

Practical Volume-Based Attacks on Encrypted Databases

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Abstract—Recent years have seen an increased interest towards strong security primitives for encrypted databases (such as oblivious protocols), that hide the access patterns of query execution, and reveal only the volume of results. However, recent work has shown that even volume leakage can enable the reconstruction of entire columns in the database. Yet, existing attacks rely on a set of assumptions that are unrealistic in practice: for example, they (i) require a large number of queries to be issued by the user, or (ii) assume certain distributions on the queries or underlying data (e.g., that the queries are distributed uniformly at random, or that the database does not contain missing values).

In this work, we present new attacks for recovering the content of individual user queries, assuming no leakage from the system except the number of results and avoiding the limiting assumptions above. Unlike prior attacks, our attacks require only a *single* query to be issued by the user for recovering the keyword. Furthermore, our attacks make no assumptions about the distribution of issued queries or the underlying data. Instead, our key insight is to exploit the *behavior* of real-world applications.

We start by surveying 11 applications to identify two key characteristics that can be exploited by attackers—(i) file injection, and (ii) automatic query replay. We present attacks that leverage these two properties in concert with volume leakage, independent of the details of any encrypted database system. Subsequently, we perform an attack on the real Gmail web client by simulating a server-side adversary. Our attack on Gmail completes within a matter of minutes, demonstrating the feasibility of our techniques. We also present three ancillary attacks for situations when certain mitigation strategies are employed.

1. Introduction

In recent years, there has been a tremendous increase in interest towards encrypted database systems that enable queries over encrypted data, because they provide privacy guarantees against a compromised database server. A number of practical systems have been proposed by academia as well as industry [1]–[11], typically relying on techniques such as property-preserving encryption [12]–[16] or searchable encryption [2], [17]–[27].

Most of these schemes leak *query access patterns*. Consider the example of an email application: a user issues a search query for a keyword over their emails. To facilitate such queries, the mail server typically stores

an inverted index (also called a *secondary index*) for each user’s mailbox, which maps each keyword to the list of emails it appears in. When fetching the results of a queried keyword, a compromised server can observe the set of email identifiers that match the keyword (*i.e.*, the access patterns of the query), even though the email bodies remain encrypted. A set of recent works [28]–[42] has shown that such access patterns leak significant information to the attacker, enabling the identification of keywords that users search for as well as email contents.

Many of these works discuss oblivious protocols such as ORAM (Oblivious RAM) [43], [44] or PIR (Private Information Retrieval) [45] as a solution to this leakage. Even an attacker eavesdropping at the server is unable to identify which documents were returned in response to a query (*i.e.*, the access patterns of queries remain hidden). Instead, the attacker can only observe the *volume* of results. Consequently, these schemes are often regarded as conferring a very strong security guarantee, the main downside largely being their slow performance.

However, in seminal work, Kellaris *et al.* [37] showed that even schemes that provably conceal access patterns allow attackers to reconstruct the *database counts*, *i.e.*, the number of documents in the database containing each particular value. The attacker neither knows the content of individual queries (which are encrypted), nor which documents were returned in response. Instead, he only observes the volume of results given a set of range queries. Kellaris *et al.* showed that volume-based attacks were possible, even if not yet practical. Their techniques required the attacker to observe the result volumes of $O(N^4 \log N)$ range queries, for a domain of size N . Furthermore, they also assumed that the range queries were drawn at random from a uniform distribution, thus severely limiting the applicability of the attack in practice. Grubbs *et al.* [46] and (more recently) Gui *et al.* [47] improved upon the results of Kellaris *et al.* by presenting attacks that do not require a uniformity assumption for queries as long as other assumptions hold—*e.g.*, that queries with all possible volumes (within a certain bound) are observed at least once; or that the underlying database is dense (*i.e.*, all N values occur in the database).

In this work, we explore an alternative design point in the space of attacks, and show that volume-based attacks are practical *without making any assumptions about the distribution of queries or the underlying data*. Our aim is to recover the content of individual queries that search for a specific keyword in the database. We note that as long as a query for each keyword is issued at least once, our attack enables an adversary to reconstruct the list of all

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the keywords that appear in the database.

In particular, we focus on the behavior of applications that allow users to search for keywords over a *secondary index*, a common data structure in database systems that maps keys to a set of matching records. In the encrypted database literature, this corresponds to the model of searchable encryption schemes [2], [17]–[27].

Our key insight is that by exploiting the *behavior* of specific real-world applications, we can avoid assumptions made by prior volume attacks about the distribution of queries or the underlying data. Furthermore, it allows our attack to be eminently practical, requiring only a *single* query to be issued by the user for recovering the keyword.

As such, even though real-world applications today leak far more information than just the volume of results, the importance of volume attacks will only grow in the future. Privacy-conscious services have begun deploying sophisticated schemes to plug traditional sources of leakage, including access patterns (e.g., the Signal messaging service [48], [49]). The takeaway of our work is that as practitioners take steps towards enhancing the privacy guarantees of their applications, they must also account for the leakage of result volumes. Application-specific behavior that facilitates easy exploitation of this leakage should be revised.

1.1. Techniques and contributions

We start by examining 11 representative applications that enable search queries over a secondary index (e.g., Gmail, Twitter, and Facebook) to identify realistic attacker capabilities that can be leveraged in concert with volume leakage. We find that many of these applications satisfy two key characteristics that enable us to mount efficient volume-based attacks, even if they are built atop a cryptographic backend (such as ORAM or PIR) that plugs traditional sources of leakage, and only leaks the volume of results.

First, we find that many applications inherently allow *other* users to *inject* application data into a victim user’s index. This property of applications has also been noted in prior work [2], [30], [31]. In our setting, it allows the attacker to potentially influence the volume of results returned by a query.

However, it is not clear how to leverage file injection alone when the only information available is the number of results. File-injection attacks have been studied in the searchable encryption literature [2], [30], [31], but these attacks rely crucially on the attacker knowing the query access patterns—namely, the set of files matching the keyword. The key idea is that the attacker injects special files F_1, \dots, F_n constructed so that each keyword is contained in a unique subset of files. When the victim queries for a keyword, the attacker learns the exact set of files returned and hence the keyword. In our model, though, the attacker only learns the number of files returned, not the exact set. Ensuring that each keyword has a unique number of files means injecting $|D|$ files, where D is the dictionary space. For the English dictionary ($\sim 200K$ words), this attack would only be feasible on a small subset. Moreover, given a set of files, there may be many different keywords that are present in the same number of files, precluding these attacks in our setting.

Instead, our strategy is to leverage a second property we observed in the real applications surveyed, which is key for making an injection attack feasible with only volume leakage: the ability to *replay* queries issued by a user *without further user intervention*. While this seems at first glance to be a strong assumption, we find that several applications display this behavior as a *built-in feature*, ostensibly to hide transient application errors.

As an example, Gmail inbox search fits our setting seamlessly, and satisfies both the aforementioned properties. The user can search for a keyword in their emails, an attacker can inject data by simply sending the user an email with a specific keyword, and the user’s query is automatically replayed by the application when the server’s response is delayed without relying on user intervention. In §2.2, we define these abilities formally, demonstrate how they appear more generally in a wide range of applications, and explain why they are hard to avoid.

Given these attacker abilities, we present attack algorithms that are able to reconstruct user queries on secondary indices. Our high-level strategy, described in §3, is twofold:

- 1) **Inject:** the attacker injects k *special* files that alter the number of results for a candidate query.
- 2) **Replay:** the attacker causes the client to automatically replay the query without user intervention.

The process repeats to narrow the search space, without the user’s knowledge. This base attack succeeds with 100% probability in identifying words in the attacker’s dictionary. Specifically, given a dictionary of keywords D that represents the attacker’s domain of interest, the attack recovers a queried keyword in only $O(\log_k |D|)$ replays of the query (e.g., < 5 for the English dictionary).

Subsequently, we build upon our base attack to present three ancillary attacks. The ancillary attacks show that our strategy remains feasible, albeit more expensive or less accurate, even when certain mitigation techniques are employed (§5).

- **No replay attack:** We provide an extension to our base attack that works even when query replay is not possible (§3.2). While the detection accuracy decreases in this case due to the mentioned shared cardinality, the attack still succeeds with significant probability on a smaller dictionary.
- **Attack with padding:** We further demonstrate that our attack remains possible even when padding is used to hide result counts (§3.3), through an extension to our base attack that requires more injected data but with proven effectiveness.
- **Attack with noise:** We finally show an extension of the base attack with noisy data when the attacker does not know the result count precisely (§3.4).

