The Joe-E Language Specification (draft)

Adrian Mettler       David Wagner
{amettler,daw}@cs.berkeley.edu

December 22, 2006

Disclaimer: This is a draft version of the Joe-E specification, and is subject to change. Sections 6 - 8 mention some (but not all) of the aspects of the Joe-E language that are future work or current works in progress.

1 Introduction

We describe the Joe-E language, a capability-based subset of Java intended to make it easier to build secure systems. The goal of object capability languages is to support the Principle of Least Authority (POLA), so that each object naturally receives the least privilege (i.e., least authority) needed to do its job. Thus, we hope that Joe-E will support secure programming while remaining familiar to Java programmers everywhere.

2 Goals

We have several goals for the Joe-E language:

- **Be familiar to Java programmers.** To minimize the barriers to adoption of Joe-E, the syntax and semantics of Joe-E should be familiar to Java programmers. We also want Joe-E programmers to be able to use all of their existing tools for editing, compiling, executing, debugging, profiling, and reasoning about Java code.
  
  We accomplish this by defining Joe-E as a subset of Java. In general:

  *Subsetting Principle:* Any valid Joe-E program should also be a valid Java program, with identical semantics.

  This preserves the semantics Java programmers will expect, which are critical to keeping the adoption costs manageable. Also, it means all of today’s Java tools (IDEs, debuggers, profilers, static analyzers, theorem provers, etc.) will apply to Joe-E code.

  In this document, we define the Joe-E language by specifying constraints that will be verified by a Joe-E verifier. These checks may be performed at the source level, or possibly upon bytecodes produced by a compliant compiler.

- **Include as much of Java as possible.** Some Java constructs must be omitted from Joe-E, because they are incompatible with capability programming. However, we ideally want to retain as much of Java’s expressiveness as possible.

  *Maximal Subset Principle:* Choose the largest subset of Java that is compatible with secure capability programming. Forbid only language constructs that render capability-style programming or reasoning impossible or error-prone.
Thus, Joe-E will permit construction of secure programs, but it will not guarantee that programs in this subset will be secure.

- **Enable capability-style reasoning about Joe-E code.** To ensure that objects receive the least authority needed, the language must allow capability-style reasoning. Capability-style reasoning involves thinking about the directed graph of object references: if object $O$ has a reference to $O'$, then we draw an edge $O \rightarrow O'$ in the graph. To characterize how $O$ can causally affect the outside world (its authority), we examine the set of capabilities that $O$ might obtain. An upper bound for this set is the bidirectional transitive closure of this graph, i.e., the set of objects reachable from $O$ via backward and forward edges in the reference graph. If the code is constructed appropriately, it is often possible to improve upon this approximation by verifying that the program semantics for some methods prevent the transitive closure worst-case from occurring; it should be easy to write code like this (e.g., facets), and it should be easy to verify the correctness of this code through purely local reasoning.

  Note that this style of reasoning assumes that references are unforgeable and that references are the only thing that convey authority—in particular, that there is no ambient authority.

- **Unforgeable references.** It must be impossible to manufacture a reference to an arbitrary object. Java's memory-safety ensures that objects can only obtain references through specific controlled mechanisms. Specifically, references held by an object $O$ can originate only in the following ways.

  1. **Endowment:** When $O$ is instantiated, it receives as its birthright any references passed to its constructor and (if it is a non-static inner class) anything visible as part of its lexical scope (including a reference to itself, via `this`);

  2. **Parenthood:** When $O$ creates a new object, it receives a reference to that object.

  3. **Introduction:** References can be introduced to an object in a variety of ways, namely:

     (a) By field access: If $O$ has a reference to $O'$, then $O$ can obtain any references stored in the accessible fields of $O'$.

     (b) By field mutation: If $O$ has a field accessible to another object, $O$ receives any references stored into this field by that object.

     (c) By invoking: When $O$ calls a method on some other object, $O$ receives any reference returned or thrown by that method.

     (d) By being invoked: When a method is called on $O$, $O$ receives any references passed as the arguments to this method call.

- **No ambient authority.** A precondition for capability-style reasoning is that the only way for an object $O$ to affect the outside world is through the references it possesses. To ensure least authority and support capability-style reasoning, the references that $O$ possesses should be limited by lexical scoping rules: e.g., limited to its fields, with no “global variables” allowed. For instance, `java.lang.System.out` violates this principle, because it is available to every object and allows causally affecting the outside world.

