

# FIRST-ORDER LOGIC

## CHAPTER 8

Chapter 8 1

### Outline

- ◇ Why FOL?
- ◇ Syntax and semantics of FOL
- ◇ Fun with sentences
- ◇ Wumpus world in FOL

Chapter 8 2

### Pros and cons of propositional logic

- 😊 Propositional logic is **declarative**: pieces of syntax correspond to facts
- 😊 Propositional logic allows partial/disjunctive/negated information (unlike most data structures and databases)
- 😊 Propositional logic is **compositional**:  
meaning of  $B_{1,1} \wedge P_{1,2}$  is derived from meaning of  $B_{1,1}$  and of  $P_{1,2}$
- 😊 Meaning in propositional logic is **context-independent** (unlike natural language, where meaning depends on context)
- 😞 Propositional logic has very limited expressive power (unlike natural language)  
E.g., cannot say “pits cause breezes in adjacent squares”  
except by writing one sentence for each square

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### First-order logic

Whereas propositional logic assumes world contains **facts**, first-order logic (like natural language) assumes the world contains

- **Objects**: people, houses, numbers, theories, Ronald McDonald, colors, baseball games, wars, centuries ...
- **Relations**: red, round, bogus, prime, multistoried ... , brother of, bigger than, inside, part of, has color, occurred after, owns, comes between, ...
- **Functions**: father of, best friend, third inning of, one more than, end of ...

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### Logics in general

| Language            | Ontological Commitment           | Epistemological Commitment |
|---------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------|
| Propositional logic | facts                            | true/false/unknown         |
| First-order logic   | facts, objects, relations        | true/false/unknown         |
| Temporal logic      | facts, objects, relations, times | true/false/unknown         |
| Probability theory  | facts                            | degree of belief           |
| Fuzzy logic         | facts + degree of truth          | known interval value       |

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### Syntax of FOL: Basic elements

- Constants *KingJohn, 2, UCB, ...*
- Predicates *Brother, >, ...*
- Functions *Sqrt, LeftLegOf, ...*
- Variables *x, y, a, b, ...*
- Connectives  $\wedge \vee \neg \Rightarrow \Leftrightarrow$
- Equality  $=$
- Quantifiers  $\forall \exists$

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## Atomic sentences


Atomic sentence =  $predicate(term_1, \dots, term_n)$   
or  $term_1 = term_2$

Term =  $function(term_1, \dots, term_n)$   
or *constant* or *variable*

E.g.,  $Brother(KingJohn, RichardTheLionheart)$   
 $> (Length(LeftLegOf(Richard)), Length(LeftLegOf(KingJohn)))$

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## Models for FOL: Example



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## Complex sentences

Complex sentences are made from atomic sentences using connectives

$\neg S, S_1 \wedge S_2, S_1 \vee S_2, S_1 \Rightarrow S_2, S_1 \Leftrightarrow S_2$

E.g.  $Sibling(KingJohn, Richard) \Rightarrow Sibling(Richard, KingJohn)$   
 $> (1, 2) \vee \leq (1, 2)$   
 $> (1, 2) \wedge \neg > (1, 2)$

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## Truth example

Consider the interpretation in which

*Richard* → Richard the Lionheart

*John* → the evil King John

*Brother* → the brotherhood relation

Under this interpretation,  $Brother(Richard, John)$  is true just in case Richard the Lionheart and the evil King John are in the brotherhood relation in the model

Mathematically, the brotherhood relation = set of 2-tuples of objects:

...

$\langle \text{Richard the Lionheart, the evil King John} \rangle$   
 $\langle \text{the evil King John, Richard the Lionheart} \rangle$   
...

$\langle \text{Tweedledum, Tweedledee} \rangle$   
 $\langle \text{Tweedledee, Tweedledum} \rangle$   
...

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## Truth in first-order logic

Sentences are true with respect to a **model** and an **interpretation**

Model contains  $\geq 1$  objects (**domain elements**) and relations among them

Interpretation specifies referents for

**constant symbols** → objects

**predicate symbols** → relations

**function symbols** → functional relations

An atomic sentence  $predicate(term_1, \dots, term_n)$  is true iff the objects referred to by  $term_1, \dots, term_n$  are in the relation referred to by  $predicate$

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## Models for FOL: Lots!