In §A, we also discuss extensions to the attack for recovering keywords in conjunctive queries.

Finally, we demonstrate the feasibility of our techniques and attack the real Gmail web client by simulating a server-side adversary (§4.5). The characteristics of real applications poses a number of constraints on the attack, e.g., based on the behavior of replays, or the time it takes to inject files into the secondary index. Despite these constraints, we show that our attack completes within a matter of minutes for the Gmail application. We also analyze the theoretical complexity of our attacks, and

experimentally evaluate their overheads and accuracy in a variety of settings.

While there are ways to mitigate the attack, the vulnerability from result count leakage is difficult to eradicate from a system completely. Padding to the worst-case count theoretically prevents leakage, but in many applications, this results in unaffordable overheads. Rather than trying to reduce system leakage, we believe that the most effective mitigation is actually on the *application* side, although these techniques too may be burdensome because they interfere with application-specific functionality (*e.g.*, disallowing users from sending email). In §5, we discuss these mitigations, but we note that in general, it is difficult to protect against the attack completely because it relies on very little from the system model, and instead exploits features inherent to the application model.

2. Attack model

In this section, we discuss the generic system model (§2.1) and the application model (§2.2) that is vulnerable to our attacks. We present the three key attack assumptions: 1) that the system leaks volume, 2) that the application allows data injection, and 3) that the applications automatically replays queries under certain scenarios. We then demonstrate the validity of our assumptions by studying a number of concrete instances for both the system and application models. In particular, we examine 11 popular web applications that allow users to issue keyword search queries over an inverted index—we find that (i) all 11 applications allow attackers to inject data into the victim user’s index; and (ii) 5 of the 11 applications also replay queries automatically without user intervention.

2.1. System Model

We consider systems in which an untrusted server (the adversary in our setting) maintains a secondary index in an encrypted database. The index maps a keyword to a list of documents or database rows (referred to as *files*, henceforth) that the keyword appears in and is stored on the server for query efficiency. Whenever the application proxy or the client queries the index for a keyword, the user receives the corresponding list of files containing the keyword. We assume that the query’s execution reveals no information to the adversary except the number of results.

More formally, we define a database \mathcal{D} as a set of records that associates keywords with the files from a collection \mathcal{F} that the keywords appear in:

$$\mathcal{D} = \{(w, f) : w \in f, f \in \mathcal{F}\}$$

A query for word w is a function q_w (where w is private) that maps \mathcal{D} to a list of matching files in \mathcal{F} :

$$q_w(\mathcal{D}) = \{f : (w, f) \in \mathcal{D}\}.$$

An implementation of such a database may internally use one layer of indirection, so that the first query returns a list of file pointers, or indices into \mathcal{F} , and the subsequent queries are used to fetch the file contents from \mathcal{F} .

The adversary’s goal is to identify the keyword w using only the size of the result set $|q_w(\mathcal{D})|$.




Figure 1. (Left) ORAM model: the server and a subset of the clients are untrusted (shaded). (Right) PIR model: the server is untrusted.

Examples. We now illustrate the relevance of volume-based attacks by discussing concrete examples of cryptographic systems that leak the volume of results to attackers. We consider a client-server model where the database stored at the server is encrypted using sophisticated techniques that also hide access patterns, and the server maintains a secondary index over the encrypted data. As we’ll see in the following examples, content encryption is not sufficient to prevent volume leakage.

ORAM-based systems. In the ORAM model (Fig. 1, left), the database administrator additionally backs the database with ORAM, hiding access patterns from the server in addition to the result contents. However, even with a guarantee of this strength, volume leakage is possible for a passive attacker because the *size* of the result contents is not hidden. In addition, even if a layer of indirection is used, so that the first query only returns a list of file pointers, the number of files returned can still be measured by recording the number of subsequent queries made.

PIR-based systems. In the PIR model (Fig. 1, right), an untrusted server owns the database and maintains a secondary index on it for fast access. In this case, the server sees all the data, as its role is to maintain and serve publicly available data. The untrusted server answers user queries in which the key requested is private [45]. However, since the data is publicly available, the untrusted server can easily learn the size of the query results.

2.2. Application model

We assume an application model based on the behavior of actual applications that rely on a secondary index. The model consists of two key assumptions: the ability to inject data into a user’s index and the ability to replay a user query without the involvement of the user. We argue that these two assumptions are in fact often inherent to the application. As evidence, we survey a variety of popular web applications that rely on a secondary index and find that both assumptions hold in 5 out of the 11 surveyed. Finally, we describe how these assumptions together make it difficult to detect our attack.

2.2.1. File injection. First, we consider the assumption that the attacker can inject data into a user’s index. For applications that involve interactions between multiple users, injection by other users is often necessary for application functionality. For example, to inject into Gmail inbox search, the attacker sends the victim user an email. Injection is especially easy if there is a secondary index that is shared. To inject an entry for a hashtag in Twitter, the attacker uploads a post with that hashtag; in Slack, the attacker simply sends a message. The ability of the attacker to inject in such applications is fundamental because these

Application	Type of queries	File injection strategy	Number of replays in 10 minutes
Gmail	Email keywords	Send emails to victim	6
Facebook	Names, post keywords	Create posts in a group page	4
Dropbox	File keywords	Upload files to a shared folder	1
Google Doc	File keywords	Upload files to a shared folder	1
iCloud Mail	Email keywords	Send emails to victim	1
Twitter	Hashtags	Post tweets with hashtags	0
Piazza	Post keywords	Create posts in a class	0
Slack	Names, message keywords	Send messages to a group channel	0
Skype	Names, message keywords	Send messages to victim	0
Yahoo Mail	Email keywords	Send emails to victim	0
Outlook Mail (Hotmail)	Email keywords	Send emails to victim	0

Figure 2. An empirical assessment of 11 popular web applications. In each case, we list the type of query made by the user, how the attacker can influence the result of this query by application-specific injection, and the number of replays observed. To measure replay, all server responses are dropped for 10 minutes, and we report the number of duplicate queries made within 10 minutes.

applications are inherently designed for multiple users and contain shared data.

2.2.2. Query replay. Second, we assume that the attacker can replay a user’s query a finite number of times. While this assumption is certainly not universal across applications that rely on a secondary index, we find that it is surprisingly common, with many applications replaying queries automatically in the background without any user intervention. This is because many applications are written to handle transient errors transparently, to put as little burden on the user as possible. In particular, an application that wants to provide a seamless experience when network connectivity is spotty may retry a query automatically if the response is too slow. Indeed, the HTTP/1.1 RFC [50] specifies that “When an inbound connection is closed prematurely, a client MAY open a new connection and automatically retransmit an aborted sequence of [idempotent] requests.” A compromised server can force this behavior by simply dropping its HTTPS responses, triggering an automatic replay.

Examples. To show that these assumptions are realistic, we surveyed 11 applications, including Gmail, Twitter, and Facebook, and tested for the ability to inject data and replay queries for a target user (Fig. 2). To test for injection, we examined the application functionality to determine whether the attacker could inject data into an index searchable by the user. To measure the number of query replays, we drop responses from the server, record all network traffic from the application client, and count the number of duplicate queries that appear within 10 minutes. We find that for all applications, injection is possible, although sometimes only if the attacker and the user share some index (*e.g.*, they are both members of a public Facebook group). We also find that 5 of these applications have query replay.

On further investigation of these 5 applications, we find that all retry queries automatically, though the rate of retries varies. Two applications, Gmail and Facebook, retry the query repeatedly. The remaining three—Dropbox, Google Drive, and iCloud Mail—retry the query once. The number of retries is important because more retries make it easier for the attacker to identify the query. Nevertheless, as we show in §4.2, even a single replay is sufficient for

significantly pruning the space of query possibilities, and, in many cases, for mounting the attack feasibly.

Some applications do not replay a query automatically, as is the case with Twitter or Slack. In §3.2 we provide a single-round version of our attack that does not require queries to be replayed at all. This version of our attack is predictably less effective than the base attack with the ability to replay, but as we show in §4.3, it is practical for small attacker dictionaries.

