: Client j is indirectly connected to i

$$\rightarrow d_{ij} \leq 3\alpha_j.$$



Directly connected to (temp open) i'

has common client j' with some facility i .

client j' has $\alpha_{j'} \geq d_{ij'}$ and $\alpha_j \geq d_{ij'}$.

When i' opens, stops both α_j and $\alpha_{j'}$.

$\alpha_{j'}$ stopped no later (..maybe earlier..)

$$\alpha_{j'} \leq \alpha_j.$$


Total distance from j to j' .

$$d_{jj'} + d_{i'j'} +$$

Analysis.

Claim: Client j is indirectly connected to i

$$\rightarrow d_{ij} \leq 3\alpha_j.$$



Directly connected to (temp open) i'

has common client j' with some facility i .

client j' has $\alpha_{j'} \geq d_{ij'}$ and $\alpha_j \geq d_{ij'}$.

When i' opens, stops both α_j and $\alpha_{j'}$.

$\alpha_{j'}$ stopped no later (..maybe earlier..)

$$\alpha_{j'} \leq \alpha_j.$$


Total distance from j to j' .

$$d_{ji'} + d_{i'j'} + d_{j'i}$$

Analysis.

Claim: Client j is indirectly connected to i

$$\rightarrow d_{ij} \leq 3\alpha_j.$$



Directly connected to (temp open) i'

has common client j' with some facility i .

client j' has $\alpha_{j'} \geq d_{ij'}$ and $\alpha_j \geq d_{ij'}$.

When i' opens, stops both α_j and $\alpha_{j'}$.

$\alpha_{j'}$ stopped no later (..maybe earlier..)


$$\alpha_{j'} \leq \alpha_j.$$

Total distance from j to j' .

$$d_{jj'} + d_{i'j'} + d_{i'i} \leq 3\alpha_j$$

Analysis.

Claim: Client j is indirectly connected to i
 $\rightarrow d_{ij} \leq 3\alpha_j$.



Directly connected (temp open) i'
has common client j' with some facility i .
client j' has $\alpha_{j'} \geq d_{ij'}$ and $\alpha_j \geq d_{ij'}$.
When i' opens, stops both α_j and $\alpha_{j'}$.
 $\alpha_{j'}$ stopped no later (..maybe earlier..)
 $\alpha_{j'} \leq \alpha_j$.
Total distance from j to j' .
 $d_{jj'} + d_{j'i} + d_{j'i} \leq 3\alpha_j$



Putting it together!

Claim: Client only pays one facility.

Putting it together!

Claim: Client only pays one facility.

Claim: S_i - directly connected clients to open facility i .

Putting it together!

Claim: Client only pays one facility.

Claim: S_i - directly connected clients to open facility i .

$$f_i + \sum_{j \in S_i} d_{ij} \leq \sum_j \alpha_j.$$

Claim: Client j is indirectly connected to i

Putting it together!

Claim: Client only pays one facility.

Claim: S_i - directly connected clients to open facility i .

$$f_i + \sum_{j \in S_i} d_{ij} \leq \sum_j \alpha_j.$$

Claim: Client j is indirectly connected to i

$$\rightarrow d_{ij} \leq 3\alpha_j.$$

Putting it together!

Claim: Client only pays one facility.

Claim: S_i - directly connected clients to open facility i .

$$f_i + \sum_{j \in S_i} d_{ij} \leq \sum_j \alpha_j.$$

Claim: Client j is indirectly connected to i

$$\rightarrow d_{ij} \leq 3\alpha_j.$$

Total Cost:

Putting it together!

Claim: Client only pays one facility.

Claim: S_i - directly connected clients to open facility i .

$$f_i + \sum_{j \in S_i} d_{ij} \leq \sum_j \alpha_j.$$

Claim: Client j is indirectly connected to i

$$\rightarrow d_{ij} \leq 3\alpha_j.$$

Total Cost:

direct clients dual (α_j) pays for facility and own connections.

Putting it together!

Claim: Client only pays one facility.