  Avoiding ambient authority is important for POLA. It should be easy to limit the amount of authority given to an object to only those capabilities necessary to perform its function, and to do so in a way that is foolproof and easy for an human auditor to recognize. In particular, the rule should be that no object receives a capability unless it has been explicitly granted that capability in one of the ways described above. Authority-bearing variables that are defined in a location distant from some code that can use them should be avoided, because they violate this rule. In addition to this static (code-based) constraint, sharing of state between objects associated with different flows of control or protection domains should be avoided as much as possible, even if they share some source code. In general, since ambient authority is available to all objects, ambient authority is incompatible with POLA and must be avoided at all costs.
• **Support local reasoning about Joe-E programs.** A closely related goal is that it should be possible to reason about Joe-E programs through only local analysis. Suppose we are given a Joe-E program, consisting of many objects. If we are given the code to one object $O$, we would like to be able to reason about the capabilities that $O$ might have access to and might pass on to others. It should be possible to reason about this just by looking at the code of $O$ and the objects it interacts with (possibly continuing transitively as far as is needed).

For instance, suppose method $C.m()$ creates a new object $T$. If $T$ never escapes from the method, then we would like to be able to conclude that no other object can affect $T$. Moreover, we would like to be able to verify, just by looking at the code of the class $C$, that $T$ cannot escape. This is an example of local reasoning, a kind of reasoning about composition, and the language should support this kind of reasoning. Such reasoning might assume nothing about the rest of the program, other than that it is valid Joe-E code; the benefit is that a programmer does not have to keep the entire program or system in his head in order to reason about local properties of his code.

As another important example of this, it must be possible (preferably with very little effort) to bound the capabilities granted to any object $O$. This should be possible even when the code of object $O$ has not been analyzed; typically, it is done by reasoning about the capabilities that are passed to $O$ when it is created and thereafter. This task allows for the creation of systems that are secure in the face of unknown, possibly adversarial code.

• **Unforgeable types.** If we invoke a method on object $O$, we may be relying on it to behave as we expect. Therefore, we may need some way to verify that $O$ is the correct entity before we invoke method calls on it. In the E language, this is accomplished with guards, auditors, and introspection; in Joe-E, we use types. Some classes are part of the base system and hence trustworthy; other classes are provided by the programmer and thus trusted. Joe-E programs should be able to check that the type of $O$ is the expected one before invoking method calls on $O$. This ability is provided by Java’s type system.

Without this feature, masquerading attacks are a serious risk. Suppose that method $m()$ accepts an object $O$ and uses it to perform various operations. If $m()$ does not validate the type of $O$, then an attacker might be able to call $m()$ and pass a malicious object $O_M$. For instance, $O_M$ might undetectably emulate the expected behavior while simultaneously observing information that $m()$ passes to its argument, leaking these secrets back to the attacker. Or, $O_M$ might behave in unexpected ways: e.g., if $m()$ expects its argument to behave like an `Integer`, then $m()$ might be surprised if two attempts to read its contents return different results (this can lead to TOCTTOU attacks, for instance). It is essential for there to be a way to avoid this kind of masquerade attack.

• **Permit use of capability discipline.** Capability discipline refers to a set of guidelines for writing programs in a way that maximizes the chances that the program will be secure and respect POLA. Suppose I want to give Alice access to a file on the filesystem. I can give her a reference to a `File` object $F$. Of course, in doing so, I have given Alice all of the authority that can be invoked through the interface of this object. If every `File` object has a `formatHardDrive()` method that erases the entire hard disk, then in giving Alice access to $F$, I have also given her the ability to re-format the hard disk, a violation of POLA. In this case, we say that $F$ fails to respect capability discipline.

It is a goal of Joe-E that it should be natural and easy to build classes that respect capability discipline. It is not a goal of Joe-E to somehow guarantee that every Joe-E class will respect capability discipline; capability discipline requires knowledge of application semantics and the desired security policy, and hence cannot be enforced at the language level.

Our general stance in defining Joe-E is include everything that is not outright incompatible with capability-style reasoning (see the Maximal Subsetting Principle). One can identify many syntactic source code patterns that are suspicious and often correspond to violation of capability discipline (e.g., `public` fields), but that are not inherently incompatible with security. We do not attempt to forbid such syntax in the Joe-E language. One might build a separate “capability-style lint” to check for...
suspect language constructs that are risky but not necessarily incompatible with capability reasoning; however, such considerations are out of scope for this document.