Avoiding detection. Because the attack relies on injection visible to the user, one practical concern in launching the attack is avoiding detection. Fortunately, in many settings, our attack is *difficult to detect before it completes*. This is because once the user issues a query, the attacker can continue to drop / block the responses to the client, causing the application to retry queries until the attack completes.

We verified this behavior with Gmail: no results are returned to the user during the attack, and to the user it simply appears that they have a bad network connection. That is, once the user initiates the query, the attack will complete without further actions from the victim user.

It is possible that the user later sees the injected emails and realizes from the synthetic content that they are under attack, but this happens only *after the attack completes*. Further, we note that although services like Gmail may strip suspicious HTML elements during email preprocessing, we can still use style formatting to avoid showing the injected content to the user, to reduce suspicion. The rest of the email could show content that is more user-friendly, *e.g.*, an ad. It is further unlikely for spam filters to detect the injected emails, since the attack targets a specific user. This is just one example, but it illustrates the numerous ways that an attacker could inject data in a way that is difficult to detect before the query is reconstructed.

3. Attacks

Given the attacker abilities discussed in §2, we present and analyze a file-injection attack to recover a user’s query on a secondary index. We show that this attack can be launched on the generic database described in §2.1, as long as the attacker can view the number of results returned. This is true even if the result content is encrypted and a model like ORAM is used to hide access patterns.

The general attack (§3.1) can recover a user’s query with 100% accuracy, by leveraging the three assumptions presented in §2. One may attempt to weaken the attacker’s abilities by making it more difficult to replay a user’s query, or padding the result sets. We discuss extensions to the attack in §3.2–§3.4 and show that it is still feasible even when various countermeasures are employed, albeit at higher overheads and possibly imperfect accuracy. Fig. 4 summarizes the overheads of the base attack and its extensions. In §A, we describe further extensions to the attack for recovering keywords in conjunctive queries.

3.1. Base Attack

At a high level, the base attack works by searching on the keyword universe through multiple rounds of user query replay. By recording the result counts between rounds, the attacker can narrow down the keyword search space by a constant factor per round.

The attacker uses file injection to influence the result count between rounds. During each round, the attacker constructs files from the keyword search space and injects the files into the user’s index. The response for each round will then contain some number of injected files. The attacker can use the new result count to determine the number of files injected after the previous round. In this way, the attacker can determine which subset of the search space contains the user’s query.

The setup of the attack is as follows: A user queries q_w on a database \mathcal{D} , as defined in §2. The response is the set of matching file contents, $q_w(\mathcal{D}) = \{f_1, \dots, f_n\}$. The goal of the attack is to recover w , using only $n = |q_w(\mathcal{D})|$, the number of files returned.

Algorithm 1 provides pseudocode for the base attack RECOVERQUERY. In more detail, the attacker first records the user query’s q_w and the number of files returned, n_0 . n_0 is the number of files that already matched to w prior to the attack. This enables the attacker to differentiate user-uploaded files from injected ones.

Next, the attacker proceeds in rounds to reduce the keyword search space. He chooses an initial dictionary D_0 , a set of words that might contain w , and a parameter k . During each round j , the attacker divides D_j into k equal partitions. He injects k files into the database and distributes the words among them as follows: *If a word appears in the i -th partition, he adds the word to exactly i out of the k files.* Hence, if a word appears in the k -th partition, the attacker adds this word to all k files.

The attacker then replays the user’s query q_w on the updated database and records the number of files returned, n_j . Assuming that the attacker can block updates to the secondary index, the number of files injected since the previous round is then $i^* = n_j - n_{j-1}$. Thus, w must have been assigned to the i^* -th partition during round j . The attacker repeats this in rounds, each time using the i^* -th partition as the new dictionary, until $|D| = 1$.

The complete overheads for the attack are summarized in Fig. 4. This attack converges in a bounded number of rounds since each round is guaranteed to reduce the dictionary size. Furthermore, for a high enough k and a small enough D , the number of rounds, *i.e.*, the number of times the attacker has to replay the user’s query, is quite low. We formalize this in the following claim:

Algorithm 1 Pseudocode for the base attack. q_w is a private query for a word w on a database \mathcal{D} . Each round of the attack partitions the search space by k .

```

1: procedure RECOVERQUERY( $q_w, k$ )
2:    $\mathcal{D} \leftarrow$  the initial database
3:    $D \leftarrow$  keyword universe
4:    $n \leftarrow |q_w(\mathcal{D})|$ 
5:   while  $|D| > 1$  do
6:     for  $i$  in  $[1, \dots, k]$  do
7:        $F_i \leftarrow$  an empty file
8:        $D_i \leftarrow$  an empty dictionary
9:     end for
10:    for  $index$  in  $[1, \dots, |D|]$  do
11:       $w \leftarrow D[index]$ 
12:       $i \leftarrow \lfloor \frac{index}{|D|/k} \rfloor$ 
13:      Append  $w$  to  $i$  unique files in  $F$ 
14:      Add  $w$  to dictionary  $D_i$ 
15:    end for
16:     $\mathcal{D} \leftarrow$  INJECTFILES( $\mathcal{D}, F$ )
17:     $n' \leftarrow |q_w(\mathcal{D})|$ 
18:     $i \leftarrow n' - n$ 
19:     $D \leftarrow D_i$ 
20:     $n \leftarrow n'$ 
21:  end while
22:  return  $D[0]$ 
23: end procedure

```

Claim 1. For any dictionary D and for any word $w \in D$, let q_w be a private query for w , and k be the number of partitions. Then, RECOVERQUERY(q_w, k) returns w after $\lceil \log_k |D| \rceil$ rounds.

Proof. Consider the j -th round of the attack, which searches a dictionary D_j that contains w . w is guaranteed to match to a partition of the dictionary that has size $\leq |D_j|/k$. Thus, round $j + 1$ of the attack will search a dictionary of size at most $|D_j|/k$ that also contains w . The algorithm repeats until the dictionary has size one. At this point, RECOVERQUERY returns the only word in the dictionary, w . Thus, it takes $\lceil \log_k |D| \rceil$ rounds to complete the attack, where D is the initial dictionary. \square

The attacker must also inject a significant number of files. We show that the number of files, along with the file size, measured in number of words, is not too large.

Claim 2. For any dictionary D and for any word $w \in D$, let q_w be a private query for w and k be the number of partitions. Then, the total number of files injected by RECOVERQUERY(q_w, k) is $k \lceil \log_k |D| \rceil$.

Proof. During a single round of the attack, the words in the i -th partition of the dictionary must be distributed among i unique files, so that the number of results for the query q_w during the next round will be increased by i if w was in that partition. The maximum value for i is k , the number of partitions. Therefore, each round requires injecting at least k files. There are $\lceil \log_k |D| \rceil$ rounds according to Claim 1, so we require a total of $k \lceil \log_k |D| \rceil$ file injections. \square

Claim 3. For any dictionary D and for any word $w \in D$, let q_w be a private query for w and k be the number of partitions. Then, the total number of words injected by RECOVERQUERY(q_w, k) is $O(k|D|)$.

Notation	Definition
\mathcal{D}	The database, a secondary index mapping words to the files they are associated with.
q_w	A query for the word w , where w is hidden.
D	The dictionary, a set of words probed by the attacker.
k	The number of partitions to search during each round. A higher k means more files injected per round, but fewer rounds total.
n_j	$ q_w(\mathcal{D}) $, or the number of file results for the query on round j . For $j = 0$, this is the user's initial query dictionary.
m	A parameter for the single-round attack. A higher m means more files injected, but higher expected accuracy.
s	A parameter for the noisy data attack. A higher s means more files injected, but a greater possible amount of noise tolerated.

Figure 3. Notation used in the described attacks.

Proof. A dictionary D_j is searched during round j of the attack. Each word in partition i of the dictionary appears i times during round j . Each partition has size $\frac{|D_j|}{k}$. Therefore, the total file size injected during this round is $\frac{|D_j|}{k} (1 + 2 + \dots + k) = O(k|D_j|)$.

