Secure State Reconstruction in Differentially Flat Systems Under Sensor Attacks Using SatisfiabilityModulo Theory Solving

Yasser Shoukry, Pierluigi Nuzzo, Nicola Bezzo, Alberto L. Sangiovanni-Vincentelli, and Sanjit A. Seshia andPaulo Tabuada. Secure State Reconstruction in Differentially Flat Systems Under Sensor Attacks Using SatisfiabilityModulo Theory Solving. In Proceedings of the 54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), pp. 3804–3809, December 2015.

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Abstract

We address the problem of estimating the state of a differentially flat system from measurements that may be corrupted by an adversarial attack. In cyber-physical systems, malicious attacks can directly compromise the system's sensors or manipulate the communication between sensors and controllers. We consider attacks that only corrupt a subset of sensor measurements. We show that the possibility of reconstructing the state under such attacks is characterized by a suitable generalization of the notion of s-sparse observability, previously introduced by some of the authors in the linear case. We also extend our previous work on the use of Satisfiability Modulo Theory solvers to estimate the state under sensor attacks to the context of differentially flat systems. The effectiveness of our approach is illustrated on the problem of controlling a quadrotor under sensor attacks.

BibTeX

@inproceedings{shoukry-cdc15,
  author    = {Yasser Shoukry and Pierluigi Nuzzo and Nicola Bezzo and Alberto L. Sangiovanni-Vincentelli and Sanjit A. Seshia and
Paulo Tabuada},
  title     = {Secure State Reconstruction in Differentially Flat Systems Under Sensor Attacks Using Satisfiability
Modulo Theory Solving},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)},
  Year = {2015},
  Month = {December},
  pages = "3804--3809",
  abstract = {We address the problem of estimating the state of a differentially flat system from measurements that may be corrupted by an adversarial attack. In cyber-physical systems, malicious attacks can directly compromise the system's sensors or manipulate the communication between sensors and controllers. 
We consider attacks that only corrupt a subset of sensor measurements. We show that the possibility of reconstructing the state under such attacks is characterized by a suitable generalization of the notion of s-sparse observability, previously introduced by some of the authors in the linear case. We also extend our previous work on the use of Satisfiability Modulo Theory solvers to estimate the state under sensor attacks to the context of differentially flat systems. The effectiveness of our approach is illustrated on the problem of controlling a quadrotor under sensor attacks.},
}