Entailment in propositional logic can be computed by enumerating models

We **can** enumerate the FOL models for a given KB vocabulary:

For each number of domain elements  $n$  from 1 to  $\infty$

For each  $k$ -ary predicate  $P_k$  in the vocabulary

For each possible  $k$ -ary relation on  $n$  objects

For each constant symbol  $C$  in the vocabulary

For each choice of referent for  $C$  from  $n$  objects ...

Computing entailment by enumerating FOL models is not easy!

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## Universal quantification

$\forall$  (variables) (sentence)

Everyone at Berkeley is smart:

$\forall x \text{ At}(x, \text{Berkeley}) \Rightarrow \text{Smart}(x)$

$\forall x P$  is true in a model  $m$  iff  $P$  is true with  $x$  being **each** possible object in the model

**Roughly** speaking, equivalent to the conjunction of instantiations of  $P$

$(\text{At}(\text{KingJohn}, \text{Berkeley}) \Rightarrow \text{Smart}(\text{KingJohn}))$   
 $\wedge (\text{At}(\text{Richard}, \text{Berkeley}) \Rightarrow \text{Smart}(\text{Richard}))$   
 $\wedge (\text{At}(\text{Berkeley}, \text{Berkeley}) \Rightarrow \text{Smart}(\text{Berkeley}))$   
 $\wedge \dots$

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## Another common mistake to avoid

Typically,  $\wedge$  is the main connective with  $\exists$

Common mistake: using  $\Rightarrow$  as the main connective with  $\exists$ :

$\exists x \text{ At}(x, \text{Stanford}) \Rightarrow \text{Smart}(x)$

is true if there is anyone who is not at Stanford!

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## A common mistake to avoid

Typically,  $\Rightarrow$  is the main connective with  $\forall$

Common mistake: using  $\wedge$  as the main connective with  $\forall$ :

$\forall x \text{ At}(x, \text{Berkeley}) \wedge \text{Smart}(x)$

means "Everyone is at Berkeley and everyone is smart"

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## Properties of quantifiers

$\forall x \forall y$  is the same as  $\forall y \forall x$  (why??)

$\exists x \exists y$  is the same as  $\exists y \exists x$  (why??)

$\exists x \forall y$  is **not** the same as  $\forall y \exists x$

$\exists x \forall y \text{ Loves}(x, y)$

"There is a person who loves everyone in the world"

$\forall y \exists x \text{ Loves}(x, y)$

"Everyone in the world is loved by at least one person"

Quantifier duality: each can be expressed using the other

$\forall x \text{ Likes}(x, \text{IceCream}) \quad \neg \exists x \neg \text{Likes}(x, \text{IceCream})$

$\exists x \text{ Likes}(x, \text{Broccoli}) \quad \neg \forall x \neg \text{Likes}(x, \text{Broccoli})$

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## Existential quantification

$\exists$  (variables) (sentence)

Someone at Stanford is smart:

$\exists x \text{ At}(x, \text{Stanford}) \wedge \text{Smart}(x)$

$\exists x P$  is true in a model  $m$  iff  $P$  is true with  $x$  being **some** possible object in the model

**Roughly** speaking, equivalent to the disjunction of instantiations of  $P$

$(\text{At}(\text{KingJohn}, \text{Stanford}) \wedge \text{Smart}(\text{KingJohn}))$   
 $\vee (\text{At}(\text{Richard}, \text{Stanford}) \wedge \text{Smart}(\text{Richard}))$   
 $\vee (\text{At}(\text{Stanford}, \text{Stanford}) \wedge \text{Smart}(\text{Stanford}))$   
 $\vee \dots$

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## Fun with sentences

Brothers are siblings

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$$\forall x, y \text{ Brother}(x, y) \Rightarrow \text{Sibling}(x, y).$$