Each round reduces the size of the dictionary searched by a factor of k , so $|D_{j+1}| = \frac{|D_j|}{k}$. According to Claim 1, there are $\lceil \log_k |D| \rceil$ many rounds. Then, if the initial dictionary has size $|D|$, the total file size injected across all rounds is:

$$k|D| + k \left(\frac{|D|}{k} \right) + k \left(\frac{|D|}{k^2} \right) + \dots + k \left(\frac{|D|}{k^{\lceil \log_k |D| \rceil}} \right) < k|D| \left(1 + \frac{1}{k} + \frac{1}{k^2} + \dots \right) = O(k|D|)$$

□

The attack presented can recover a user's query on a generic secondary index with perfect accuracy, even when the file contents and metadata, except result counts, are hidden. The number of results returned is indeed the only information we assume, and we do not require knowledge of the distribution of the query dictionary.

3.2. Single-round Attack

The base attack relies heavily on the ability to replay the user's query. Without the ability to replay, it is difficult to recover the query with total accuracy without some knowledge of the distribution of words in the database. This is a fundamental limitation of the attack—since we assume that the attacker cannot read any file metadata other than the total number of results, the attacker cannot differentiate between user-uploaded files and injected files during just a single round of the user's query.

We now present a version of our attack that does not require the attacker to replay queries. We show that the attacker can guess the user's query in a single round with some degree of accuracy if he can inject a larger number

Algorithm 2 Pseudocode for the single-round attack. Input m represents the tradeoff between file injection and accuracy.

```

1: procedure SINGLEROUNDINIT( $m$ )
2:    $\mathcal{D} \leftarrow$  the initial database
3:    $D \leftarrow$  keyword universe
4:   for  $i$  in  $[1, \dots, m \times |D|]$  do
5:      $F_i \leftarrow$  an empty file
6:   end for
7:   for  $index$  in  $[1, \dots, |D|]$  do
8:      $w \leftarrow D[index]$ 
9:     Append  $w$  to  $m \times index$  unique files in  $F$ 
10:  end for
11:   $\mathcal{D} \leftarrow$  INJECTFILES( $\mathcal{D}, F$ )
12:  end procedure
13: procedure SINGLEROUNDRECOVERQUERY( $q_w, m$ )
14:    $n \leftarrow |q_w(\mathcal{D})|$ 
15:   if  $n < m$  then
16:      $w' \leftarrow null$ 
17:   else
18:      $index \leftarrow \lfloor \frac{n}{m} \rfloor$ 
19:      $w' \leftarrow D[index]$ 
20:   end if
21:   return  $w'$ 
22: end procedure

```

of files. Moreover, if the universe of possible keywords is smaller in size, then the attacker can identify the query with high probability. For example, consider an attacker who knows that Alice is sick, and wants to identify what disease she has by recovering her queries. The attacker can use the set of common diseases as the dictionary of possible keywords, the size of which is on the order of tens. Note that using this dictionary still does not require knowledge of Alice's query distribution. In fact, our attack will also permit the attacker to identify that the query of the victim is not in his query set.

The key idea is as follows. Because the attacker has only one round to complete the attack, he must inject enough files *before* the user sends his query such that the attacker can still recover the query with some accuracy. Although he cannot inject files multiple times as in the base attack, he may still be able to inject a large enough quantity of files so as to filter out the noise from user-uploaded files that match the query. And, as we will see from the analysis, this can actually be done in such a way that *multiple* queries can be recovered without requiring the attacker to execute the attack repeatedly per query, in contrast to the base attack.

We describe the attack formally in Algorithm 2. First, the attacker initializes the attack using SINGLEROUNDINIT. The attacker starts with a dictionary D of candidate words, and chooses a constant m . Before the user sends his query q_w , the attacker injects $m|D|$ files into the database \mathcal{D} , such that the i -th word in the dictionary appears in mi files. Thus, each word appears a unique number of times and is spaced apart by at least m files.

Then, when the user queries q_w , the attacker estimates w using SINGLEROUNDRECOVERQUERY (Algorithm 2). The attacker first reads the result set size $n = |q_w(\mathcal{D})|$. If $n < m$, then w is not in the attacker's dictionary, and no more information can be gained for this particular query. If $n \geq m$, then the attacker guesses w' , the i -th word in

Attack type	Number of replays	Total files injected	Total words injected
Base attack	$\lceil \log_k D \rceil$	$k \lceil \log_k D \rceil$	$O(k D)$
Single-round attack	1	$m D $	$O(m D ^2)$
File padding (base-2 tiers)	$k \lceil \log_k D \rceil$	$O(n_0 k D ^{\lceil \log_k 2 \rceil})$	$O(n_0 D)$
Noisy data	$\lceil \log_k D \rceil$	$sk \lceil \log_k D \rceil$	$O(sk D)$

Figure 4. The overheads of each type of attack, in terms of the number of query replays, files injected, and words injected.

the dictionary, where $i = \lfloor \frac{n}{m} \rfloor$. With some probability, the attacker’s guess is correct and $w' = w$.

The question, then, is how to choose m such that we maximize the probability that $w' = w$. Clearly, the larger m is, the better, since a larger m can filter out more noise from the user’s uploaded files. Given some underlying distributions of word and query frequency, we can write the precise probability of the attack’s success.

Formally, let Q be a probability distribution over the universe of words where $Q(w)$ is the probability that the user will query q_w . Let \mathcal{D}_0 be the initial database, before any file injections. Then, $|q_w(\mathcal{D}_0)|$ equals the number of user-uploaded files that would have been returned for w .

Claim 4. *For any query q_w , and any $m \geq 1$, the probability that `SINGLEROUNDCOVERQUERY`(q_w, m) outputs an incorrect w' is:*

$$\Pr(w' \neq w) = \sum_{w, |q_w(\mathcal{D}_0)| \geq m} Q(w)$$

Proof. Consider a user query q_w . If $|q_w(\mathcal{D}_0)| < m$, then there are two cases for the result set size, either w is in the dictionary probed by the attacker or w is not. If w is not in the dictionary, then the current database \mathcal{D} is unchanged, so the count observed is still $|q_w(\mathcal{D}_0)|$. Since this is less than m , the attacker will not output a guess w' , so we can ignore this case. Otherwise, suppose that w is the i -th word in the attacker’s dictionary. Then, the number of injected files for w is mi . The attacker will then guess the word at index $\lfloor \frac{|q_w(\mathcal{D})|}{m} \rfloor = \lfloor \frac{|q_w(\mathcal{D}_0)| + mi}{m} \rfloor = i$, so $w' = w$.

The remaining case is when $|q_w(\mathcal{D}_0)| \geq m$. Then, it is guaranteed that $w' \neq w$, whether or not w is actually in the dictionary probed by the attacker. If w is the i -th word in the dictionary, then the attacker will guess w' with a dictionary index greater than i . Otherwise, the attacker will incorrectly guess that the user queried for a word in the dictionary. Thus, the probability that the attacker guesses an incorrect w' is the probability that the user will query for a word w such that $|q_w(\mathcal{D}_0)| \geq m$. This is $\sum_{w, |q_w(\mathcal{D}_0)| \geq m} Q(w)$. \square

This claim implies that if a large enough m is chosen, then the attacker will be able to perfectly recover all user queries. For instance, if m is greater than $\max_w |q_w(\mathcal{D}_0)|$, then the probability of an incorrect guess is 0. Therefore, the better the attacker can estimate the distribution $|q_w(\mathcal{D}_0)|$ and Q , the more he can increase his probability of recovering the user’s query correctly. Otherwise, he will have to guess a large enough m to ensure accurate query recovery, at the cost of more file injection.

The query’s success rate is also dependent on the dictionary of words chosen by the attacker. If $Q(w) = 0$ for all $w \in D$, for example, the attacker will not be

able to output a correct guess. Ideally, the attacker would insert the entire universe of words, but this is infeasible since the total number of words injected is given by: $m + 2m + \dots + |D|m = O(m|D|^2)$. However, even if the attacker can only afford to probe a small dictionary, he can still increase his chance of success if he has some knowledge of Q ; he can then choose to probe words that the user is more likely to query.

There are two key advantages of this approach over the base scheme presented in §3.1. First, the initial round of file injections can be reused to recover multiple user queries over a long period of time. As long as the attacker chooses a large enough m , the noise due to files that may be added by the user later on can still be filtered out. The attacker can launch a long-running attack in which he continuously probes for the same dictionary of words by gradually increasing m to match the rate at which real files are added. Then, at any point in the future when the user queries for a word in the dictionary, the attacker will be able to discover the word.