- **Provide a set of capability-friendly base classes.** Joe-E should provide a set of library classes that enable programming in the capability style. At a minimum, this collection should contain the minimum necessary to build useful Joe-E programs. These base classes should respect capability discipline and should be constructed to maximize the likelihood that programs built using the base classes will respect POLA and will be secure.

## 3 Definitions

The Joe-E Language is a subset of the Java source language as defined in the Java Language Specification, 3rd Edition.

### 3.1 Power and Tokens

The Joe-E language is designed to facilitate reasoning about a conservative approximation to authority that we denote power. In order to simplify reasoning, we consider the object identity only of a specific subclass of objects we call tokens, and conservatively assume that any authority made available from the object identity of other objects is available everywhere in the program.

A class is a token class if it is the class org.joe.e.Token or any of its subclasses. An instance of any such class is a token.

### 3.2 The Overlay Type System

Joe-E defines interfaces with no members that are used as inherited annotations on Java classes. These are called marker interfaces and are used to indicate properties of importance to the Joe-E language and verifier. In many cases, it would be appropriate for classes in the standard Java libraries to implement these interfaces. However, we cannot modify the existing Java class libraries. Instead, Joe-E defines an extended type system consisting of additional interface-implementation relationships overlaid on top of the Java type system.

The base type system is the type system defined by the Java language; it defines certain subtyping relationships. In addition, Joe-E provides a way to declare a Java library class to honorarily implement a specified interface, and this defines some additional subtyping relationships. The overlay type system is defined as the union of the subtyping relationships from these two sources, along with their transitive closure. Note that since honorary components of the type system only add interfaces to classes, the overlay type system will be a consistent, “legal” typing relation (no circular subtyping, etc).

All type checking performed as part of the standard Java compilation process and JVM runtime enforcement uses the base type system, as required to preserve Java semantics. However, Joe-E’s additional restrictions are defined in terms of the overlay type system.

### 3.3 Compliance and Deeming

Each marker interface is associated with a set of restrictions that must hold for all classes implementing that interface. The obligation to satisfy these restrictions is automatically inherited by any subclasses of the class declared to implement the interface, as these subclasses also implement the associated interface. The inheritance of restrictions is necessary to conclude that any object assignable to a variable of some type fulfills that type’s restrictions.

These restrictions are automatically checked as described in Section 4; the decision procedure used is sound but not complete. Because there will be classes that satisfy the contracts associated with a marker interface, but which cannot be automatically verified to do so, a Joe-E implementation may deem certain classes to satisfy the interface, exempting them from automated verification. Such deemings must be made
with care, and are restricted to classes in the Java and Joe-E libraries that have been manually verified
to satisfy the deemed interfaces. Note that being deemed to implement an interface is distinct from being
declared to implement that interface honorarily. Neither implies the other: A class can explicitly implement
an interface but not be automatically verifiable to meet its contract and thus require deeming. On the
other hand, a class that implements an interface honorarily might automatically be verified to satisfy its
requirements.

Each class considered to satisfy a marker interface without requiring automatic verification must be
individually deemed to implement that interface; deeming decisions are not automatically inherited. This is
because a subclass may fail to meet some obligations that its superclass was manually verified to maintain.

The following invariants will hold for the set of honorary interface implementations and deemings made
in a Joe-E implementation:

1. If a class \( C \) honorarily implements an interface \( I \), and class \( D \) extends \( C \), \( D \) must implement \( I \) in the
base type system if possible (i.e. unless \( D \) is a class from the Java library). If \( D \) is a class from the
Java library, \( D \) must be explicitly declared to implement \( I \) honorarily.

2. If a class \( C \) is deemed to implement an interface \( I \), and class \( D \) extends \( C \), then \( D \) must be deemed to
implement \( I \).

### 3.4 Immutable Types

A type \( T \) is **immutable** if and only if it implements the marker interface `org.joe.e.Immutable` according
to the overlay type system. The (empty) `org.joe.e.Immutable` interface must be provided by the Joe-E
implementation.

The intuition behind an immutable object is that such an object cannot be changed (mutated) in any
observable way, nor can any objects reachable by following the fields of the immutable object. The contents
of an immutable objects’ fields and any objects reachable from an immutable object must not change once
the object is constructed. With the exception of library classes explicitly deemed to implement `Immutable`,
an immutable class must satisfy additional linguistic restrictions enforced by the verifier (§4.3) to ensure this
property. Library classes that cannot be automatically verified and are deemed immutable must be carefully
manually verified to expose no possibility for modification of their contents.