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Brothers are siblings

$$\forall x, y \text{ Brother}(x, y) \Rightarrow \text{Sibling}(x, y).$$

"Sibling" is symmetric

$$\forall x, y \text{ Sibling}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow \text{Sibling}(y, x).$$

One's mother is one's female parent

$$\forall x, y \text{ Mother}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow (\text{Female}(x) \wedge \text{Parent}(x, y)).$$

A first cousin is a child of a parent's sibling

$$\forall x, y \text{ FirstCousin}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow \exists p, ps \text{ Parent}(p, x) \wedge \text{Sibling}(ps, p) \wedge \text{Parent}(ps, y)$$

## Fun with sentences

Brothers are siblings

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$$\forall x, y \text{ Sibling}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow \text{Sibling}(y, x).$$

One's mother is one's female parent

## Equality

$term_1 = term_2$  is true under a given interpretation if and only if  $term_1$  and  $term_2$  refer to the same object

E.g.,  $1 = 2$  and  $\forall x \times(\text{Sqrt}(x), \text{Sqrt}(x)) = x$  are satisfiable  
 $2 = 2$  is valid

E.g., definition of (full) *Sibling* in terms of *Parent*:

$$\forall x, y \text{ Sibling}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow [\neg(x = y) \wedge \exists m, f \neg(m = f) \wedge \text{Parent}(m, x) \wedge \text{Parent}(f, x) \wedge \text{Parent}(m, y) \wedge \text{Parent}(f, y)]$$

## Fun with sentences

Brothers are siblings

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"Sibling" is symmetric

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One's mother is one's female parent

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## Open and Closed Worlds

Suppose the KB contains the following facts:

$\text{Teaches}(\text{Russell}, \text{CS188}, \text{Fall05})$      $\text{Teaches}(\text{Russell}, \text{CS294-10}, \text{Fall05})$

How many courses does Prof. Russell teach in Fall 2005???

## Open and Closed Worlds

Suppose the KB contains the following facts:

$Teaches(Russell, CS188, Fall05)$      $Teaches(Russell, CS294-10, Fall05)$

How many courses does Prof. Russell teach in Fall 2005???

Database system: 2

First-order logic: between 1 and  $\infty$

Database systems assume **unique names** and **closed world**

## Deducing hidden properties

Properties of locations:

$\forall x, t \text{ At}(Agent, x, t) \wedge Smelt(t) \Rightarrow Smelly(x)$   
 $\forall x, t \text{ At}(Agent, x, t) \wedge Breeze(t) \Rightarrow Breezy(x)$

Squares are breezy near a pit:

**Definition** for the *Breezy* predicate:

$\forall y \text{ Breezy}(y) \Leftrightarrow [\exists x \text{ Pit}(x) \wedge \text{Adjacent}(x, y)]$

Note that one sentence suffices to cover all squares and times

## Interacting with FOL KBs

Suppose a wumpus-world agent is using an FOL KB and perceives a smell and a breeze (but no glitter) at  $t = 5$ :

$Tell(KB, \text{Percept}([Smell, Breeze, None], 5))$

$Ask(KB, \exists a \text{ Action}(a, 5))$

I.e., does *KB* entail any particular actions at  $t = 5$ ?

Answer: *Yes*,  $\{a/Shoot\}$  ← substitution (binding list)

Given a sentence *S* and a substitution  $\sigma$ ,

*S* $\sigma$  denotes the result of plugging  $\sigma$  into *S*; e.g.,

$S = \text{Smarter}(x, y)$

$\sigma = \{x/Hillary, y/Bill\}$

$S\sigma = \text{Smarter}(Hillary, Bill)$

$Ask(KB, S)$  returns some/all  $\sigma$  such that  $KB \models S\sigma$

## Keeping track of change

Facts hold in *situations*, rather than eternally

E.g.,  $\text{Holding}(Gold, Now)$  rather than just  $\text{Holding}(Gold)$


Situation calculus is one way to represent change in FOL:

Adds a situation argument to each non-eternal predicate

E.g., *Now* in  $\text{Holding}(Gold, Now)$  denotes a situation

Situations are connected by the *Result* function

$\text{Result}(a, s)$  is the situation that results from doing *a* in *s*



## Knowledge base for the wumpus world

"Perception"

$\forall b, g, t \text{ Percept}([Smell, b, g], t) \Rightarrow Smelt(t)$

$\forall s, b, t \text{ Percept}([s, b, Glitter], t) \Rightarrow AtGold(t)$

Reflex:  $\forall t \text{ AtGold}(t) \Rightarrow \text{Action}(Grab, t)$

Reflex with internal state: do we have the gold already?