The second advantage is that this variation of the attack is mostly passive, in that the attacker actively injects files once and then passively reads file responses for the remaining duration. This is in contrast to the base attack, in which the attacker must actively inject new files with every query response. Thus, although the file injection overhead becomes higher and the success rate is reduced, an attack without the ability to replay a user’s query is still both possible and practical.

3.3. Attack Against File Padding

An obvious countermeasure to the attack outlined in §3.1 is to use a cryptographic scheme that pads query responses to hide the number of files returned. Note that padding might not always be possible because it potentially adds nontrivial bandwidth overheads and hence increases costs for a system operator.

Padding interferes with the attacker’s ability to determine the number of files returned for a query. However, as we show in this section, the attacker can still learn some information. The common issue in all of the following schemes is that the attacker retains the ability to inject files. Thus, even if the attacker can no longer determine a user’s query, he can still inflate the bandwidth overhead by injecting large enough files.

The simplest scheme would be to always pad to the worst case. Formally, the largest possible response is $\max_w |q_w(\mathcal{D})|$. The scheme must then pad every result set to this count, which is potentially very expensive. The attacker can aggravate the problem by simply injecting a large number of files that all contain the same word, forcing the system to send that many files in response to all requests.

A more practical scheme is to use *tiered padding*. In this case, each response is padded to one of several predefined sizes, or tiers. For example, one could choose to use base-2 exponential padding, so that each response size is rounded up to the nearest power of 2.

Tiered padding can deter the base attack, but comes at the cost of expensive bandwidth overheads. Here, we analyze the number of files that the attacker must inject and the bandwidth overhead for the server. We use exponential tiered padding for the analysis, but a similar analysis applies to any padding scheme. Recent works [51], [52] propose more efficient padding schemes that add probabilistic noise to the result set size; in §3.4 we describe an extension of our attack that applies to such scenarios.

Recall that on every round, the attacker records $n_{j-1} = |q_w(\mathcal{D})|$, the number of files returned to the user's query at the end of the previous round. Under this padding scheme, $n_{j-1} = 2^p$ for some p . The actual number of files is then in the range $(\frac{n_{j-1}}{2}, n_j]$. In the next round, the attacker must inject enough files to ensure that the query will be padded to the next highest tier, so that there is a measurable difference in the query's number of results. This is at least $\frac{n_{j-1}}{2}$ files.

In a direct translation of the base attack, the attacker has to inject k partitions of the dictionary in such a way that he can differentiate between the partitions. Then, the attacker would have to inject $\frac{n_{j-1}}{2}$ files for the first partition, $\frac{n_{j-1}}{2} \times 2$ for the second, and so on. This leads to $n_{j-1}2^{k-2}$ files injected for a single round. Even worse, $n_j = n_{j-1}2^{k-2}$, so the next round will also require an exponentially larger number of files to be injected.

The number of files injected can be reduced by injecting the partitions one at a time, with $\frac{n_{j-1}}{2}$ files per partition. After all of the files for a partition are injected, the attacker can replay the query to measure if the user's query matched that partition. This way, the attacker can inject $\frac{kn_{j-1}}{2}$ files per round. However, this requires increasing the number of query replays by a factor of k , since each round now requires k replays instead of one.

Claim 5. *Consider a database that uses base-2 exponential tiers to pad query responses. For any user query q_w , let $n_0 = |q_w(\mathcal{D})|$, the query response on the initial database. For any attacker dictionary D and any number of partitions k used during the search, the total number of file injections necessary to recover the query is $O(n_0k|D|^{\log_k 2})$.*

Proof. During round j of the attack, where n_{j-1} is the observed number of files returned by q_w during the previous round, the attacker must inject $\frac{n_{j-1}}{2}$ files for each of the k partitions. Then, the attacker must inject $\frac{kn_{j-1}}{2}$ files during round j . Each round doubles the number of files returned, so that $n_j = 2n_{j-1}$. There are $\lceil \log_k |D| \rceil$ rounds by the same analysis as in Claim 1. Then, the attacker must inject a total of $O(n_0k2^{\log_k |D|}) = O(n_0k|D|^{\log_k 2})$ files to recover q_w . \square

Claim 6. *For any query q_w , the total size of files injected, measured in number of words, is $O(n_0|D|)$.*

Proof. To compute the total number of words injected, we first consider the number of words injected during round j . The number of files injected is $\frac{kn_{j-1}}{2}$. Each file contains a copy of a single partition of the current dictionary. Since

the dictionary size is reduced by a factor of k with each round, the current dictionary has size $\frac{|D|}{k^j}$. Then, the total number of words injected during a single round is $\frac{n_{j-1}|D|}{2k^{j-1}}$. $n_j = n_02^j$, so the number of words injected during a single round is $O\left(n_0|D|\left(\frac{2}{k}\right)^{j-1}\right)$. With $k \geq 2$, this gives us a total of $O(n_0|D|)$ words injected across all rounds. \square

While the overhead for the attacker is significant, this analysis does not take into account the substantial bandwidth costs for the client. Every query may require nearly doubling the query's number of results. To answer the attacker's replayed queries, the cryptographic scheme needs to pad the files with approximately as much data as the attacker must inject, to hide the number of files returned. This can be prohibitively expensive for a database system.

In the PIR setting, an even more effective version of our attack is possible: the server has the ability to also delete data in addition to injecting it. So the attacker can toggle the number of results for a keyword over multiple padding sizes, instead of just increasing it.

3.4. Attack with Noisy Data

In §3.1, we assume that the attacker can identify precise result counts. That is, we assume that the observed number of results is exactly equal to $|q_w(\mathcal{D})|$, to the number of files that matched w in the database \mathcal{D} . This allows the attacker to precisely measure the change in query result sets between rounds due to injected files.

However, the change measured may not exactly equal the number of injected files. For example, if the cryptographic scheme adds some noise to the result sets, then the attacker cannot precisely identify the change in result counts due to file injection. Another example appears in some searchable encryption schemes, where the results are batched together in blocks (say m results per block), or when using ORAMs [53] that attempt to hide the number of results within an ORAM Path. For the first, the attacker observes the number of blocks so it can estimate the actual number of results within an error of $\sim m$. For the second, we discuss in §6 that such ORAMs still reveal an approximate number of results in some realistic settings.

In this section, we show that our attack still has a significant chance of success even if there is some noise in the volume measurements. Formally, if the attacker expects a noise of at most s files in some time interval, this means that for each word w , the database system can add up to s elements to the database \mathcal{D} . Each of these elements is of the form (w, f) , where f is a dummy file. If a user queries q_w on every interval, he can expect an increase of at most s files with each new query.

Similar to ideas presented in the above scenarios, the attacker can still recover a query q_w if he can inject more files to filter out noise in the database. In particular, with an expected noise of s in between rounds of an attack, he can repeat a word in the i -th partition si times instead of just i . If the user's query word w falls in partition i during round j , then the number of results observed will be $n_j \leq n_{j-1} + si + s$. Then, to determine the partition that the user's query belonged in, he can compute $\lfloor \frac{n_j - n_{j-1}}{s} \rfloor = i$.




Figure 5. **(Base attack)** Number of rounds required to identify a keyword with varying choices of k and different dictionary sizes.




Figure 6. **(Base attack)** Total number of files injected with varying choices of k , across different dictionary sizes.




Figure 7. **(Base attack)** Number of bytes injected for varying choices of k , across different dictionary sizes: (left) average bytes per round; (right) maximum bytes across rounds.

Thus, assuming that the attacker can correctly guess the maximum noise that will be added during any round, the attacker can still recover the user’s query with perfect accuracy. The attacker can estimate s with some knowledge of the application. For instance, he can record the rate of incoming email for an average user, for example. Furthermore, if the attacker underestimates s and guesses a wrong partition, he will quickly discover his error since the query’s result set size is unlikely to match any partition during the following round.

The overhead to overcome noise is quite low; a factor of s to the number of files and words injected. Thus, even if the attacker is unable to perfectly measure the number of results and/or block network traffic, he can still recover the user’s query with near-perfect accuracy.

3.5. Queries with multiple keywords

Our attacks so far focus on queries with single keywords. However, applications may allow clients to issue queries with multiple keywords as well. One way in which applications may handle such queries is by expressing the queries as a conjunction of the different keywords. For such cases, we describe an extension to our attack in Appendix A. We present two attacks for conjunctive queries—the first optimizes the number of required replays while the second reduces the number of files injected.