### 3.5 Powerless Types

A type \( T \) is **powerless** if and only if it implements the marker interface `org.joe.e.Powerless` according to the
overlay type system. The `org.joe.e.Powerless` interface must be provided by the Joe-E implementation,
and it must be declared to extend the `org.joe.e.Immutable` interface. This ensures that every powerless
type is also immutable (but not necessarily vice versa). A **powerful** type is one that is not powerless.

A Joe-E implementation must ensure that the following types honorarily implement `org.joe.e.Powerless`:

- the primitive scalar types (`boolean`, `byte`, `short`, `int`, `long`, `char`, `float`, and `double`)
- `java.lang.Throwable`
- `java.lang.Enum`.

(These types are designated powerless using the honorary mechanism, since they cannot be declared to
implement this interface explicitly.)

A Joe-E implementation may declare specific additional types from the standard Java libraries and from
the Joe-E library to implement `org.joe.e.Powerless`, so long as their behavior can be verified (manually,
in the case of classes deemed `Powerless`) to be that of a transitively immutable object that does not reveal
the identity of any tokens.

**Rationale:** A powerless object conveys no inherent or identity-based power and thus can be excluded from
the object reference graph without loss of soundness. Any authority granted to the holder of the object
is solely a product of the data it contains; this authority could be “forged” by anyone with knowledge of
this data and thus does not reflect a type of capability that can be guarded by our system. (Note that
cryptographic keys fall into this category; our system is not able to reason about cryptography.) Any
authority vested in the object identity of a non-Token object is not modeled in our view of authority and is
conservatively assumed to be available to anyone.

The **Powerless** interface can be used to assert that all instances of a user class are powerless. This
assertion is checked at compile time by the Joe-E verifier, as described in Section 4.3.

An immutable object contains no mutable state and has no references to mutable state. A reference
to an immutable object cannot be used to enact any state change visible to another entity that holds a
reference of the same object. An immutable object conveys no power except for the unforgeable identity of
any tokens it may contain. This potential form of power distinguishes a powerless object from one that is
merely immutable. (By definition, all powerless objects are also immutable.) In practice, most immutable
objects are likely to also be powerless. The exceptions are tokens and objects containing tokens.

### 3.6 Selfless Types

A type $T$ is **selfless** if and only if it implements the marker interface `org.joe.e.Selfless` in the overlay
type system. The `org.joe.e.Selfless` interface must be provided by the Joe-E implementation and must
declare a `hashCode()` method.

A Joe-E implementation may declare specific types from the standard Java libraries and from the Joe-E
library to implement `org.joe.e.Selfless`. Such classes must not inherit `Object`’s `hashCode()` method; it
must be overridden either in the class itself or in some parent class. The behavior of an instance of the class
must be verified (manually, in the case of classes deemed **Selfless**) to conceal object identity.

**Rationale:** An instance of a selfless type does not have visible object identity. Any two instances of the
same record type that hold the same contents are indistinguishable. A (shallow) clone of any selfless object
will thus be indistinguishable from the original. One requirement for this condition to hold is that the selfless
object be shallowly immutable: selfless objects cannot be allowed to change, otherwise the indistinguishability
between instances is lost if one of them is changed. The contents of its fields do not have this restriction,
however, as any change made to them would affect all objects that reference them.

This is useful for ensuring that serialization and deserialization of objects is an identity operation. A
selfless object can be serialized without having to worry about maintaining its identity. We anticipate that
this will make serialization easier to perform using unprivileged code. The requirement that `hashCode()`
be overridden is included to allow for hash codes to be taken when the concrete type is not known, but is
known to provide a deterministic hash code because it is selfless.

The **Selfless** interface can be used to assert that all instances of a user class can be considered selfless.
This assertion is checked at compile time by the Joe-E verifier, as described in Section 4.4. Also see the
following section on **Equatable**.

### 3.7 Equatable Types

A type $T$ is **equatable** if and only if it implements the marker interface `org.joe.e.Equatable` in the overlay
type system. The (empty) `org.joe.e.Equatable` interface must be provided by the Joe-E implementation.

An instance of an equatable type allows comparison with another object using the `==` and `!=` operators.
In the case of object types, this is pointer comparison, which is disallowed unless one of the objects being
compared is equatable or null.

