

9/3/15 Privilege Separation

Scribe: Christie Dierk

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1 Introduction

Privilege separation separate system into modules, each with their privilege

Least privilege give a component the smallest amount of privilege

Examples:

- browsers
- android permissions
- OS process isolation
- wireshark (network packet parser)
- SSH server
 - handshake component: password, keys
 - bytestream component: parses bytestreams (vulnerable to buffer overflows)
- Virtual Machines

How can you evaluate security improvement? (very roughly)

- evaluate how many known vulnerabilities are mitigated
- amount of code in trusted base (less is better)

2 Chromium browser's security architecture

Two modules


1. browser kernel (**BK**): user privilege
 - interacts with OS (FS - password, files, I/O, etc)
2. rendering engine (**RE**): (web) restricted privilege
 - no interaction with OS

Goal if **RE** gets compromised, **RE** cannot get access to OS and **BK** is not compromised

Challenge compatibility

2.1 Threat Model


Chromium assumes the following:



Goals Should not compromise **BK** or gain access to OS

- attacker cannot install persistent malware
- attacker cannot monitor user keystrokes
- attacker cannot read from FS (file system)

2.2 Architecture




2.2.1 Rendering Engine

RE only allowed to interact with **BK** API

RE contains complexity of browser code

- parses HTML
- builds DOM
- runs JavaScript on DOM
- bitmap
- same-origin policy (isolates sites from each other)
 - origin** : scheme (http, https, file) + hostname + port




1. Each site is associated with resources
 - cookies, data, JavaScript
2. Each resource is associated with an origin (url)
3. Each script runs only on resources with same origin

Same-origin policy is a form of privilege separation!

RE implements same-origin policy

2.2.2 Browser Kernel

- cookie DB
- password DB
- window management
- network stack
- download manager



2.3 Attacks Not Prevented

- Phishing
- origin isolation → **RE** takes care of same origin
- web site vulnerabilities (XSS, CSRF)

2.4 Evaluation

- less code runs with user privilege compared to monolithic browser
- 67% of of vulnerabilities were in **RE**
 - 38 out of 87 (stopped by privilege separation)
 - * 70% of **RE** vulnerabilities that gain full control