Applications may alternatively express multi-keyword queries as disjunctions of the different keywords instead. We leave attacks on disjunctive queries to future work.

4. Evaluation

In this section, we evaluate the overheads and accuracy for the base attack (§4.2) and its extensions. We simulate various application settings and degrees of attacker ability, including an attacker that cannot replay the query (§4.3), and a storage system with file padding (§4.4). Second, we present a case study on Gmail to evaluate the feasibility of the attacker’s abilities assumed in the base attack in a real-world application (§4.5). We demonstrate successful attacks on Gmail by simulating a server-side adversary, that complete within a few minutes across a variety of dictionary sizes.

4.1. Setup

In all experiments, we use the entire corpus of emails from the Enron email dataset [54] as the queried documents,

consisting of $\sim 500K$ emails belonging to 151 users and $\sim 2.5GB$ in size. We extracted keywords from this dataset by first stemming the words [55], and then removing 675 stopwords. We next filtered out any words that contained non-alphabetic characters, or were ≥ 20 or ≤ 3 characters long. This gave us a total of $\sim 259K$ keywords. In our experiments, we only used the top $\sim 123K$ keywords (*i.e.*, those that appeared in > 3 documents) in order to remove noise from the dataset.

Since an attacker’s dictionary may contain words that do not exist in the queried documents, we supplemented the Enron keywords with a corpus of English words [56]. Preprocessing the English words in a similar manner yielded a total of $\sim 257K$ keywords. The union of both datasets resulted in a universe of $\sim 342K$ keywords.

4.2. Base Attack

Assuming that the queried word is in the initial dictionary chosen by the attacker, the base attack achieves perfect query recovery, with strict bounds on the overheads necessary in number of query replays and data injected (as described in Fig. 4). Our simulation of the attack in Figs. 5 and 6 confirms the theoretical guarantees.

In this experiment, we build the attacker’s dictionary D by randomly sampling keywords from the keyword universe. We pick the keyword queried by the user at random from D in order to stress test the effort required by the attacker—a keyword not in the D would be trivially detected at the end of a single round without requiring further replays. We then report the number of rounds required to guess the keyword with 100% accuracy for different choices of k in Fig. 5, and the total number of files injected across rounds in Fig. 6. Recall from §3.1 that any instance of the attack converges after exactly $\lceil \log_k |D| \rceil$ replays and $k \lceil \log_k |D| \rceil$ files injected, where k is an integer chosen by the attacker. Thus, with a dictionary of fixed size $|D|$, the parameter k represents a tradeoff between the number of query replays required vs. the number of file injections required. The attacker’s choice of k then depends on the attacker’s ability to replay the query and the rate at which files can be injected for the target application.

We explore this tradeoff with fixed-size dictionaries in Fig. 7, which demonstrates how the average number of bytes injected per round increases with k (while the number of rounds decreases). In the worst case where the dictionary comprises the entire keyword universe and $k = 24$, the bytes injected per round is still less than 10MB,

demonstrating the feasibility of the attack. We also show the maximum number of bytes injected across any round in Fig. 7, equivalent to the number of bytes injected during the first round. The number of bytes that the attacker can inject during a single round must be at least as large as this number. We find that even in the worst case, this is approximately 50MB.

Takeaway. The attack can be mounted easily even when queries are replayed at most once, *i.e.*, the attacker can recover the keyword in merely two rounds without having to inject more than several tens of MBs of data. As an example, Gmail limits the size of emails to a comfortable 25MB [57], and the attacker need only send 3-4 emails to the victim’s inbox in order to identify the query.

4.3. Single-round Attack

In the single-round variation of the attack, we sacrifice some accuracy but do not require the ability to replay the user’s query. This variation of the attack is also stronger in that it can be used to identify multiple queries over a long period of time, whereas the base attack must be instantiated once for every query of interest. Also, this variation is a mostly passive attack, since the bulk of the attack is spent reading query responses, rather than also injecting files in an online fashion.

We evaluate this attack by measuring its accuracy while varying the parameter m chosen by the attacker. Recall that m represents the tradeoff between the file injection overhead and the number of files injected (§3.2). In this experiment, we only query keywords that exist in the Enron dataset, since keywords that do not exist in the dataset will always be accurately detected for any choice of m .

For each value of m , we measure the attack’s accuracy in two scenarios: (i) when the queried keyword is in the attacker’s dictionary and the attacker guesses the keyword; and (ii) the keyword is not in the dictionary, and the attacker determines that the keyword is not of interest. In each scenario, we first fix the dictionary, and then inject a single round of files at the beginning of the simulation for a chosen value of m . We then query 1000 randomly selected keywords and measure the percentage of accurate guesses. Fig. 8 plots the accuracy of guesses as m increases, averaged over different dictionary sizes.

Predictably, the accuracy of the attack improves with m , while the number of file injections required also increases. For $m = 5$, we need only inject $5|D|$ files, but achieve an accuracy rate of only $\sim 14\%$ for words that belong to the attacker’s dictionary. For $m = 1000$, we achieve an accuracy of $\sim 96\%$, but must inject $1000|D|$ files. In practice, a lower value of m might not only suffice but also be feasible: for $m = 20$ we achieve an accuracy of $\sim 64\%$, while the number of bytes injected for a dictionary of size 10K is $\sim 7\text{GB}$.

Takeaway. The barrier to mount an attack is higher in the absence of replays, and the attacker needs to inject several GBs of data to identify a keyword with reasonable confidence. However, in scenarios where the attacker’s dictionary contains a small number of words (when the attack knows a candidate list of queries, as discussed in §3.2), the feasibility of the attack increases proportionately. For example, an attacker who wishes to identify the disease

that a victim might have only needs a dictionary of ~ 950 keywords [58]. If the attacker is interested only in sexually transmitted infections (STIs), then the size of the dictionary drops to ~ 27 keywords [59], increasing the feasibility of the attack manifold.

4.4. Attack Against File Padding

We assess the feasibility of the attack when the server pads query responses to one of several predefined sizes. In such cases, though it is still possible for the attacker to guess the queried keyword, it also requires greater effort. As described in §3.3, the attacker can choose to either minimize the number of rounds, or minimize the number of files injected. In this experiment, we evaluate the latter strategy. Specifically, we measure the overhead incurred by the attacker when the server pads responses to powers of 2 and 10, and compare it with a baseline where the responses are unpadded.

We build the attacker’s dictionary by randomly selecting keywords from the Enron dataset, and then measure the overhead for *each* keyword in the dictionary. We use this setup to stress the number of files the attacker will have to inject, since responses for non-existent keywords will get padded to a size of 1 by the server.

Fig. 9 illustrates the attacker’s overhead in terms of the total number of bytes injected with varying dictionary sizes. When responses are padded to a power of 2, the attacker has to inject a feasible $\sim 35\text{MB}$ on average to mount the attack, with a large dictionary size of 10K keywords. Though the overhead increases dramatically when the responses are padded to a power of 10, a small dictionary size of 100 keywords still requires only $\sim 45\text{MB}$ of injected data to pinpoint the keyword.

Takeaway. Padding responses is a viable defense *only if* the following conditions hold simultaneously: (i) the quantum of padding is high, and (ii) the attacker’s dictionary of interest is large. In all other situations, the attack remains feasible as demonstrated above.

4.5. Case Study: Gmail Inbox Search

So far, we have experimentally validated the theoretical performance of our attacks across various parameter choices. We now demonstrate the practical feasibility of our attack in real-world applications by attacking Gmail’s inbox search feature. We attack the real Gmail web client, assuming that the server maintains a secondary index over the user’s (encrypted) emails and only learns the volume of query results. Note that this is not currently the case, and Gmail’s servers have access to far more leakage than simply the volume of results. However, our aim is to demonstrate that even if Gmail (and other real-world applications) were to deploy sophisticated privacy-preserving mechanisms at the server such as ORAM or PIR, the volume of query results remains a potent source of leakage. Therefore, in this experiment, we attack the real Gmail web client by simulating such a server-side adversary using a man-in-the-middle proxy; we simulate the adversary because we don’t have actual control over Gmail servers.

We first show that the attacker can indeed meet the two key requirements of file injection and automatic query




Figure 8. **(Single-round attack)** Accuracy with varying m across different dictionary sizes.




Figure 9. **(File padding)** Overhead incurred by attacker when query responses are padded.