The following types are honorarily declared to implement `org.joe.e.Equatable`:

- the primitive scalar types (`boolean`, `byte`, `short`, `int`, `long`, `char`, `float`, and `double`)
- all array types
- `java.lang.Enum`
Rationale: Primitive types are equatable because they have no object identity to expose; == simply compares their scalar values. Arrays are equatable because the equals() method on arrays already does a pointer-identity comparison. Enumerations, which are the only types that Java allows to extend Enum, are not constructed like ordinary objects; instead a fixed number of instances are constructed when the class is initialized and are made available to everyone as static members. Enum's implementation of equals() is final and is equivalent to ==, so making the class equatable is harmless, and only serves to make enumerations more convenient to use.

The Equatable interface can be used to allow pointer equality comparisons on objects of a type (See §4.7). This prevents this type or any of its subtypes from being declared selfless (§4.4).

4 Restrictions on Joe-E classes

4.1 Threads
For now, we are restricting Joe-E to the single-threaded subset of Java.
Rationale: Unrestricted synchronization could allow a set of threads otherwise effectively isolated from the outside world to communicate sensitive information outside its sphere of isolation with relative ease using lock/unlock operations. In the absence of such primitives, one can provide stricter guarantees of confinement. In addition, such primitives expose several additional sources of nondeterminism to which we would have to restrict access.

4.2 Static Fields
All static fields must be declared final and be of a powerless type. (This is automatically the case for enumerations, since java.lang.Enum is honorarily Powerless.)

Rationale: A reference to an object of any powerful type may convey authority. A mutable field conveys the authority to change its value. A public static variable in either of these categories provides ambient authority. While less obvious, this reasoning also applies to private static fields. Since any piece of code can create an object of the type in question, the object thus created has privileged access to the private static state. For the static state to have a reason for being declared non-final, there must be a way for it to be modified. Similarly, if it is of a powerful type, in nearly all cases, a newly-created object of this type thus grants authority to utilize this capability. Since anyone can instantiate the object, this is a likely source of ambient authority which could be difficult to spot if non-powerless static fields were allowed. It should also be mentioned that simple alternatives to the use of static fields nearly always exist.

4.3 Powerless and Immutable
If a class C implements org.joe.e.Powerless in the overlay type system, at least one of the following must be true:

- every instance field f of C is both declared final and of a powerless type.
- C is a library class explicitly deemed to implement org.joe.e.Powerless.

In addition, C cannot be a subclass of org.joe.e.Token. Any violation of either of these constraints is a verification-time error. The org.joe.e.Token class must be provided by the Joe-E implementation, and neither org.joe.e.Token itself nor its sole superclass java.lang.Object may implement org.joe.e.Powerless.

If a class C implements org.joe.e.Immutable in the overlay type system, at least one of the following must be true:

- every instance field f of C is both declared final and of an immutable type.
- C is a library class explicitly deemed to implement org.joe.e.Immutable.
‘Every instance field of \( C \) includes fields of any superclasses (whether accessible to \( C \) or not; this includes, for instance, all private fields of all superclasses). If \( C \) is an inner class, then this includes all fields of its lexically enclosing classes. Any violation of the above constraints is a verification-time error.

4.4 Selfless

The following restrictions are imposed on classes that implement \texttt{Selfless}:

- All instance fields must be \texttt{final}.
- The class must not be equatable.
- The object identity of instances of the class must not be visible. This can be satisfied by one of:
  1. \( C \)’s superclass is a selfless type.
  2. \( C \)’s superclass is \texttt{java.lang.Object}, \( C \) overrides \texttt{equals()}, and \( C \) doesn’t call \texttt{super.equals()}.

Note that no explicit checks are necessary to guarantee that a Selfless class provides a safe \texttt{toString()} implementation, just the general checks to ensure that interfaces are satisfied with methods that are not banned via taming.