$\forall t \text{ AtGold}(t) \wedge \neg \text{Holding}(Gold, t) \Rightarrow \text{Action}(Grab, t)$

$\text{Holding}(Gold, t)$  cannot be observed

⇒ keeping track of hidden state is essential

## Describing actions I

"Effect" axiom—describe changes due to action

$\forall s \text{ AtGold}(s) \Rightarrow \text{Holding}(Gold, \text{Result}(Grab, s))$

"Frame" axiom—describe **non-changes** due to action

$\forall s \text{ HaveArrow}(s) \Rightarrow \text{HaveArrow}(\text{Result}(Grab, s))$

**Frame problem:** find an elegant way to handle non-change

(a) representation—avoid frame axioms

(b) inference—avoid repeated "copy-overs" to keep track of state

**Qualification problem:** true descriptions of real actions require endless caveats—what if gold is slippery or nailed down or ...

**Ramification problem:** real actions have many secondary consequences—what about the dust on the gold, wear and tear on gloves, ...

## Describing actions II

Successor-state axioms solve the representational frame problem

Each axiom is "about" a **predicate** (not an action per se):

$$\begin{aligned} P \text{ true afterwards} &\Leftrightarrow [\text{an action made } P \text{ true}] \\ &\vee P \text{ true already and no action made } P \text{ false} \end{aligned}$$

For holding the gold:

$$\begin{aligned} \forall a, s \text{ Holding}(\text{Gold}, \text{Result}(a, s)) &\Leftrightarrow \\ &[(a = \text{Grab} \wedge \text{AtGold}(s)) \\ &\vee (\text{Holding}(\text{Gold}, s) \wedge a \neq \text{Release})] \end{aligned}$$

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## Summary

First-order logic:

- objects and relations are semantic primitives
- syntax: constants, functions, predicates, equality, quantifiers

Increased expressive power: sufficient to define wumpus world

Situation calculus:

- conventions for describing actions and change in FOL
- can formulate planning as inference on a situation calculus KB

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## Making plans

Initial condition in KB:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{At}(\text{Agent}, [1, 1], S_0) \\ \text{At}(\text{Gold}, [1, 2], S_0) \end{aligned}$$

Query:  $\text{Ask}(\text{KB}, \exists s \text{ Holding}(\text{Gold}, s))$

i.e., in what situation will I be holding the gold?

Answer:  $\{s / \text{Result}(\text{Grab}, \text{Result}(\text{Forward}, S_0))\}$

i.e., go forward and then grab the gold

This assumes that the agent is interested in plans starting at  $S_0$  and that  $S_0$  is the only situation described in the KB

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## Making plans: A better way

Represent plans as action sequences  $[a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n]$

$\text{PlanResult}(p, s)$  is the result of executing  $p$  in  $s$

Then the query  $\text{Ask}(\text{KB}, \exists p \text{ Holding}(\text{Gold}, \text{PlanResult}(p, S_0)))$   
has the solution  $\{p / [\text{Forward}, \text{Grab}]\}$

Definition of  $\text{PlanResult}$  in terms of  $\text{Result}$ :

$$\begin{aligned} \forall s \text{ PlanResult}([], s) &= s \\ \forall a, p, s \text{ PlanResult}([a|p], s) &= \text{PlanResult}(p, \text{Result}(a, s)) \end{aligned}$$

Planning systems are special-purpose reasoners designed to do this type of inference more efficiently than a general-purpose reasoner

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