Figure 10. **(Gmail)** CDF measuring the time it takes to inject files into the index for Gmail.

$ D $	k	No. of replays		Total injected emails	Attack duration
		Theoretical	Actual		
10	10	1	1	10	1min
100	10	2	2	20	2min 5s
1K	32	2	2	63-64	2min 5s
10K	22	3	3	64	5min 6s
100K	18	4	5	71	7min 10s

Figure 11. Attack parameters and duration for Gmail across various dictionary sizes.

replay. Subsequently, we perform an exhaustive experiment across a wide range of dictionary sizes (10 to 100K) to determine the *minimum amount of time* required to mount a successful attack on Gmail. The parameters of our attack are governed by the following constraints: (i) the periodicity of replays in the Gmail client; (ii) the time it takes to inject files into a user’s inbox; and (iii) the pagination limit in Gmail (which upper bounds the total number of injections). We find that for a small dictionary of size 10, a successful attack can be mounted within 1 minute from start to end; for a large dictionary with 100K words, an attack completes successfully in around 7 minutes (see Fig. 11).

We now describe our methodology in more detail.

Setup. Since we don’t have control over Gmail servers, we simulate a server-side adversary using a man-in-the-middle (MITM) HTTPS proxy [60]. Specifically, we launch the Gmail web client on a browser within a guest virtual machine, and launch the MITM proxy on the host. We reroute all host network traffic through the MITM proxy. Subsequently, we install the proxy’s certificate at the client browser in order to simulate a server-side adversary. At this point, all TLS network traffic to and from the client browser passes through the MITM proxy, which it can then examine and manipulate.

Query replay. Once a user issues a query, we use the MITM proxy to stimulate automatic query replay by simply dropping the HTTP responses returned by the server. After a period of time, the Gmail web client retries the query automatically, without user intervention. Specifically, we find that the client replays the query every 1–3 minutes in the absence of a response. To the user, it simply appears as if the client has a bad network connection.

File injection. File injection in Gmail is simple; the attacker requires a separate Gmail account to send emails to the victim. For the base attack, the attacker must send k emails in each round and also be sure that they are

all indexed by the next replay (*i.e.*, at least 60s). We determined the rate at which emails could be injected (Fig. 10) to show that it is feasible to index a sufficient number of emails. We found that after injecting 40 emails of size 10KB each, 36 were visible in the user’s mailbox 60 seconds later, shown in Fig. 10. Thus, within a time window of 60s, the attacker can pick any value less than 36 as a safe option for k .

Volume leakage. In this experiment we assume that the proxy directly obtains the exact result set size from the server, since we simulate a server-side adversary. However, we find that Gmail has a maximum pagination limit of 100, *i.e.*, the server returns at most 100 results in response to a query. The pagination limit constrains the parameter regime of our attack, in that it upper bounds the total number of files that can be injected by the attacker over the duration of the attack.

End-to-end attack. The aim of the experiment is to minimize the time it takes to launch a successful attack. However, the constraints discussed above—the periodicity of replays, the time it takes to inject files, and the pagination limit—restrict the parameter regime within which an attacker can operate. Therefore, we start by computing the optimal parameters required for mounting a successful attack within the space of possible parameters. Next, we attack Gmail using the computed parameters and report the end-to-end duration of the attack.

Since the Gmail application has a fixed periodicity of replays, the attack duration is directly governed by the number of replays required for the attack. Hence, given a dictionary size $|D|$, our aim is to minimize $\log_k |D|$, where k refers to the number of files that need to be injected per round. However, given the pagination limit of $\ell = 100$, we require that the total number of injected files $k \times \log_k |D|$ be less than ℓ . At the same time, k should be less than 36 given the time it takes to inject files.

We therefore solve the following optimization problem:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{minimize} && \log_k |D| \\ & \text{subject to} && k \times \log_k |D| < 100 \\ & && \text{and } k < 36 \end{aligned}$$

Fig. 11 summarizes our findings for varying sizes of the attacker’s dictionary, 10 to 100K. Note that the total number of injected emails is sometimes marginally less than $k \times \log_k |D|$. This is because $\log_k |D|$ is not always an integer, and therefore files of interest across subsequent rounds may sometimes contain less than k keywords. Additionally, for $|D| = 100K$, our attack requires an extra round of replay because the size of the injected files in the first

round were large, increasing the time it took for files to get sent and indexed.

Overall, our experiment demonstrates the feasibility of volume-based attacks on Gmail, which can be successfully completed within a matter of minutes depending on the size of the attacker’s dictionary. In addition, the attack is difficult to detect because during the course of the attack, the user only sees a suspended connection. The user only makes a single query, and the Gmail client automatically replays the query in the background. During this time, emails injected by the attacker are not delivered to the user’s web client, and only modify the server-side index. The user may later see the injected emails, but only after the attack successfully completes.

5. Mitigations

In this section, we discuss mitigations of our attack. Overall, we believe it is difficult to eradicate our attack in all settings. Injection is often fundamental to application functionality, worst-case padding is too expensive, and replay could be a legitimate user or application action, as discussed in §2.2. Nevertheless, based on our evaluation in §4, we believe that the mitigations proposed below could significantly reduce the extent of the attack by limiting the attacker’s abilities (§2.2) or making the attack too expensive to mount. However, with enough resources, it is possible for the attacker to defeat some of these through the attack extensions described in §3.

Preventing volume leakage. Strategies that reduce the attacker’s ability to measure the number of files contained in a response can be effective in preventing volume-based attacks. As discussed in Sections 3.3 and 4.4, padding query results to an upper bound might help mitigate the attack by increasing the attacker’s burden, and can be effective in hiding the response size. At the same time, it results in unaffordable overheads for many applications [61], as also demonstrated by our analysis in §4.4. We believe that to varying degrees, this is a property of all padding schemes.

A more practical way to hinder the attacker is to inject some noise in the responses. This requires little overhead in server-client bandwidth compared to the attacker’s overhead: an additive factor of k per query compared to a multiplicative factor of k per attack. This countermeasure is also simple to implement: add a random number of dummy files to every response and have the client filter them out. Note that while this increases the attacker’s overhead, it does not wholly preclude the attack, as we described in §3.4.

Another method is to limit the number of results that can be fetched at a time. The user must explicitly request further results if needed. While stricter limits on the number of results lowers the feasible dictionary size for the attack (thereby increasing the attacker’s burden), it might also have an adverse impact on user experience.

Preventing file injection. File injection is arguably the most difficult to defend against, since it is often a part of the target application’s functionality. For example, an email inbox search feature is not much use if it can only search for keywords within emails that were sent by the user, and not to the user.

Thus, we believe that the main defense here is rate-limiting and detection. In the email application (§2.1), this

would require the server to actively filter out suspicious emails. As we found in §4.5, applications such as Gmail already rate-limit emails; however, this was not enough to defeat the attack.

Preventing query replay. The most effective way to prevent the base attack is to block query replays. Query replays are a feature of applications such as Gmail that produce the illusion of a seamless connection during limited network connectivity (§4.5). A possible countermeasure is to include a unique query ID for each request, so that the server can detect and filter out duplicate requests.

The main disadvantage of such an approach is that the server would then have to record and replay past responses in order to both prevent the attack and keep the application available. Long-running user sessions would have to be garbage-collected, potentially sacrificing correctness. More crucially, web servers are often replicated for performance and fault tolerance. Ensuring consistency for duplicate queries in such settings is well-known to be expensive, if even possible [62]. Finally, this countermeasure does not prevent against the single-round attack described in §3.2.

6. Related Work

To compute on encrypted data, the community has developed a rich set of cryptographic schemes and protocols, as well as encrypted database systems. A recent set of attack papers study the information an attacker can obtain from these schemes and systems, termed *leakage-abuse* attacks by Cash *et al.* [20]. Many attacks in this category leverage leakage from data relations or access patterns, and few works target oblivious schemes and systems relying only on volume leakage, as our work does.

We now briefly discuss cryptographic schemes and systems that leak result volumes, followed by related attacks on these systems.

Cryptographic schemes and systems. There are a multitude of ways to access or compute on encrypted data, such as property-preserving/ property-revealing encryption [12]–[16] or searchable encryption [2], [17]–[27]. For a comprehensive survey, see [63]. Here we focus on systems leveraging ORAM or PIR that leak the volume of results (and are thus vulnerable to our attacks).