4.5 Final Fields

Java guarantees that the final fields of an object are only uninitialized while the constructor for that object is being executed, and have all been initialized when the constructor exits. However, the constructor can call arbitrary methods during its execution, making its fields visible in an uninitialized state to those methods. In these methods (possibly from other classes) default values that may later change are visible for the object’s final fields. This can allow for time-of-check-to-time-of-use attacks as the values of these fields can be observed to change. In order for the final qualifier on fields to ensure that the field value will not change, allowing Joe-E programs to trust in the finality of fields, Joe-E prevents any code other than the constructor itself from viewing an object in a partially-constructed state. This is accomplished by placing the following restrictions on constructors, to ensure that a reference to the partially-constructed object cannot escape during execution of the constructor:

- A constructor can’t call any instance methods on the object being constructed. These are calls that resolve to instance methods (defined or inherited) that are invoked implicitly or explicitly on \texttt{this}.
- A constructor cannot call the constructor of any non-static inner class of itself, i.e. any non-static member class that is defined within it or any of its superclasses. (Non-static inner class instances have a reference to their containing object and thus its fields; this restriction ensures that no code from such an inner class executes during construction.)
- A constructor can’t make any references to \texttt{this}, except as a way to name fields (e.g., a use or definition of the field \( f \) using the expression \texttt{this.f} is permitted). This restriction ensures that \texttt{this} cannot become aliased.

4.6 Throwables

Note that making \texttt{java.lang.Throwable} a powerless type ensures that no \texttt{Throwable} can contain any powerful capabilities or any object of type \texttt{org.joe.e.Token} or any of its sub- or superclasses.

Rationale: Exceptions can implicitly communicate capabilities across security boundaries. This propagation can be hard to reason about, because the exceptional flow might not be immediately apparent in the source code. To see how this can cause unpleasant surprises, suppose Alice calls Bob. Bob has some special capability that she lacks, and Bob wants to avoid leaking this to her. At some point, Bob might need to
invoke Chuck to perform some operation, passing this capability to Chuck. If (unbeknownst to Bob) Chuck can throw an exception that Bob doesn’t catch, this exception might propagate to Alice. If this exception contains Bob’s precious capability, this might cause Bob’s capability to leak to Alice, against Bob’s wishes.

Example:

class E extends RuntimeException {
    public Object obj;
    public E(Object o) { obj = o; }
}
class Bob {
    // a capability, intended to be closely held
    private Capability cap;
    ...
    void m() {
        new Chuck().f(cap);
    }
}
class Chuck {
    void f(Capability cap) {
        ... do some work ...
        throw new E(cap);
    }
}
class Alice {
    void attack() {
        Bob bob = ...;
        try {
            bob.m();
        } catch (E e) {
            Capability stolenCap = (Capability) e.obj;
            doSomethingEvil(stolenCap);
        }
    }
}

The problem is that it is hard to tell, just by looking at the code of Bob, that Bob’s private capability can leak to the caller of m(). This is a barrier to local reasoning about the flow of capabilities. By requiring that all throwables be powerless, we ensure that exceptions cannot convey authority or communicate capabilities across security boundaries.

4.7 Object Identity

The == and != operators can only be applied to:

- two values of primitive type (this includes the case where one of these values is a boxed type that will be auto-unboxed);
- any object being compared with null; or
- two references, one or more of which is declared to be of a type that implements org.joe.e.Equatable in the overlay type system.

Any other use of == or != is a compile-time error.
Rationale: The ability to uniquely identify an immutable object independent of the value that it contains can imbue an object that otherwise contains “just data” with a form of authority. For example, a locked box class can recognize whether it has been supplied the right key by keeping a private reference to the key object used only to test if a supplied key is the same one. An object used for this purpose must be an instance of org.joe.e.Token or one of its subclasses. A reference to an enumeration type does not convey any authority, not even by its identity, since all such objects are global, universally exported via static fields. For such values, == and its “safer” possibly-selfless alternative, equals(), are equivalent.

4.8 Parameterized Types

Since the Java language does not guarantee the type-safety of bounds on parameterized types, we provide no special support in the verification framework for recognizing fields that are bound by a parameterized type. All type parameters in Joe-E source code are treated as if they are of Java’s Object type, and thus are treated equivalently to their compiled version, after type erasure.

4.9 Library Protection

Optional: A Joe-E implementation may impose restrictions to ensure that Joe-E user code does not declare itself to be a member of a library package. These checks are required if any user code is loaded using the same classloader as any library code not protected by the classloader (e.g. by package sealing).

These checks are not required for a standard Java environment, at least not for Java classpath code. The standard classpath libraries are loaded by the native primordial class loader, while all user code is loaded with a Java-language class loader that extends java.lang.ClassLoader. These checks may be necessitated if a Joe-E implementation uses the same classloader for Joe-E user code and the Joe-E library.