Claim: S_i - directly connected clients to open facility i .

$$f_i + \sum_{j \in S_i} d_{ij} \leq \sum_j \alpha_j.$$

Claim: Client j is indirectly connected to i

$$\rightarrow d_{ij} \leq 3\alpha_j.$$

Total Cost:

direct clients dual (α_j) pays for facility and own connections.
plus no more than 3 times indirect client dual.

Putting it together!

Claim: Client only pays one facility.

Claim: S_i - directly connected clients to open facility i .

$$f_i + \sum_{j \in S_i} d_{ij} \leq \sum_j \alpha_j.$$

Claim: Client j is indirectly connected to i

$$\rightarrow d_{ij} \leq 3\alpha_j.$$

Total Cost:

direct clients dual (α_j) pays for facility and own connections.

plus no more than 3 times indirect client dual.

Total Cost: 3 times dual.

Putting it together!

Claim: Client only pays one facility.

Claim: S_i - directly connected clients to open facility i .

$$f_i + \sum_{j \in S_i} d_{ij} \leq \sum_j \alpha_j.$$

Claim: Client j is indirectly connected to i

$$\rightarrow d_{ij} \leq 3\alpha_j.$$

Total Cost:

direct clients dual (α_j) pays for facility and own connections.

plus no more than 3 times indirect client dual.

Total Cost: 3 times dual.

feasible dual upper bounds fractional (and integer) primal.

Putting it together!

Claim: Client only pays one facility.

Claim: S_i - directly connected clients to open facility i .

$$f_i + \sum_{j \in S_i} d_{ij} \leq \sum_j \alpha_j.$$

Claim: Client j is indirectly connected to i

$$\rightarrow d_{ij} \leq 3\alpha_j.$$

Total Cost:

direct clients dual (α_j) pays for facility and own connections.

plus no more than 3 times indirect client dual.

Total Cost: 3 times dual.

feasible dual upper bounds fractional (and integer) primal.

Putting it together!

Claim: Client only pays one facility.

Claim: S_i - directly connected clients to open facility i .

$$f_i + \sum_{j \in S_i} d_{ij} \leq \sum_j \alpha_j.$$

Claim: Client j is indirectly connected to i

$$\rightarrow d_{ij} \leq 3\alpha_j.$$

Total Cost:

direct clients dual (α_j) pays for facility and own connections.
plus no more than 3 times indirect client dual.

Total Cost: 3 times dual.

feasible dual upper bounds fractional (and integer) primal.

3 OPT.

Putting it together!

Claim: Client only pays one facility.

Claim: S_i - directly connected clients to open facility i .

$$f_i + \sum_{j \in S_i} d_{ij} \leq \sum_j \alpha_j.$$

Claim: Client j is indirectly connected to i

$$\rightarrow d_{ij} \leq 3\alpha_j.$$

Total Cost:

direct clients dual (α_j) pays for facility and own connections.
plus no more than 3 times indirect client dual.

Total Cost: 3 times dual.

feasible dual upper bounds fractional (and integer) primal.

3 OPT.

Fast!

Putting it together!

Claim: Client only pays one facility.

Claim: S_i - directly connected clients to open facility i .

$$f_i + \sum_{j \in S_i} d_{ij} \leq \sum_j \alpha_j.$$

Claim: Client j is indirectly connected to i

$$\rightarrow d_{ij} \leq 3\alpha_j.$$

Total Cost:

direct clients dual (α_j) pays for facility and own connections.
plus no more than 3 times indirect client dual.

Total Cost: 3 times dual.

feasible dual upper bounds fractional (and integer) primal.

3 OPT.

Fast! Cheap!

Putting it together!

Claim: Client only pays one facility.

Claim: S_i - directly connected clients to open facility i .

$$f_i + \sum_{j \in S_i} d_{ij} \leq \sum_j \alpha_j.$$

Claim: Client j is indirectly connected to i

$$\rightarrow d_{ij} \leq 3\alpha_j.$$

Total Cost:

direct clients dual (α_j) pays for facility and own connections.
plus no more than 3 times indirect client dual.

Total Cost: 3 times dual.

feasible dual upper bounds fractional (and integer) primal.

3 OPT.

Fast! Cheap! Safe!