ORAM techniques [43], [44] and PIR schemes [45] enable a client to access data items stored at the server without the server knowing the query requested. These two types of schemes consider different models and employ different techniques, but ultimately, the goal of both is to hide the contents of the query from the server.

Many works leverage ORAM for different purposes. For example, ObliviStore [64] and CURIOUS [65] show how to use ORAM for cloud storage. TaoStore [66] shows how to support asynchronicity in multi-user cases. These systems leak the volume of results to the server. Obliv [67] builds a search index over ORAM and pads or truncates the set of results to a fixed size. Roche *et al.* [53] propose an ORAM scheme (called vORAM) that supports variable-sized data blocks by including them within an ORAM node (or bucket) on the same path, but our attack with noisy data in §3.4 can still work on these schemes. While such a scheme hides the result volume to some extent, it limits the amount of data that can be included on a path in this way

(say, L files). Since the attacker can see how many ORAM paths are fetched on a query, he can estimate the number of results with an error margin of L . In the database setting, this error margin can be made relatively small because the database fetches the rows that match the keyword (not just the row identifiers), and these cannot all be stored on the same path. Moreover, Naveed [61] demonstrates that, in general, extending ORAM schemes to hide the volume of results is (for a large fraction of queries) actually slower than streaming the database through the client.

Some works [68]–[70] build SQL databases or keyword indices on top of PIR. For example, to perform an index search for a keyword k , the client performs PIR retrievals to traverse the index and select every value in the index. The server does not know which data items were fetched, but it still sees the number of results.

Related attacks. When considering the amount of leakage attacks exploit, there are at least three categories: attacks exploiting data relations, attacks exploiting access patterns, and attacks exploiting result set size but not access patterns or data relations. The last category is the most challenging because the attacker needs to work with the least amount of information. At the same time, this category is also the least studied. Our attack is in this last category, and we now discuss other volume-based attacks.

Cash *et al.* [2] point out that if an attacker knows the exact number of times a keyword appears in a victim’s documents, and if that result size is unique to this keyword, the attacker can identify the keyword when seeing the result size. In comparison, our attack does not assume the attacker knows the frequency of each keyword in a victim’s index—indeed, when attacking a specific user in the email application, the attacker often does not have access to the victim’s mailbox and does not know these counts. Moreover, many keywords don’t have unique counts (*e.g.*, 99% words in the Enron dataset, §4), in which case the attack of Cash *et al.* does not work. Our attacks do not suffer from this limitation.

In seminal work, Kellaris *et al.* [37] showed how an attacker can reconstruct the contents of a field in the database given only the volume of results. However, their attack relies on a set of assumptions that are arguably not realistic in practice. In particular, Kellaris *et al.* assume that (1) the user makes range queries that are *uniformly* distributed on that column, a property on which their algorithm relies crucially; and (2) the user makes $O(N^4 \log N)$ queries where N is the size of the domain. Such a large number of queries is infeasible for the attacker to observe in many settings. Grubbs *et al.* [46] improved upon the results of Kellaris *et al.* by demonstrating attacks that do not make assumptions on the distribution of queries, as long as *all* possible $O(N^2)$ range queries are issued. As a result, for queries drawn from a uniform distribution, their attack requires $O(N^2 \log N)$ queries to be issued. In recent work, Gui *et al.* [47] further improved upon the result of Grubbs *et al.* by demonstrating attacks that require an order of magnitude fewer queries. However, their attack still assumes that the adversary is able to observe all possible queries that produce a bounded number of results, and that the database is dense (*i.e.*, all possible values occur in the database).

Our attacks differ from the attacks described above in assumptions as well as target. In contrast to existing

attacks, our attack requires only a single query to be issued by the user, followed by $O(\log |D|)$ replays (which, concretely, is often less than 10 in number; §4). Our attack also makes no assumptions about the query distribution. On the other hand, unlike the aforementioned works, our attack requires the ability to inject and sometimes replay queries, though we demonstrate realistic scenarios in which this can be achieved (§2.2). Another difference is that the aforementioned attacks reconstruct the database using range queries, but not individual query keywords; we reconstruct queries, but do not target the overall database. However, we note that reconstruction follows as a direct consequence of our attack, where the original counts for each keyword could be determined if queries for all possible keywords are issued.

In concurrent work, Blackstone *et al.* [71] also propose a suite of volume-based attacks, some of which passively analyze the volume of query results based on some known data (similar to prior work), while two additional attacks rely on injecting files into the database, similar to ours. In particular, their file injection attacks are conceptually similar to our base attack in §3.1. The primary difference is that our attacks leverage query replay—we study the real behavior of many applications, and crucially, we find automatic query replay to be a common property; by leveraging this property, we are able to substantially improve the efficiency of our attacks. The attacks of Blackstone *et al.* do not require queries to be replayed. As a consequence, however, their attacks rely on an alternate set of assumptions. First, they require the adversary to know the baseline volumes for all keywords in the dictionary, before the attack can be launched. Second, for correctness, their binary search based attack requires the targeted keyword to have a unique volume in the baseline volumes. Our attacks do not have such requirements, and our algorithm allows us to prune the search space faster, drastically decreasing the overall duration of the attack. We also describe multiple extensions to the attack, including settings where the results are padded (§3.3) or noisy (§3.4).

7. Conclusion

We demonstrated a generic attack on encrypted databases that only leverages result size leakage. We showed that our attack can reconstruct queries in a range of realistic settings, weakening the security of these systems. Our attack is resistant to various mitigation strategies, and can reconstruct sensitive information even in situations where the result volumes are padded, the volume measurement is noisy, or the client application lacks the ability to replay queries. We showed the effectiveness of our attack via both theoretical bounds and an empirical evaluation, including a demonstration on the Gmail web application.

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Appendix A. Extensions for conjunctive queries

In this section, we describe extensions to our base attack for identifying keywords in conjunctive queries. The extensions are based on attacks described by Zhang *et al.* [30]. Zhang *et al.* consider powerful attackers who can observe file access patterns and thereby uniquely identify documents in the result set. Instead, we adapt the attacks for our setting in which the attacker observes nothing more than the size of the result set. We present two attacks—the first optimizes the number of required replays while the second reduces the number of files injected.

A.1. Reducing the number of required replays

Zhang *et al.* [30] present a general attack for conjunctive queries with d keywords. The attacker injects n files into the database, each containing L randomly chosen keywords from the dictionary D . They claim that for properly chosen n and L , the intersection of the returned files will contain exactly the d queried keywords and no others with a very large probability. The authors prove the claim for $L = \frac{1}{2}^{1/d} |D|$, and $n = (2 + \epsilon)d \log |D|$ (where $\epsilon > 0$) and show that the probability of success in this case is $e^{(-1/|D|)^{\epsilon/4}}$.

We extend the above attack as follows. The attacker creates the n files as before, but injects 2^i copies of the i -th file into the database (for $i \in [0, n - 1]$). The number of files returned is thus sufficient to uniquely identify the exact subset of files whose copies were returned in the result.

The attack only requires a single replay of the query, but the total number of files injected by the attacker in this case is equal to $2^0 + 2^1 + \dots + 2^{n-1} \approx 2^n = |D|^{(2+\epsilon)d}$. The attack is thus more suited for situations with small dictionaries.

A.2. Reducing the number of files injected

Zhang *et al.* also present an adaptive attack for conjunctive queries with d keywords, which reduces the number of files the attacker needs to inject. The core idea is

to first perform a binary search in order to identify the lexicographically largest keyword w in the query. Once w is identified, the attacker performs another binary search to identify the next keyword in the query, but with w present in all the injected files. The attacker proceeds in this manner until all the keywords are identified.

Specifically, the attacker orders all keywords in the dictionary lexicographically, and then injects a single file containing the first $|D|/2$ keywords. If the size of the result set increases by one (*i.e.*, the response includes the injected file), then he repeats the attack by injecting another file containing the first $|D|/4$ keywords; on the other hand, if the response does not include the file, then he injects a file containing the first $3|D|/4$ keywords instead. The attacker repeats the process $\log |D|$ times, until the first (lexicographically largest) keyword is identified. The attack applies straightforwardly in our setting.

For this variant of the attack, both the number of required replays and the total number of files injected are equal to $d \log |D|$. Compared to the attack in previous section, this variant drastically reduces the number of files that need to be injected, but also increases the number of required replays.