4.10 Native Methods

Native methods are forbidden.
Rationale: Native methods bypass the memory- and type-safety checks of the Java language that are necessary to ensure the unforgeability of capabilities. Therefore, they are forbidden.

5 Malicious bytecode

This specification requires that Joe-E programs be written in source form, compiled using a Java compiler, passed through the Joe-E verifier, and then executed with a JVM. In particular, we require that every classfile be produced by a correctly operating Java compiler; no part of a Joe-E program is permitted to contain bytecode obtained from untrusted sources or generated by hand.
Rationale: Java compilers perform many checks that are not duplicated by the JVM. These checks include\(^1\): exception safety; access control for inner classes; isolation of user code from classpath code; in-range checks for short types. Since these checks are performed only by the compiler, malicious bytecode can evade these checks. This means that if any part of the program includes bytecode not produced by a legitimate Java compiler, Joe-E programmers will be unable to rely upon exception safety, access control for inner classes, etc.

In principle, one could duplicate all these checks in the Joe-E verifier, and then raw bytecode would not need to be forbidden since programmers could rely upon these language features even in the presence of malicious bytecode. However, the benefit of adding this into the verifier seems to be questionable given the costs, so we omit this (for now, anyway).

\(^1\)See Appendix A for further discussion.
6 Taming

This is left for later.

Reminder: We will need to suppress java.lang.Object.hashCode() and any other hashCode() implementations that reveal object identity. We will need to tame java.lang.Throwable to ensure it meets the semantics of a powerless class, since Section 3.5 requires it to be honorarily powerless.

We may also need to tame some existing exception classes defined in the standard Java libraries and then explicitly deem them to implement org.joe.e.Powerless, so that their behavior will indeed be consistent with what one would expect of a powerless type (since all throwables are required to be powerless).

One important issue to remember concerning taming is that Java’s interface implementation checks are unaware of taming decisions. This can be a problem when one calls the method on an object that is known only to belong to the interface. In this case, the verifier is only able to resolve the method to the interface rather than a concrete implementation, and so it will be unable to tell if the concrete implementation is supposed to be tamed away. In order to prevent a loss of soundness in this case while still allowing methods to be called in this manner, the verifier must itself check that classes implement interfaces correctly. It must ensure that the requirements of the interfaces implemented by a class are satisfied by methods that aren’t banned by the taming decisions. The current implementation performs this check.

Another issue: things get complicated if one tries to restrict the use of the zero-argument constructor of a non-final class that is not tamed away outright, as the constructor can be called implicitly. The current implementation makes the assumption that this will not happen, i.e. that no class will be tamed but will have its void constructor restricted.

7 Work in Progress

Further documentation will be forthcoming about the taming framework and philosophy as it is developed, as well as documentation on taming decisions.

This specification currently does not prevent the reading of an uninitialized value for a static final field; this protection may be provided in the future.

If any source of nondeterminism is considered a capability, one can also reason that any method called on an immutable object (provided it doesn’t include an authority-bearing argument) will deterministically return the same result every time it is invoked. Unfortunately, the unmodified Java language provides ambient access to nondeterminism via virtual machine errors which can be caught by any class. In particular, a class can behave nondeterministically based on the amount of memory available by keeping track of how much memory it must allocate before it receives and recovers from an out-of-memory error. In order to consider nondeterminism a capability, virtual machine nondeterminism must be hidden from objects not granted the authority to see it.

8 Open Questions

Additional issues under consideration:

• Synchronized on public static powerless objects: the state of the lock is part of the state of an object. It can be used to communicate information between two otherwise disconnected classes, an overt channel. Not an issue now, since we’re in the single-threaded subset of Java, but remember to deal with this, when we come to threaded code.

• Do we need to forbid expressions like e.class, where e is any expr? I think the answer depends on what taming decisions we make for class Class, but let’s remember this for later when we look at taming.
A Issues with malicious bytecode

If we were to accept (possibly maliciously constructed) bytecode from an unknown source and link it into our program (after checking that it is accepted by the Joe-E verifier), there would be many pitfalls to worry about. These include:

- Java’s visibility modifiers (private, protected, etc.) can be subverted in the presence of inner classes. The Java compiler inserts synthetic getter/setter methods; while the compiler checks that Java source cannot use these synthetic methods, the JVM does not, so malicious bytecode could exploit them to gain access to private state. Consequently, Java programmers cannot count on visibility modifiers on inner classes, in the presence of malicious bytecode.

  Joe-E code compiled from source can ensure that these protections are enforced. A more sophisticated implementation of the Joe-E verifier would be able to make the same guarantees for arbitrary bytecode. Extension of the verifier to handle arbitrary bytecode is nontrivial but quite feasible, and may be considered for a version subsequent to the first prototype.

- Exception-safety can be subverted in the presence of malicious code. The Java compiler checks a property that one might call exception-safety: if the program calls a method \texttt{m()}, and if \texttt{m()} terminates abruptly, it can only do so with an exception that is (1) (a subclass of) a class declared in \texttt{m()}’s clause; (2) (a subclass of) a \texttt{RuntimeException}; or, (3) (a subclass of) an \texttt{Error}. This property is enforced only by the Java compiler, and not by the JVM. Consequently, maliciously constructed Java bytecode can throw checked exceptions not declared in its \texttt{throws} clause.

  Just as in Java, Joe-E programmers cannot rely on exception-safety in the presence of malicious bytecode. While it would be possible to re-implement the exception-safety checks in the Joe-E verifier, it seems this would require more effort than it is worth.

- Final fields can be assigned to multiple times, in the presence of malicious bytecode. The Java compiler performs so-called “definite assignment” checks to ensure that every final field is assigned to exactly once by the time the constructor exits, and is never assigned after that point. This check is not necessarily duplicated by the JVM; consequently, malicious bytecode might be able to modify final fields, subvert our immutability analysis, and potentially violate other security properties.

- Since generic types are implemented by erasure, malicious bytecode can partially subvert type-checking for type parameters. The correct use of type parameters is only checked at compile time, and then is erased. Consequently, though the JVM does check basic type system, the JVM does not and cannot check that type parameters are used correctly. Further details: http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=997144 (§5).

- It seems the intuitive range limits for short types can possibly be violated by malicious bytecode. Consider the following method:

  
  ```java
  boolean isByte(byte b) {
    return (-128 <= bb) && (bb <= 127);
  }
  ```

  One might naively expect that \texttt{isByte()} can only return true. However, it’s not clear that this is actually guaranteed, in the presence of malicious bytecode. The JVM stores \texttt{byte} values in 32-bit registers, and handles them almost exactly the same way as \texttt{int} values. No range checks are performed. It may be possible for malicious bytecode to pass a full 32-bit value to \texttt{isByte()}, causing the method to return false. Similar risks may apply to \texttt{boolean, byte, short, and char}. We have not yet evaluated this risk. References: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/java-spec-report/message/756?threaded=1 http://archives.java.sun.com/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind9802&L=java-security&P=2691
• It might be possible to subvert some of the access checks for protected members. Let \( x \) be a protected non-static field of class \( C \), and let \( S \) be a subclass of \( C \) from a different package. The Java compiler enforces a special check that \( S \) can access \( \text{obj}.x \) only if \( \text{obj}'s \text{class} \) is in the inheritance subtree rooted at \( S \) (and not, for instance, if \( \text{obj} \) is of class \( C \)). This check is a little bit tricky in the presence of overriding, and there have been reports that malicious bytecode can bypass this check. We haven’t investigated this in any detail. http://www.kestrel.edu/home/people/coglio/ftjp04.pdf

• There may also be some potential danger spots with monitors. What if malicious bytecode fails to follow a stack discipline with its \texttt{monitorenter/monitoret} instructions? What if the bytecode fails to call \texttt{monitorexit} before returning? What a security-critical library acquires a lock and calls our malicious bytecode, which then uses \texttt{monitorexit} to release the library’s lock? It is unclear what may be possible here.

• The \texttt{ACC\_SUPER} bit may allow to subvert the semantics of overridden methods. Suppose class \( C \) defines a method \( m() \), which is overridden by some subclass \( S \). With current Java semantics, holding a reference to \( S \), you aren’t supposed to be able to invoke the body of \( C.m() \) on this object. However, malicious bytecode could reset the \texttt{ACC\_SUPER} bit in its classfile and get access to the hidden method, so that it can get an instance of \( S \) to execute the code specified in \( C.m() \). If \( S \) was relying on overriding to prevent access to \( C \)'s implementation of \( m() \), then malicious bytecode could falsify this assumption.

We make no claims that this is the complete list of pitfalls associated with malicious bytecode. The simplest way to avoid these pitfalls is to compile everything from source using a trusted Java compiler and refrain from accepting raw bytecode from unknown sources; this is exactly what we require when writing Joe-E programs.